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
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the cover

Sun Tzu wrote *The Art of War* thousands of years ago. He warrants our attention today.

AIR POWER IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

DR. WILLIAM J. OLSON



INTEREST about low-intensity conflict (LIC) is on the rise again in this country. There is a certain faddishness in this interest, an air of *déjà vu*, and an air of unreality. The conceptual interest in limited and sublimated wars in the nuclear age is at least thirty-five-years old, and the significant U.S. government concern about how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare dates back to the Kennedy administration. Literature on the subject, though varying in terminology, is extensive. Indeed, one could argue that there really is nothing new to say on the subject. The principal value of a new terminology is that it provides a way of separating an enduring concern from past doctrinal failure and embarrassment, helps to rekindle interest in an important area, and provides the means to educate a new generation of officials on the ins and outs of low-intensity conflict. As a descriptive instrument, however, it leaves much to be desired, as continual problems with definition in forum after forum so readily demonstrate.¹

Yet, coming to terms with a definition is important, for it forces us to deal with the "messy military and political realities small wars embody and the military and political costs they exact."² It forces us to come to grips with a fundamental contradiction—the importance we assign the topic and our reluctance to come to terms with its implications.

Two major problems exist in trying to define low-intensity conflict. First is the problem of perspective. Like the Theory of Special Relativity, the perception of the phenomenon depends on one's position relative to it. Second, the definition is being forced to include too much, and, as with many such cases, expansion of meaning means dilution or defining nothing at all.

Let us begin with the realization that all our definitions of the spectrum of conflict are subjective and are based on our position relative to the conflict. We define a spectrum of conflict in relation to the wars we fight, placing total war—nuclear war—at the high end of the spectrum.

We define a mid-intensity war, generally, as one confined to the use of conventional arms; but, given the haggling over concepts, it is clear that we are on unsafe ground whenever we try to define low-intensity conflict. It should be obvious that from someone else's perspective—namely, the combatants—any armed struggle, short of war fought for limited purposes, is a total war. For them, at least, the degree of violence and the quantity and quality of arms are not adequate criteria for definition.

The Iran-Iraq War, for example, is a mid-intensity conflict by our standards, measured against the possibility of thermonuclear war with the Soviets. For the Iranians and the Iraqis, however, the war is total, with the fate of both societies on the line. Thus, for them, it is a high-intensity conflict waged with all available resources for the highest stakes.³ Similarly, we should realize, even insurgency situations are high-intensity conflicts for the primary participants (except in situations like Afghanistan where only one participant, the resistance, wages all on the outcome while their opponent—in this case, the Soviets—will survive defeat there). This is more than an academic point, for our perception of a conflict will influence our response to it, and how well or poorly we deal with a "low-intensity conflict," could depend on whether it is someone else's "major war"—which it quite often will be.

The second significant definitional problem arises from the fact that there are so many people trying to reach a definition, and they are trying to include too much in the definition. The problem here arises from using terms such as the *spectrum of conflict*, which links in a linear chain such diverse events as hostage rescue missions and thermonuclear war. This linkage creates immense conceptual problems when one moves from developing a linear definition—to make illustration and discussion easier—to the practicalities of turning such notions into actual responses. It is always difficult to add apples and oranges, and that is what is being done in trying to establish a mechanistic,

linear definition of a spectrum of conflict in which disparate and multifarious events are linked in some artificial whole. In short, there is no way to make a definition consistent.

In addition, the concept of a spectrum of conflict also obscures the disjuncture between what is appropriate in low-intensity conflict and what is suited to medium- or high-intensity conflict. It allows the unspoken assumption that the same force structure and method of conflict used for conflicts "higher" on the spectrum, simply on a reduced scale, are adequate in low-intensity situations. Given U.S. experience and our observations of other's conflicts in recent decades, it should be obvious that this is not the case. What is needed then is a realization that the spectrum of conflict is a semantic convenience and not an analytical or conceptual tool of any fineness; its use not only suggests linkages that obscure reality but also impedes the kind of thinking necessary to deal with the problems at hand.

Next, we should not include hostage rescue missions, relief exercises, and small-scale counterterrorist operations in low-intensity conflict. Properly, these are not conflicts but policing actions, even if they should involve special military forces, and, as such, should be put in a separate category, perhaps labeled as "marginal-military operations." Low-intensity conflict should be reserved for insurgency/counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, we must recognize that the political aspect of these situations demands our predominate attention. Indeed, the definition of LIC should not focus on the military level of conflict but on its political character.

An additional problem is one of threshold—that is, when and at what point does a low-intensity conflict move into the mid-intensity range. From a U.S. perspective, it must be at that point where major U.S. combat elements are involved in a combat capacity using more or less standard U.S. conventional war-fighting doctrine. For the nation receiving U.S. support, it must be at that point that the insur-

gency can field main force units in regular operations with a reasonable chance of success. In terms of Mao's three stages of insurgency, this is the ultimate goal if power cannot be won at a lower stage. It is important to remember, however, that this stage is not an absolute, that it can be reached and then given up if the correlation of forces is unfavorable, and that, for the participants, the war is a *guerre à outrance* regardless of the level of violence.

A final definitional problem, as well as one that plagues all efforts at execution, arises from conflicting bureaucratic interests. One commentator has noted:

The most substantial constraints on America's ability to conduct small wars result from the resistance of the American defense establishment to the very notion of engaging in such conflicts, and from the unsuitability of that establishment for fighting such wars.⁴

This is a problem detailed well by Ambassador Robert Komer in his study of the Vietnam War:

What we did in Vietnam cannot be fully understood unless it is seen as a function of our playing out our military repertoire—doing what we were most capable and experienced at doing. Such institutional constraints as the very way our general purpose forces were trained, equipped, and structured largely dictated our responses.⁵

The problem here is not a lack of will but a tendency for institutions to carry out their functions regardless of changing situations or needs—the playing out of institutional repertoires that are well known and comfortable even if they are no longer effective.

"Underlying American military philosophy," argues Sam Sarkesian, "is the assumption that military formations trained for conventional battle are adequate to engage in low-intensity conflict." In Sarkesian's view, "this 'generalist' attitude prevails throughout the military system. Simply stated, 'common' service training for appropriate military units is considered adequate to respond to almost all contingencies." This is not the case, however. "The fact of the matter is that the highly sociopolitically

sensitive character of low-intensity conflict and force employment require a dimension that is hardly touched in standard military training or professional education."⁶

From this starting point, it is perhaps possible to outline a definition of low-intensity conflict that gives us some operational guidelines. Toward this end, let us assume that low-intensity conflict is generally confined within one country, although the participants can be assisted by external forces, and that it is generally fought between groups representing rival paradigms for social and political organization. The objective is not military conquest but social control, which may use military means as one instrument in the struggle. The objective is to win political control at the lowest cost as quickly as possible. For the participants in such a struggle, the conflict is total; but from a U.S. perspective, it should be clear that the conflict is confined and should be contained, with force being used sparingly. Unlike the Iran-Iraq situation or similar ones, where conflicting national goals and the resources available to nations open up almost endless possibilities for escalation, conflicts within states—short of civil wars—are generally more containable and amenable to political solutions. Thus, a further element in our definition should be that low-intensity conflict is the use of all the means of power—diplomatic, economic, and military—to influence or create a situation more favorable to U.S. interests at the lowest possible level of involvement. Furthermore, any use of military force must be measured against its social-political utility. Military means are a tactical element in a strategic program that emphasizes political goals and means. The use of military power, though essential, is limited, while the use of diplomatic-political power may be open-ended.

The view here, then, is that low-intensity conflict is going to be someone else's war, but one with implications for U.S. policy that will require a response. In addition, we should acknowledge that low- to mid-intensity conflicts

are likely to be the pattern for future war and that they will present the greatest threats to U.S. interests and the most severe challenge to our ability to respond as a nation. As a result of these arguments, we shall perhaps recognize that low-intensity conflicts and Third World issues are the most pressing strategic problems facing our nation and that a solution or a methodology for responding to this type of threat is crucial to national survival.

The whittling away of our capacity to defend our international interests is a far more immediate threat than that of a general war with the Soviet Union, yet simultaneously making such a war more likely and degrading our ability to fight such a war if it should happen. Indeed, one might argue with some historical evidence that our enemies are aware of our incapacity to deal with low-order conflicts, and thus they resort to or support them as a means of striking at our interests below our effective level of response. This method could be called the termite approach—eating away at the foundations of our interests out of sight until the whole structure is riddled with rot and ready to collapse of its own weight.⁷

To illustrate certain comparisons between insurgencies, the need for a counterinsurgency doctrine, and other key issues related to low-intensity conflicts, I shall focus on two conflicts—Oman in 1970 and Afghanistan today—and then contrast them with the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. From these cases, one can deduce a number of specific guidelines for coping with the overall problem of insurgency and for using air power effectively in low-intensity warfare.

Oman

The insurgency in Oman had its roots in the distant past of the country, arising from the tensions of long-standing political-religious rivalries and the hostility among various tribal groups. The incompetence of the political leadership in Oman in the 1960s complicated

these older patterns of rivalry and provided the breeding ground for insurgency.

Initially, the insurgency did not have a significant ideological base, but during the course of the 1960s, Arab nationalism became a more important factor. This latter was abetted by the encouragement of Iraq's radical regime and by the charismatic influence of President Gamal Nasser in Egypt. The 1967 emergence of a radical Marxist regime in South Yemen, on Oman's southwestern border, also contributed to the development of a more radical, ideological movement in Oman.⁸

Slowly the older revolt, supported in part by Saudi Arabia, gave way to a Marxist-inspired insurgency supported in part by China, Iraq, South Yemen, and, later, the Soviet Union. By the late 1960s, this movement controlled significant portions of western Oman, particularly the mountainous region known as Dhufar, and was beginning to threaten the very survival of the regime. The aging sultan refused to take the steps that were necessary to confront the revolt, but his son, Qabus, perhaps encouraged by Oman's British advisors and patrons, staged a coup in 1970, replacing his father. It is with Sultan Qabus that the serious and ultimately successful counterinsurgency operation began in Oman.

the revolt

In the late 1960s, well-trained, ideologically motivated cadres began to take over the Omani revolt, converting the movement into a Marxist insurgency. An active political propaganda campaign among the villagers and tribal groups of Dhufar, coupled with intimidation or elimination of recalcitrants, gave the insurgents a fairly extensive and stable base of operations bordering Yemen, which served as a sanctuary and supply base. Many young Omanis who had been educated abroad joined the movement, and attacks against government-controlled towns and roads began to escalate in the early 1970s. However, the insurgency, troubled

by internal rivalry, was poorly organized and did not demonstrate any particular adeptness in its military operations. Since it was only in its infancy as a military movement, this incompetence was understandable. Because this inability was more than matched by the feebleness and incompetence of the Omani government, the insurgency grew in spite of itself. The emergence of Sultan Qabus and his reliance on British counterinsurgency expertise came at a highly critical juncture. The new sultan gave a new sense of direction to the government and began an effective campaign before the insurgency had had a chance to establish itself as a formidable force.

The initial government effort was also clumsy and poorly organized. The new sultan had to deal with the fact that there was little innate Omani nationalism or loyalty to the central government to draw on. The bureaucracy was small, venal, and incompetent; and the military was little better, being poorly equipped, trained, and officered, except for its British advisors. However, the sultan enjoyed several advantages. He, or the sultanate, had a degree of acceptance and legitimacy within the country that could be used to muster support; and he was able to finance a more vigorous war effort as the result of oil revenues that were beginning to come into the country. In addition, he had been trained at Sandhurst and had an understanding of military matters, and he was able to call on British advisors and some nonindigenous combatants to help with the counterinsurgency effort. Furthermore, several other area states, particularly Iran, were concerned about the possibility of a Marxist state emerging in Oman and as a consequence gave both financial assistance and military support.

the counterinsurgency effort

The main features of the counterinsurgency program in Oman were the use of small, mobile forces; an education and training program for the military; an active civil action cam-

campaign to win over the population; a priority effort to undermine guerrilla support by winning over cadres and their bases among the population; the use of a blockade system to seal off the supply lines to the guerrillas from Yemen; and an internal development and reform program that proved to the people that the government was both committed to their welfare and competent to provide for their needs.

The main British contributions, apart from advice, were some pilots and a few planes for Oman's small air force, plus the loan of Special Air Services (SAS) forces, elements of the 22d SAS regiment. The SAS forces, organized into small groups called British Army Training Teams (BATTs), were the main British combat element, and it was their participation that was perhaps the key element in the subsequent effective counterinsurgency effort. The initial task for these forces, in conjunction with the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), was to establish firm control over the areas already under government control and to expand slowly outward from these bases. The role of the SAS forces was not primarily as a combat arm but as an advisory, recruiting, and training arm. Although the SAS teams saw action, their main contribution was to organize the Omani effort. The keys to this effort were a program to establish an effective intelligence network to report on rebel movements and developments; a program of amnesty and training to convert former rebels into government forces organized as small, mobile groups called *firqats*; a civil action program that brought medical and veterinary assistance, education, and engineering help to formerly destitute areas; a rewards program for turning in weapons; an active psychological operations effort; and a program to develop the SAF as a fighting force that could hold its own.

The *firqat* program was particularly successful and provided the counterinsurgency effort with both invaluable intelligence and actual combat support.⁹ The program was not aimed primarily at killing the enemy but at converting him to the government's cause, thus sub-

tracting from the enemy and adding to the government effort with the same stroke. The *firqat* was not organized as a regular military unit but as irregulars, and persuasion and consultation had to take the place of orders and a regular chain of command. This approach was necessary because of the nature of the local Arab character and leadership style. Although it created headaches, the results of the extra effort were justified. The *firqat* became an effective instrument in combating the armed guerrilla formations and, even more important, in demonstrating to formerly remote or ignored areas that the government cared about them. This gesture helped to undermine the appeal of the insurgents, who, in turn, began to resort to intimidation tactics, which backfired as the government continued to demonstrate a clear alternative.

The civil action program, which operated along with the military campaign, sometimes caused military or security problems, but the program was important to demonstrate to the people that the government was truly concerned about their welfare and not just out to subjugate them. In one case, a government-controlled town became the gathering point for many of the areas' flocks, brought in by the families of *firqat* members. The people, former supporters of the resistance, expected the government not only to take care of the animals but also to provide a market for their sale. This latter was a particular headache for the government forces, but it was decided to use the sultan's own air force to ferry the animals to market. In addition, "a Texas-style cattle drive supported by jet fighter cover and 5.5-inch artillery" was organized to drive many of the animals through enemy-held territory to a market center.

Amidst scenes like shots from a Boulting Brothers comedy mixed with a John Wayne Western, fire fights between pickets and adoo [enemy units] on the high ground, whoops of delight from the *firqat* and expressions of amused disbelief by the SAF and SAS, five hundred head of cattle were

driven across the plateau down the jebel to Taqa. . . . Next day the herd, surrounded by armoured cars, arrived at Salalah to be met by the rejoicing inhabitants. . . . There was no doubt that this signal demonstration of Government power did more to impress the people than all the broadcasts and leaflets put together.¹⁰

The story of the cattle drive clearly demonstrated the government's power and the fact that it cared.

The net result of these efforts was to undermine gradually popular support for the resistance and reduce the insurgents' combat capability. By 1975, the government declared the war ended; and, to date, there has been no major recurrence. However, as one observer has noted, "winning a counterrevolutionary war is like clearing a garden of weeds; it is what you plant afterwards that matters"—and, one might add, how well you tend it.¹¹

the air war

The use of air power in Oman was constrained by Oman's limited ability to afford air forces and its decision not to rely on air power as a major combat element. The contribution of the air force came largely in aerial reconnaissance, resupply and communications efforts, attacks on known enemy positions (or actions to frustrate attacks on government positions when the targets could be clearly identified), and, of course, supplying the special forces elements central to the counterinsurgency effort. Fixed-wing aircraft, principally Skyraiders and Skyvans, provided the main support; but helicopters became an important element in supply and troop movement after 1971.

The main users of helicopters in a combat role in Oman were the Iranian special forces contingent sent to Oman by the shah in 1973. Trained by the United States, these forces relied on classic helicopter tactics and certainly made a contribution to the overall effort by providing needed manpower. However, it is debatable whether their tactics contributed anything to winning the war. Indeed, the Iranians often

found it difficult to locate the enemy. The insurgents were usually forewarned about an Iranian advance, the noise of the helicopters giving their intention away; and the Iranians tended to rely on large, set-piece operations that the guerrillas were able to avoid. In addition, the Iranians tended to keep to themselves, which hampered coordination with SAF operations.¹² As one Special Air Services officer noted:

The trouble was that the Iranians did not patrol at all as SAF understood it. When they did leave their bases, they moved in force. Any adoo about saw them coming from miles away and sensibly lay low until they had passed by. Consequently the only people who could get at the adoo were the firqat, and these refused to go on patrol because they thought the Iranians might mistake them for adoo on their return.¹³

The emphasis in the Omani counterinsurgency effort was on a sophisticated political campaign that used ground and air forces sparingly and only against known targets. After the back of the insurgency was broken, and the insurgents were pushed back into pockets where there was little or no civilian population, the campaign against them took on a more regular military character. Here ground and air forces were able to operate more or less unconstrained. The targets remained somewhat scattered and fleeting, but this circumstance did not matter since the effort could be directed at a broken and retreating enemy no longer able to hide among the people.

Soviets in Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an interesting departure in the study of counterinsurgency. For years, the Soviets have encouraged insurgency, taught its principles, and supplied its practitioners. Now they are caught in the snare of dealing with their own insurgency, and the last six years have not demonstrated that they are any better at coping than others faced with similar situations. Their involvement is still developing and any conclu-

sions are interim, but the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, their failure so far to quell the war of national liberation there, and their efforts to devise a winning formula offer many insights into the particular problems of low-intensity conflict. A consideration of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not meant to suggest approval for the policies being employed there or to make invidious comparisons with U.S. low-intensity conflict efforts. There are lessons to be learned from the types of things that the Soviets are doing and not doing.

Without going into detail about the events leading up to the invasion in December 1979, let it suffice here to say that the Soviets had a variety of long-term interests in the region, complicated by the fact that there was an active and increasingly successful insurgency in the country against the Soviet-supported Marxist regime that had been in power several years. For a number of complex reasons, the Soviets became convinced that they had to move into the country quickly to keep its clients in power. This determination led to the invasion in December 1979 and the years of strife in Afghanistan ever since.¹⁴

The initial Soviet invasion introduced some 80,000 crack airborne troops and mechanized forces that seized Kabul, the main roads, and other cities; as a result, Nur Mohammad Taraki was installed as the leader of the nation. In the weeks immediately following the invasion and coup, the number of Soviet forces rose to around 100,000 and has remained fairly constant until recently. The Soviet forces still dominate the cities and control the main roads—though with great difficulty—but they have been unable to crush the resistance or to drive it from its main operating bases. Without a substantial increase in forces, the present stalemate is likely to last for the foreseeable future. The Soviets, however, seem to be willing to wait.¹⁵

The invasion itself was a model of its type. It was executed with dispatch, was well-organized and planned, and accomplished all its initial objectives. It demonstrated clearly the So-

viet capability to plan and execute swift operations using deception, surprise, and highly mobile airborne and mechanized forces. Clearly, however, the Soviets miscalculated the circumstances in the country and misjudged the effect that their invasion would have on both the international community and on the Afghans themselves.

The invasion left the Soviets in charge of all the main roads and cities, but Soviet and government forces largely left the countryside to the resistance. Either the Soviets believed that the suddenness and forcefulness of the invasion would overawe any resistance, or they thought that they could handle any resistance once they were in charge in Kabul.

After six years of incessant fighting, however, the situation today is nearly the same as it was six years ago, except for the fact that the Afghan Army is much less of a viable force than it was. The puppet government in Kabul remains isolated, despised by the majority of the population and plagued by internal bickering, while resistance forces are better equipped and organized—though only barely. In addition, the resistance is able to mount attacks on Soviet facilities, including both the major air base outside of Kabul and the Soviet embassy itself. The *mujahidin* (indigenous resistance fighters) have penetrated the government and suborned much of the Afghan Army—which has become a major source of supply for the resistance. The *mujahidin* are also able to harass convoys on the roads and, in several areas, have proved able to resist strong Soviet offensives, particularly in the Panjshir Valley. They have even retaken some of the major cities for short periods of time. In short, despite considerable investment, the Soviets are no nearer to dominating the country than they were in 1979.¹⁶

The Soviets were successful in achieving an Afghan political coup and installing a government they felt more comfortable with; however, by aiming at the leadership and the situation in Kabul, they failed to appreciate the depth of sentiment against the Communist

government and the degree to which the local population was willing to go to resist external involvement. In addition, subsequent efforts to suppress the *mujahidin* have exposed deficiencies in Soviet combat tactics and techniques and have illustrated the problems inherent in dealing with an insurgency. This experience is of particular interest to U.S. analysts, providing an opportunity not only to study the Soviets in action but also to observe another superpower making the type of mistakes in a low-intensity conflict that should be familiar to the United States.

the strategic situation

As it now stands, the Soviets are unable to defeat the resistance, while the *mujahidin* are unable to force the Soviets out. The combat forces on the two sides are about equal in size, although the Soviets can deploy far more forces if needed and can call on the Afghan Army, while the Afghan resistance can call on a potential force of some 2,000,000—though not all at any one time. The resistance also receives considerable assistance from the general population. The Soviets have complete air supremacy and can deploy the full range of modern ground combat equipment; the resistance must rely on an assortment of infantry-type weapons, including antique Lee-Enfield rifles, captured Soviet arms, and a number of SA-7s, AK-47s, light machine guns, a few heavy machine guns, a variety of small mortars, and the odd antitank gun. The Soviets and their Afghan allies are basically besieged within their enclaves, and the resistance is largely able to move at will about the country, though such movement is becoming increasingly difficult during daylight.¹⁷

The result is a stalemate. Nevertheless, the Soviets seem to believe that time is on their side: although they have not developed a particularly effective counterinsurgency strategy militarily, they appear to be prepared to try to outlast the resistance's willingness to go on. Of

course, the Soviets are still learning and are likely to experiment with various strategies over time.¹⁸

To date, their strategy comes in four main categories. First, the Soviets are trying to develop political and military cadres to take over responsibility within the country, creating at least a facade of local government. This effort is plagued by rivalry among political elements within the Afghan government itself and by the fact that the government is deeply penetrated by resistance sympathizers. To deal with this situation, the Soviets are trying to build up the state security apparatus, the KHAD, as the local version of the KGB. Even this organization has been penetrated, however. A similar situation exists in the military.

The Afghan Army has dropped from more than 80,000 soldiers to approximately 40,000—and this current number must be maintained by press gangs. Morale is low, desertion is high, and at least some officers and quite a few rank and file support the resistance directly or indirectly. The Soviet military, who outnumber the Afghan Army by almost three to one, do not trust the Afghan soldiers. In combat, they tend to use the Afghans as cannon fodder, driving the Afghans in front of them in attacks. Similarly, the Afghan Air Force is closely supervised, and Afghan pilots generally fly with a Soviet copilot or escort. Still, the Soviets are trying to create loyal cadres by sending students and soldiers to the Soviet Union for training and by setting up local universities and schools to train the "right" sort. This type of force strengthening will require a long-term effort.¹⁹

Second, the Soviets are trying to develop a "hearts and minds" campaign. They are trying to promote rural development, are building schools and hospitals, and have mounted psychological operations to persuade the local populace of the benefits of socialism that is bringing an end to Afghanistan's "feudal" past. However, this campaign is seriously undermined by atrocities against the civilian population and by a bombing offensive that

destroys fields and flocks.²⁰

Third, the Soviets are trying to penetrate the resistance movement and to spread dissension and discord among rival tribes and the numerous factions that compose the resistance efforts. This campaign has had limited success, but as with everything else, it is too early to judge its effectiveness.

Finally, the Soviets are using their military force to wear down the resistance. The main elements in the military effort include campaigns against known resistance strongholds (at least seven major offensives in the Panjshir Valley alone since 1980); small, mobile search-and-destroy missions against isolated *mujahidin* groups; some nighttime operations; heavy, almost indiscriminate bombing or assaults on villages to drive the population off the land; the use of chemical weapons; extensive mining, some accomplished by airborne means; interdiction missions against supply routes; stronghold and installation protection; convoy escort duty; and hammer-and-anvil-type offensives.²¹

Over the course of the occupation, the Soviets have modified their effort, moving from the use of tanks and mechanized rifle formations toward greater use of helicopters, air assaults, and small-unit actions, although offensives such as those launched to seal off supply routes from Pakistan still involve armored and mechanized forces. The Soviets have found that heavy tanks are inappropriate for much of the Afghan terrain and have shifted to the use of lighter armored vehicles. Interestingly, however, reports indicate that in at least some cases early on, despite combined arms doctrine, the Soviets used armor unaccompanied by supporting ground forces or these troops never dismounted from their armored personnel carriers, with predictable results. Reports also indicate that Soviet units have not responded flexibly to situations but have followed plans slavishly; and even the use of small, mobile forces has been hampered by lack of support.²²

One of the most recent campaigns in the

Panjshir, which came in the spring of 1984 after a long truce, also seemed to revert to older habits—reliance on large troop actions rather than on small-unit actions. The main difference in the effort was an apparent determination to garrison the Panjshir permanently. Also, it seems that the Soviets are coming to rely more heavily on a strategic bombing campaign designed to depopulate the countryside, thereby drying up the guerrilla ocean—the kill-the-patient school of medicine. The military effort, though, has not been a sustained action but a rather episodic affair, with sharp peaks and valleys. Some of this campaign style is dictated by the regional weather; in addition, the Soviets seem to be oscillating between an active military effort and a containment approach. In either event, this style is not in harmony with current Soviet military doctrine—but, of course, most Soviet doctrine is not aimed at the type of situation prevailing in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the resistance is not able to take full advantage of Soviet disabilities. It is severely divided, some groups within it spending more time fighting other resistance groups than the Soviets. Afghanistan has never been a highly unified country, and religious, regional, family, and tribal loyalties often take precedence over national identity. This lack of any cohesive nationalism or ideology means that the resistance has no consistent discipline or acknowledged overall leadership—a fact which the Soviets can exploit by inciting old feuds. The history of nonideologically based movements of tribal groups against a determined enemy is not very reassuring to those concerned about the long-term viability of the resistance in Afghanistan. Most resistance groups are small, coordination is difficult even when the will is present, and logistical difficulties limit the size of forces and operations. Furthermore, the resistance is indifferently armed, must cope with long lines of supply, and is dependent on the generosity of foreign donors and Pakistani tolerance. These circumstances inhibit the resistance capability to mount any sustained,

large-scale offensive that could threaten the Soviet presence. The conflict remains a war of attrition.²³

The Afghan situation illustrates that the Soviets are still struggling for a formula for coping with an insurgency. A quick review of Soviet military literature reveals increasing commentary on Russian experiences in Central Asia in the nineteenth century, the Soviet experience in Central Asia after World War I, partisan warfighting during World War II, mountain-fighting techniques, and the experiences of other nations in low-intensity conflicts. This study includes the U.S. experience in Vietnam. The Soviets are trying to learn how to operate effectively against indigenous insurgent forces in a foreign land, and some modifications in their operations indicate that some learning is going on. It is too early to evaluate the depth and long-term doctrinal impact of this effort.²⁴

the use of air power

The Soviets' use of air assets, particularly helicopters, shows some effects of their learning experience. The Soviets are relying on helicopters for more and more of their effort, and they are using them in a range of missions, from convoy escort duties to troop insertion against resistance strongholds.²⁵

The initial use of air power in Afghanistan, of course, was the rapid insertion and subsequent reinforcement and resupply of several airborne brigades. Once again, the Soviets proved the value of long-range inter/intra-theater lift and demonstrated their capability in this area.

After the initial deployment of forces, however, the Soviets seemed to have had some difficulty in deciding how to employ their air power; and lack of coordination between ground forces and the air assets, which are controlled separately, remains a problem. Still, the Soviets are using air power in a variety of ways. They are resorting to high-level saturation bombing and

have begun to use a number of Su-25 Frogfoot ground support aircraft, perhaps for evaluation purposes. The main air weapon, though, has been the helicopter, principally the Mi-24 Hind, and the Mi-8 Hip.²⁶ The Hind is used as a fire support platform and as a roving agent, usually in twos and threes, to interdict daytime movement. The Mi-8 is generally used to ferry in forces for ground assaults. One of the standard employments has been to ferry ground forces into positions behind suspected resistance forces and then to use ground troops in a frontal assault to drive these forces onto the "anvil" of the heliborne forces. Other helicopters are used to resupply isolated garrisons. The helicopter, however, has not eliminated the ground threat. Moreover, the resistance, despite its limited means, has taken a heavy toll in helicopters, demonstrating their vulnerability to fairly unsophisticated ground fire.

To date, the Soviets have used no low, slow fixed-wing counterinsurgency aircraft or anything similar to the AC-130. Time may change this posture. Overall, the Soviets do not have forces, doctrines, or weapons designed for low-intensity conflict, with the possible exception of *spetsnaz*. Their current strategy seems to favor what has been termed "migratory genocide," driving the people from the land through terror tactics. Once a more docile population is ensured, then the Soviets will move to more humane programs. For the present, however, they seem to be groping toward some such programs, not yet committing major efforts to carrying them out.

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was not an example of a low-intensity operation, nor was it exactly a counterinsurgency operation; but it is useful to examine this invasion by way of contrast and to see how the massive (in relative terms) use of air power can affect a situation. The principal targets of the Israeli invasion were the irregular forces and political infra-

structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a largely guerrilla force. The Syrian forces based in Lebanon were also major targets, however, and much of the Israeli effort was aimed at crippling the Syrians.²⁷

Technically, the war between the PLO and Israel is not an insurgency, yet it is hard to categorize it as anything else. The tactics employed by the PLO are also those used by insurgent forces, but the main body of guerrillas happen to be fighting from exile. Both parties in the fight claim the same land, and the PLO and its supporters outside the country view Israel as an occupying power. It is this "war from the outside" and the landlessness of the PLO that give the struggle its peculiar characteristics.

How the PLO came to be in Lebanon and how the organization was able to build a base of operations there against Israel are complex stories in the long sagas of both Lebanon and the Palestinians during the last several decades. Suffice it to say that, from the mid-1970s, the Palestinians were able to build up a fairly extensive political and military infrastructure in Lebanon, from which they could organize attacks into Israel. In addition, the PLO was strong enough to challenge Lebanese authority and had become a major actor in the civil war in that country. The instability in Lebanon and the fact that the PLO could use this nation bordering Israel as a base of operations, a unique development for the Palestinian movement, excited fear in Israel. This fear, plus the fact that the Syrians were expanding their presence in Lebanon, particularly to extend their anti-aircraft missile network and flank Israel, increased Israeli security worries. As a result, the Israelis executed a well-planned and almost flawless operation—up to a point—aimed at liquidating all their security problems in one move.²⁸

The invasion, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was a classic in swift, well-coordinated operations. Relying largely on combined arms tactics, the Israelis overwhelmed

the lightly armed Palestinians and devastated the Syrian Army and Air Force. The air campaign against the Syrians, particularly, was a model of its type.

The major objectives of the Israeli campaign were to eliminate the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, to destroy Syrian forward-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and to provide an opportunity to resolve the Lebanese civil war in such a fashion as to restore order on Israeli's northern frontier and to preclude the possibility that Lebanon could be used as a base for either the Syrians or the Palestinians. This bold program may also have had an unspoken assumption—namely, that, by the invasion, the United States would be involved in the subsequent settlement process and would thus complement the political objectives by working out a comprehensive settlement.²⁹

As a military venture, the invasion was, for the most part, a stunning success, although, given the fact that the Palestinians were a ragtag force, the Israelis might have been expected to do even better. Virtually all of the specific military objectives were achieved, and the air campaign against the Syrian SAM batteries in the Biqa Valley were masterfully executed. The Israeli Air Force also performed beyond even its expectations in dealing with the Syrian Air Force and showed an imaginative use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). The ground forces, too, overwhelmed the Palestinians quickly and dealt a series of sharp blows to the Syrian Army. In so doing, they demonstrated the effectiveness of helicopters in the antitank role, although their losses indicated the vulnerability of helicopters to even unsophisticated fire.

Perhaps the only negative note in the military effort was the relatively poor showing of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in conducting military operations on urban terrain and in some mountain areas. Reluctant to risk the lives necessary for a major effort to root out the PLO in Beirut, for example, the Israelis turned to artillery and air strikes to destroy PLO posi-

tions. Past experience in urban terrain has demonstrated time and again that such exercises are of very limited value and that no amount of conventional bombing will dislodge a committed enemy. The Israelis also paid a price for these tactics. Although the amount of damage done in Beirut by Israeli attacks was fairly limited (the air strikes, in particular, being highly controlled and surgical), the television image broadcast worldwide of seemingly indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets did nothing to bolster Israel's international reputation. Much less publicized was the discipline of Israeli ground forces in conducting urban operations; in these military actions, the various units involved operated under strictly enforced rules of engagement that prevented them from harming civilians even if these civilians were providing shelter for guerrillas. The IDF suffered casualties on occasion to avoid alienating Lebanese opinion by indiscriminate fire in response to provocation.

However, despite its obvious excellence in the planning and execution of the Lebanon campaign, did Israel achieve its objectives? The spectacular nature of the military operation has tended to obscure the fact that the invasion had a largely political purpose. While it may be too early to draw final conclusions, interim judgments suggest that the operation was only of limited success and that its ultimate costs may have exceeded any benefits. The invasion demonstrated Israel's conventional military capabilities, which were hardly in doubt, but the Israelis have not found a formula for disengagement that will accomplish their original goals. Under pressure to withdraw, the IDF has been the object of continual harassment, while more people have probably been killed or wounded than in all the Palestinian attacks on Israel. Meanwhile, these and other complications have created doubts and some political division within Israel about the wisdom of the invasion; and both the invasion and the subsequent occupation of Lebanon have promoted

the radicalization of the Shia population on Israel's border, a threat that may eventually prove more serious than the PLO. In addition, the PLO has not been eliminated from Lebanon and may be in the process of returning.³⁰

Beyond these negative outcomes, the cost of keeping occupation forces in Lebanon has put a further strain on a crippled Israeli economy, which can ill afford the diversion of money and manpower. Despite the invasion, the Syrians remain in the Biqa; all of the Syrians' materiel losses have been more than replaced by the Soviets, who now have an even greater claim on Syria; and the Syrian influence in Lebanese internal affairs has only increased. The Lebanese situation is not much clearer than it was before the invasion; in fact, although Lebanon may be limping toward a return to national unity, the new government may not necessarily be favorable to Israel. The ultimate result may strengthen the Arab siege of Israel, particularly if the PLO is indeed reinfiltrating Lebanon.

It is not clear at this point that the Israelis accomplished anything more than a temporary disruption of the PLO. Also, it is not clear whether the large-scale invasion justified the costs or achieved anything of lasting value. However spectacular the military success, it should not obscure the fact that the Israelis failed politically. They demonstrated their unique command of conventional warfare, but their handling of the insurgency—the concern that provoked their invasion—still remains in the category of palliatives.

One should acknowledge other significant facts. Given the regional and international character of the insurgency, unilateral Israeli means to resolve the problem are severely limited. A political solution may be completely impossible, even if the Israelis are prepared to deal with the PLO—but that is not the issue to focus on here. The question that must be asked is whether military means can substitute for political ones. The invasion of Lebanon, unlike other Arab-Israeli wars, was not a struggle for survival against overwhelming odds, with

massive forces marshaled on Israel's borders. Clearly, there was no immediate or overwhelming military threat. The main objective was to use the military to achieve a political end. The success of the venture remains highly dubious and underscores the inadequacy of substituting arms for policy.

Lessons for U.S. Decision Makers

From the foregoing discussion, it is possible to derive nine major lessons, which can be grouped into three general categories. These have an impact on low-intensity conflict thinking and merit attention in organizing the U.S. effort to cope with future low-intensity conflicts:

- Military requirements—definition/doctrine development; force structure, and quantity and quality in equipment, training, and C³I (command, control, communications, and intelligence).
- Political requirements—political will for involvement; coalition warfare; and nation/institution building in the host country.
- Constraints—priority struggle with other national/bureaucratic interests; conventional syndrome (systemic prejudice); and insufficient or overcentralized command and control.

As noted earlier, there is a problem in defining low-intensity conflict, both because of its ambiguity and because of rivalry between various agencies for influence. This problem, in turn, generates difficulties in developing doctrine, as the services, civilian agencies, and influential individuals remain in disagreement about what should be included in the doctrine. The definition and doctrine are not simply matters of intellectual interest but carry with them implications for force structure and, of course, funding. Thus, there have been many definitions of low-intensity conflict and a number of doctrines, as well as a steady stream of commentaries on the requirements for counter-insurgency campaigns. Nevertheless, we seem impervious to the lessons, the advice, or the needs.

It will not be sufficient to devise a definition and doctrine for low-intensity conflict without following through on the measures needed to implement them. One basic matter that we must consider is force structure to deal with low-intensity conflict situations — what forces, how many, and how configured. We cannot assume that existing force structure, equipment, or modified doctrine will meet the special needs of low-intensity conflicts. We must design our forces, equipment, training programs, and C³I systems not to overwhelm the insurgency with sophistication but to respond in consonance with the situations.³¹

The main requirements in designing a response are political, not military; but it is important to have a force structure that can respond with flexibility within this context. As the case studies indicate, political considerations predominate in dealing effectively and efficiently with insurgencies, not the use of this or that weapon system. This fact does not mean that force is ruled out but simply means that its utility must be measured against its contribution to political ends. Since U.S. involvement in low-intensity conflict is likely to be coalition warfare, continuing assessment is necessary.

In considering a U.S. response in such circumstances, we must bear in mind also that this country's ability to deal with the situation must be based on the political climate at home. The Vietnam War raised the issue of political will and this country's ability to use its combat forces overseas in conflicts without clear purposes. Since low-intensity conflicts are always likely to involve ambiguity, the question of this country's ability to become involved in low-intensity conflicts remains in doubt. The lesson of Vietnam in this regard is not that the United States should not go to war without absolute approval at home, as Colonel Harry Summers, USA (Ret), and others have argued, but that popular opinion is subject to change despite the justifications. Limited wars may still have to be fought; the issue is how to keep U.S. involvement limited so as to avoid major

disapprobation. Any involvement will require a political effort in this country to justify U.S. purposes.

Such involvement also means coalition warfare, which imposes its own special problems in designing a U.S. response. Although Colonel Summers and I disagree on most things, he is right when he points out that coalition warfare creates special problems for the United States, one of which is the disparity of interests and goals of the erstwhile partners, which can be exploited by the opposition.

Another key political problem for the United States in low-intensity conflicts is the question of nation or institution building in the host country. In most cases, the conflicts within a given society have developed from a lack of local political legitimacy. The insurgency not only menaces the survival of a government but also demonstrates that it is not in sufficient control of its own internal affairs or sure enough of the loyalty of its own people to govern effectively. If the country in question lacks a competent bureaucracy and an effective military, the United States, as the coalition partner, must help to promote the necessary institutions and legitimacy that are essential for the government's survival. Nation building is a complex and tricky task, one that the United States can only assist in. This country cannot impose democracy on others. Thus, U.S. involvement in low-intensity conflict may mean dealing with ambiguous situations in which there will be severe constraints on the ability of the United States to influence events. While assisting a force and its leaders in another country may be essential, it can carry hidden dangers, one of them being the creation of a military system in the host country that can come to dominate the political system and thus aggravate the problem. In countries with legitimacy problems, the creation of a strong, competent military may be the first step toward creating a system of military rule. Thus, caution must be exercised in developing a nation-building policy.

The final set of considerations in developing a U.S. response to low-intensity conflicts is the issue of constraints on the development of a consistent policy. In addition to those already mentioned, certain systemic problems inhibit the formulation of an effective response. One of the main problems is the continuing struggle in this country among various institutions for resources and attention. It is by no means universally accepted that low-intensity conflicts should receive the attention that is suggested here. Moreover, the struggle among various elements of the bureaucracy for priority of their interests means that any attempt to establish a clear agenda is fraught with turf battles.

Complicating this situation is the fact that bureaucracies tend to deal with problems, however unique, with a set of well-established responses. When this conventional syndrome, also described as the gyroscopic effect, is prevalent, agencies tend to resist new ideas or methods even if the old responses have proved inadequate. This problem has been particularly acute in regard to low-intensity conflict situations: although the standard responses have been singularly ineffective, the system refuses to learn. In part, this complacency stems from the fact that low-intensity conflicts do not represent a system-threatening crisis, one that overrides parochial concerns and gives the disparate elements of the system a sense of common purpose.

A final constraint is the question of command and control. Low-intensity conflicts require a high degree of coordination and control to make sure that ends and means are well matched. This requirement presents a particularly difficult problem for the United States, given the diffused nature of its political systems and the almost anarchical approach it takes in dealing with foreign countries. The reverse side of this problem, however, is also an acute concern, for low-intensity conflicts, at the ground level, require that local authorities have discretion in responding to the demands of the moment. Inflexible or misinformed au-

thorities who are distant from the immediate situation but who feel the need to be in control can paralyze any effort, no matter how well-thought-out. Thus, the question of excessive control is just as crucial as the need to have a clear line of command and control in guiding the U.S. low-intensity conflict effort. Central to dealing with these key issues is the need for a clear policy, both military and political, for U.S. involvement. What is required is more than a rationale but an articulated statement relating ends to means, purpose to abilities—a statement expressing concrete goals and clear limits.³²

THE use of air power by the United States in a low-intensity conflict, whether directly or as part of an advisory effort, will necessarily be within a political context, both here and in the target state, that must receive primary attention, for it will shape U.S. involvement and thus the employment of force. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion has some implications for the U.S. Air Force that need to be recognized before any such conflict requires our participation.

Traditional air doctrine as we conceive it is inappropriate for low-intensity conflict, I believe: extension of tactical air doctrine to the counterinsurgency effort is inadequate and wrong. Moreover, the United States is ill-equipped and ill-prepared to advise on or conduct a low-intensity conflict. Unfortunately, we may find also that the remedy for this situation of inadequacy is beyond our capacity or at least beyond our willingness to make the necessary adjustments.

Tactical air doctrine and the attending force structure are designed for conventional wars against conventional enemies. In most low-intensity conflict situations, control of the air is established by default, while isolation of the battlefield, where there are few and fleeting fixed battles, is a non sequitur. The use of high-speed, high-performance aircraft and

heavy ordnance, like the indiscriminant use of long-range artillery, is counterproductive. Targets are difficult to identify, distinguishing friend from foe is largely a matter of chance, and time on station is too ephemeral. What are needed are slow planes that can be directed discriminatingly by ground observers who have an understanding of the situation. The air platform needs to be stable, tough, inexpensive, and easily maintained and operated in an austere environment. Ordinarily, the AC-130 would be an excellent candidate for this task; however, because it is so expensive and difficult to maintain or operate from remote or poor facilities, it is a bad choice for most low-intensity conflicts. Similarly, expense, time on station, and difficulty of maintenance are reasons why helicopters are not necessarily the best answer to the situations of low-intensity conflict.

The important point that we must recognize is that low-intensity conflict is someone else's war, not ours, not the "big one" that our systems and doctrines are designed for.³³ It is this orientation toward general war—with the accompanying notion that general-purpose forces and weapon systems designed to fight the Soviets in Europe are capable of fighting any other conflict anywhere else—that largely disqualifies the United States from low-intensity conflict. Our weapon systems and doctrines are directed toward dealing with the Soviets, just as theirs are centered on us. The consequences of such an orientation when applied in a different context are plainly visible in the current Soviet experience in Afghanistan. In order to deal seriously with low-intensity conflict, we must develop a force structure and doctrine that clash with the big-war syndrome. It is our inability to recognize this fact and to accept the consequences that makes any successful response on our part doubtful.

For example, the United States Air Force currently has no air platform for low-intensity conflict (excepting the AC-130).³⁴ With the exception of the JVX, none are programmed. The Air Force does not have a small, intratheater lift

aircraft capable of operating from remote, austere fields; and it has few pilots who are familiar with such aircraft built by other nations, so that a training mission is precluded. The Air Force deemphasizes special operations and, for bureaucratic and budgetary reasons, finds the idea of low-performance aircraft embarrassing. The tendency is to develop sophisticated jets—manifesting the “zoom-zoom” syndrome—and to encourage other states to acquire them regardless of whether these nations have the material base, technical expertise, or strategic need for such systems. In fairness, other states want them, but we offer few alternatives. In some cases, we build ourselves out of the market. Unfortunately, however, our interests and those of our international friends mean that we are still called on for assistance, and our predilections often lead us into offering bad advice or assistance inappropriate to the local need.

What, then, is the appropriate use of air power in low-intensity conflict, and what should the overall U.S. military role be? If the stress in U.S. involvement is on political programs, is there a role for the military? And if, as suggested, there are many constraints on the use of air power, is there a role for air power?

The main U.S. military role will come in combat support and combat service support, including training and education missions that support the U.S. political effort and the activities of the host country to respond effectively to an insurgency. Air power is most helpful in noncombat or support roles—that is, in intelligence collection/reconnaissance, troop movement, resupply, and showing a presence. In addition, it can be employed effectively against known enemy formations or to interdict attacks on friendly positions. These roles require a number of different systems specifically designed for such tasks and able to operate in relatively austere situations. Also required is a doctrine that subordinates the use of air power to political purposes. One of the indirect consequences of too great a reliance on air

power, even for troop movement, is that it creates an artificial distinction between the war on the ground and the war in the air. It also reinforces another deceptive dichotomy in that it stresses maneuver and mobility over political activity. Maneuver and mobility are obviously desirable, but military means alone will not achieve political ends.

The U.S. role in promoting such uses of air power requires programming and acquiring a number of systems, trained pilots, and support staff capable of working in a low-intensity environment; working to change current doctrine on the use of air power for low-intensity conflict; and an effort to convince Congress to remove restrictions that prevent our encouraging Third World states to buy the air platforms they need from other suppliers when we cannot provide them. Second, for the Air Force, it means creating a low-intensity force, perhaps comparable to its tactical or strategic air elements, though not as large. The Air Force is taking, perhaps, the first steps in this direction with the creation of a Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, but it remains to be seen whether this new body will have the scope and influence necessary to affect U.S. air power doctrine for low-intensity conflict to any significant degree. If such serious attention is not forthcoming, the Air Force should abandon low-intensity conflict to the U.S. Army and allow the Army to develop the appropriate systems and force structure. The Army, then, must come to terms with all of the problems and challenges. These suggestions may be unpalatable, but they are realistic in terms of the demands for an effective response. The question is whether to take low-intensity conflict seriously and to deal with the implications of doing so.

In regard to the political effort that should form the context for any U.S. involvement in a low-intensity conflict, the problem is particularly complex. Colonel Summers points out that

... the United States is singularly unequipped to orchestrate the regional application of US power.

Although military unified command headquarters may pull together Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine elements, . . . there are no equivalent regional agencies to coordinate and control diplomatic, economic, sociological or psychological power.³⁵

Summer notes further that the situation is even worse at the national level:

[While] the National Security Council can consider and decide on actions, . . . there exists no supranational command authority short of the President himself to control operations . . . and thus coordinate the efforts of the Department of State, . . . the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other activities involved in support of low-intensity conflict. . . . This lack of unity of command almost ensures [that] there will be no unity of effort.³⁶

One might add that, in the absence of any sense of crisis, the various elements of the bureaucracy will not willingly accept any infringement of their authority. Yet, the importance of low-intensity conflicts demands a more sophisticated and dedicated approach. The attenuated nature of the situation may obscure its importance, but the United States cannot simply address the problem on a departmental, piecemeal basis. The solution lies in clear, decisive, sustained guidance at the highest levels, supported by the bureaucracy and the services, to effect the necessary changes for dealing with low-intensity conflicts.

The first step in this direction is to establish an ad hoc group for low-intensity conflict at the national/National Security Council (NSC) level, perhaps chaired by the U.S. Vice-President but with the active support of the President. The purpose of this group would be to provide a focal point for thinking on low-intensity conflict and an action agency to promote a coordinated effort among all government departments and agencies concerned. It would be a high-level lobbying group and clearing house that could establish priorities and provide sustained guidance.

In addition to this body, a corresponding ad hoc group under civilian control is needed to coordinate and direct *all* U.S. efforts in a situation that has been designated a low-intensity conflict. Such a group, located in the host country but with direct links and responsibility to the national-level/NSC group, would direct all U.S. in-country activity for the duration of the crisis. Such a body would subordinate all normal U.S. official relations with the country in question and would coordinate its policy with the national commission. This solution is not likely to win the approval of the various competing bureaucracies, but the demands of a low-intensity conflict policy and the needs for consistency and coordination must override business as usual.

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Notes

1. For an example of recent studies on the issue, see *US Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict*, edited by Sam Sarkesian and William Scully (New York: Transaction Books, 1983). There are also an increasing number of conferences on the subject, and the services, particularly the Army, are trying to develop doctrine and forces for low-intensity operations.

2. Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," *International Security*, Fall 1984, p. 153.

3. For a similar idea, see Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," in *Power, Strategy, and Security*, edited by Klaus Knorr (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1983, pp. 126-51.

4. Cohen, p. 165. Peter Bahnsen, a defense expert at OSD, makes a

similar point more wittily when he defines low-intensity conflict as those wars the U.S. military does not want to fight. Major Andrew Krepinevich also argues convincingly that the U.S. military avoided giving special operations and counterinsurgency anything but lip service; see "The United States Army in Vietnam: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Army Concept of War," unpublished paper, United States Military Academy.

5. Robert Komer, "The Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: International Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam," Rand R-967-ARPA, August 1972 (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1973), p. 45.

6. Sarkesian and Scully, p. 11.

7. See Stephen Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security*, Fall 1982, pp. 83-113. Rosen

also notes that bureaucracies are slow to change without an overwhelming sense of vision (p. 109), inhibiting effective response to low-intensity conflict, which is commonly an attenuated threat.

8. The literature on the insurgency is limited and varies in quality. See John Peterson, "Britain and the Oman War," *Asian Affairs*, October 1976, pp. 285-98; John Peterson, "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar," *World Affairs*, Spring 1977, pp. 278-95; John Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Foundations of an Emerging State* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Bard O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," in *Insurgency in the Modern World*, edited by Bard O'Neill et al. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980), pp. 213-34; Aryeh Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); D. L. Price, "Oman: Insurgency and Development," *Conflict Studies*, January 1975; Bard O'Neill and William Brundage, "Revolutionary Warfare in Oman: A Strategic Appraisal," *Middle East Review*, Summer 1978, pp. 48-56; John Townsend, *Oman: The Making of the Modern State* (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Nabil Kaylent, "Politics and Religion in Oman: A Historical Overview," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Winter 1979, pp. 567-79; F. A. Clements, *Oman: The Reborn Land* (New York: Longman, 1980); George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, fourth edition (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 682-88; *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States* (Washington: American University Press, 1977); and J. C. Wilkinson, "The Origins of the Oman State," in *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, edited by Derek Hopwood (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), pp. 67-88.

9. Colonel Tony Jeapes, *SAS Operation in Oman* (London: Kimber, 1980).

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-41.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 192-93.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

14. For studies of the background on the Soviet invasion and on Soviet interests in the region, see Henry Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983); Richard Newell and Nancy Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981); Mark Heller, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1980, pp. 36-59; Hanah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis*, Spring 1979, pp. 93-113; Alfred Monks, *The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

15. See Claude Malhuret, "Report from Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983-84, pp. 426-35; Alvin Rubinstein, "Afghanistan: Embraced by the Bear," *Orbis*, Spring 1982, pp. 135-53; and Colonel Jerome Haggerty, "Afghanistan: The Great Game," *Military Review*, August 1980, pp. 37-44.

16. See Major Joseph Collins, "The Soviet-Afghan War: The First Four Years," *Parameters*, Summer 1984, pp. 49-62; Major Terry Heyns, "Will Afghanistan Become the Soviet Union's Vietnam?" *Military Review*, October 1981, pp. 50-59; Edgar O'Ballance, "Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan," *Military Review*, August 1980, pp. 45-52; "Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation," U.S. State Department Special Report No. 112; Gregory D'Ehi and Charles Bork, "Afghan 101: Yale Journalists Tour Jihad Battlegrounds," *Soldiers of Fortune*, January 1984, pp. 46-49, 86, 88-92; Master Sergeant William Beck et al., "Afghanistan: What Impact on Soviet Tactics," *Military Review*, March 1982, pp. 2-11.

17. Major Joseph Collins, "Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan: A Preliminary Assessment," *Comparative Strategy*, No. 4, 1983, pp. 147-68; G. Jacobs, "The Years of Soviet War Operations Evaluated," *Asian Defense Journal*, December 1982, pp. 34-36, 38-39, 43, 44-45; Jan Hogg, "Afghans Seize New Types of Soviet SMG," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 28 January 1984, p. 101.

18. Leon Gouré and Michael Dean, "The Soviet Strategic View,"

Strategic Review, Winter 1981, p. 72; David Isby, "Soviet Tactics in the War in Afghanistan," *Jane's Defense Review*, 1983, pp. 681-93; "The Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution," *Middle East Journal*, September 1982, pp. 151-64.

19. Borje Almquist, "Get Shot in the Back of the Head or Become Cannon Fodder," *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 February 1984, p. 12 (JPRS, 1984); "Current Assessment of Afghanistan Situation," *Le Monde*, 15-17 November 1983; Patricia Claude, "Year of the Afghan Jihad," *Le Monde*, 28 and 30 December 1983.

20. *Ibid.*; Sven Lindquist, "Soviet Tactics," *Dagens Nyheter*, 29 April 1984, p. 4 (JPRS, 1984); Moham Ram, "Jihad, Soviet-Style," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 1982, p. 16.

21. "The Soviets in Afghanistan: Winning by 'Making Terror Reign,'" *Baltimore Sun*, 27 November 1983; Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 30ff. Mathew Stevenson, "Traveling the Afghan Archipelago," *American Spectator*, February 1984, pp. 11-14; Oliver Roy, "Afghanistan: Four Years of Soviet Occupation," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, March 1984, pp. 8-11; Robert Toth, "Soviet Jets Rain Bombs on Afghans," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 April 1984; Roger Fontaine, "'Migratory Genocide' Considered Part of Moscow's War Strategy," *Washington Times*, 17 July 1984; Malhuret, op. cit.

22. Isby, op. cit.; Collins, op. cit.

23. Anthony Hyman, "Mujahidin Tactics," *Islamic World Defense*, January-March 1984, pp. 20-25; Bradsher, op. cit., pp. 218-26; Richard Newell, "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan," *The World Today*, November 1979, pp. 432-42.

24. Isby, op. cit.; Isby, "Afghanistan 1982: The War Continues," *International Defense Review*, No. 11, 1982, pp. 1523-28.

25. *Ibid.*; O'Ballance, op. cit.; Collins, op. cit. Various issues of *Krasnaya zvezda* also indicate Soviet interest, although this is generally expressed indirectly.

26. *Ibid.*

27. See Richard Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli PLO War in Lebanon* (New York: Hill and Wong, 1984); Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Dr. Karl Schnell, "Experiences of the Lebanon War," *Military Technology*, July 1984, pp. 23-33; and Anthony Cordesman, "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict: Military Lessons for American Defense Planning," *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1982, pp. 29-32. Day-to-day coverage of the invasion was provided in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Jerusalem Post*.

28. On the background of the Lebanese situation, see Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979).

29. Gabriel, op. cit.; Schiff and Ya'ari, op. cit.

30. Schiff and Ya'ari, op. cit.

31. The literature on counterinsurgency is fairly uniform on this position. Also see Bard O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework to Analysis," in *Insurgency in the Modern World*, edited by O'Neill et al., pp. 1-42.

32. Rosen, op. cit.

33. The OV-10A may be a suitable candidate for an all-purpose low-intensity conflict platform, but a serious effort is needed to examine its potential. The danger here is that in considering the aircraft, we shall overload it with the type of sophisticated gear that this country favors but that generally makes our systems too expensive or complicated for others. The development of a low-intensity conflict vehicle will go against many of the institutional prejudices of the United States military. The effort is important, however. I have benefited from discussions with various Air Force low-intensity conflict experts, including Colonel Ray Stratton, Colonel John Roberts, Major George Schriever, and Lieutenant Colonel William Hudspeth. In addition, Jerome Klingaman of the Air War College has shared his vast experience, and I have also benefited from his

unpublished paper titled "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars."

34. This is an overstatement and does not take into account the AC-130, but, as noted earlier, the AC-130 does not fit the criteria of an inexpensive, easily maintained platform able to operate out of unsophisticated fields. The AC-130 is fine for U.S. use, but it puts us

out of the market for coalition warfare if we are to train local forces and provide them with equipment they need.

35. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, "Principles of War and Low-Intensity Conflict," *Military Review*, March 1985, p. 48. Emphasis added.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.


War poses all the hard philosophical questions about life and death and morality and demands immediate answers. The abstractions of scholarly debate become the very concrete matters of survival. In one short year, Vietnam took the measure of a man and of the culture that put him there. War strips away the thin veneer applied slap-dash by the institutions of society and shows Man for exactly what he is. We must listen closely to the men and women who became both the victims and the perpetrators of the war if we want to learn something real about this particular conflict, something real about the human spirit, something real about ourselves.

Mark Baker
Nam, p. 15

HOW YOU USE IT COUNTS

FROM London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies issues an annual inventory of orders of battle called "The Military Balance." A number of military journals publish editions featuring these lists. When one learns, for instance, that "hy mor coy" means "heavy mortar company" and figures out that a nation touting "FGA: 2 sqns with 30 A-4KU" has a rather small air force, the list begins to make sense. It can even be fascinating if one has a professional interest in these matters.

The problem with looking at national power in terms of weaponry and numbers of divisions, wings, fleets, etc., is that it fosters a "bigger, better, and more" syndrome in our approach to national security. Perhaps, in this increasingly interrelated and complex world, large military forces may be pricing themselves down the road taken by the dinosaurs. Simultaneously as the cost of fielding a large, modern military has increased, situations and circumstances where the use of the kind of overwhelming force they are capable of delivering have become rare. Power can be measured in many ways other than by impressive weapons inventories. Smaller nations rich in resources like oil often have large international corporate and industrial holdings that tender them the kind of economic and political clout that translates quite well into power. While the military forces of some small but wealthy countries barely fill half a column in any journal's "military balance" edition, they may still be able to frustrate the superpowers through state-sponsored terrorism or by supporting insurgents (or freedom fighters).



Even as armies, air forces, and navies acquire increasingly capable and expensive weaponry, there seem to be ever more restrictive limits on the application of military power. From 1961 to 1975, as the world's greatest military power, the United States was unable to attain its national goals in Southeast Asia. To be sure, American technology was vastly superior to that of the North Vietnamese, Vietcong, Khmer Rouge, and Pathet Lao. Taken together in any "strategic balance" edition published in 1975, these forces would not have begun to use the ink needed to cover our inventory. As the war progressed, every tangible measurement of military success indicated that we were clobbering the enemy and, while losing 57,000 American lives and spending nearly \$200 billion on the war, we killed perhaps a million of our foes, wrecked their transportation and electrical generating systems, and destroyed thousands of trucks as they moved through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In South Vietnam, the

claim that our army was never defeated in a major battle is historically supportable, if arguable. Still, the color of the flag over Ho Chi Minh City testifies to the relevance of inventories in measuring military capability.

The Soviet Union has fared no better. Despite a long tally sheet, hefty in numbers of divisions, fleets, and wings of newlyminted "Ftrs and Bbrs," the Soviets continue to suffer from traditional Russian insecurities, as evidenced by the more than thirty divisions they keep quartered in the lands of their Warsaw Pact allies. And how effective are those forces? Eyeball-to-eyeball and toe-to-toe with the U.S. and NATO forces, they would probably give at least as good as they got. Since most analysts agree that this kind of war is most unlikely, the Soviet Union, too, has to contend with applying power in a world where overwhelming military force often is not relevant. In Afghanistan, for instance, after six years of fighting, the Afghan rebels are far from defeated. The

Soviets, on the other hand, control most of Kabul, at least during the daytime.

The most pressing problem for the American military may not be how to continue our build-up in the face of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Rather, it may be how to effectively use what we have, given the realities of the modern world. The use of military power is an art. It has very little to do with inventory lists or programs planned for the "outyears." Winning or losing in warfare is *the* crucial issue. A fascination with lists of weaponry, their capabilities, and numbers of "divs and sqdns" obscures the larger and more important dimensions of warfare. The mastery of strategy and tactics is fundamental, and just as important is an understanding of the importance of culture, geography, history, and political realities of the day. As appealing as it may be, the solution is not so simple as "nuking them till they glow" or "bombing them back to the Stone Age."

E.H.T.



IRA C. EAKER
SECOND-PRIZE ESSAY

HOW DARE THEY TAMPER WITH THE SACRED FUNCTIONS OF THE HORSE CAVALRY?

MAJOR L. PARKER TEMPLE III



In 1909, the year the Army bought its first airplane, a far-sighted Infantryman, one Captain John A. Taylor, suggested in the . . . Infantry Journal that aeroplanes might soon be able to perform the most important duty of cavalry—which he saw as “penetrating the fog of war to locate the heads of

marching columns of the enemy.” This seemingly innocuous suggestion immediately sent the blood pressure of the cavalymen soaring upward. The Cavalry Journal promptly published an editorial in outraged reply, protesting that [Taylor] didn’t deserve serious consideration. How dare he tamper with the sacred functions of the horse cavalry?¹

THIS example of the difficulty in changing doctrine during the first third of this century typifies the environment in which General William “Billy” Mitchell spent a career dedicated to explaining, in terms of military doctrine, the impact that air power could have. His service branch did not support him professionally or doctrinally. More than fifty years later, the service that resulted from his efforts is facing a similar problem as space forces change the nature of military operations. Today’s Air Force, however, is in a better position to adapt to space forces than was the Army to General Mitchell’s air forces. The key difference will be the application of space experience gained during the past twenty-seven years.

During congressional testimony in 1913, General Mitchell said he did not favor separation of the air arm from the Army.² At that time, apparently, he could envision the integration of air and ground forces in some doctrinal context that did not require separation. However, before the end of the First World

War, General Mitchell came to believe that control of air forces had to be separate from ground and sea forces.³ Actual operational experience proved to be the deciding factor for him. By 1919, he returned from France convinced that land and sea power would soon be obsolete.⁴

Despite the experience of the First World War, the new doctrine for air power as an entity different from ground power was neither popular nor acceptable. The early air power advocates literally staked their careers on their doctrinal beliefs. Changes to the entrenched ways of thinking and operating were resisted with all the inertia that a traditional organization can muster. But the body of experience eventually grew until the resistant organization was overtaken by change. In resisting, the Army had laid the foundation on which the break with the air arm was made inevitable. Separate control might have been acceptably achieved had there been an adequate intellectual and physical reorganization to allow air forces within the doctrinal context

of the existing military forces.

Today's Air Force is at a similar crossroads: whether to reorganize doctrine to account for the uniqueness of space or whether, instead, to resist until space forces form a separate service. The former course would begin with earnest doctrinal recognition of the Air Force's increasingly important space operations experience and the effects of the space-related organizational changes in the military. The latter course would be the result of inaction.

To proceed intelligently in choosing which path to take, we must define doctrine. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, states that "aerospace doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge which is gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience."⁵ Put another way, "doctrine is officially approved prescriptions of the best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should be, the product of experience. Doctrine is what experience has shown usually works best."⁶

Is AFM 1-1 the right document to discuss doctrine for space forces? The new revision improves the cohesiveness and consistency of doctrine, incorporating serious and profound thought about air forces based on experience; establishes the proper doctrinal framework by describing and interrelating the environment, characteristics, and capabilities of air forces; and enumerates the Air Force missions and specialized tasks. In short, the new AFM 1-1 is purported to be the right guide for the air forces of today and the future. However, General James V. Hartinger, the first Commander of Air Force Space Command, said in 1983 that its predecessor's "treatment of traditional Air Force mission areas and associated doctrine looks fine. But it makes no reference to space doctrine."⁷ Air Force Manual 1-6, *Military Space Doctrine*, had appeared in 1982; subsequently, it was viewed as a shallow document, which the combination of air and space in *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* was to remedy.⁸ However, the assertion that

air and space forces are identical in nature, concept, and employment reduced the value of the new AFM 1-1 to an increasingly important segment of the Air Force: space operations.

Assertions of such similarity lose the perspective of the most basic, inherent, and irconcilable differences and are roughly akin to the cavalry officers of old espousing the idea that airplanes were good only for carrying hay to the cavalry in the field. To determine a wiser course, we must start with the environment and then proceed to examine characteristics, capabilities, missions, and tasks. With these ideas in mind, we may be ready to decide on the doctrine and organizational structure most promising for the future.

The Wrong Environment

Our *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* explains that "land, naval, and aerospace forces possess certain intrinsic capabilities to produce . . . [desired effects]. Each force derives its intrinsic capabilities from the characteristics and medium in which it operates."⁹ The manual explains that aerospace is synonymous with *air* and that both terms mean the aerospace medium.¹⁰ It reads well substituting *air* for aerospace, but not *space* for aerospace. The mutual identity of air, space, and aerospace is fundamentally untrue, both legally and physically. Legally, aircraft require a country's permission for overflight, whereas space systems do not. More important, vehicles do not operate in the same physical manner in air and space.

The manual has only one paragraph on space.¹¹ In that paragraph, space is identified as the outer reaches of the aerospace medium. This philosophically pleasing concept of a continuum of the aerospace environment from the earth's surface to the point where the last vestige of atmosphere gives way to deep space has no practical use. The history of unsuccessful attempts to define a boundary

between the air and space has been so for good reasons. The legal implications alone have been difficult to surmount. While that inability is not new (it actually predates the first Earth-orbiting satellites), wherever the boundary exists, the legal and physical rules that govern things in space and those that govern things in the air are fundamentally different. These differences may seem obvious, but they are crucial.

The Wrong Characteristics

Perhaps the most significant differences in air and space forces are in their characteristics. "Aerospace allows potentially unlimited horizontal and vertical movement for aerospace warfare systems. The capacity to maneuver freely in three dimensions allows our forces to exploit the characteristics of *speed*, *range*, and *flexibility*."¹² Because of the laws of physics, there are constraints on space systems that result in very limited movement (a few percent or less) in either the horizontal or vertical once in orbit. Space systems are particularly unmaneuverable in relation to air forces, due to the energy considerations that keep science fiction such as Luke Skywalker's starfighter exactly what it is—fiction.

From the point of view of air forces, it would seem that increases in characteristics are desirable. Aircraft that fly faster, go farther, and do more things are the qualitatively superior air vehicles we depend on to counter numerically superior opponents. "The prior acceptance and application of the thesis that superior arms favor victory, while essential, are insufficient unless the 'superior arms' are accompanied by a military doctrine . . . which provides for full exploitation of the innovation."¹³ Increasing the speed, range, and flexibility of space systems does not exploit their innovation or produce correspondingly more desirable results. Once an orbit is chosen, the parameters of inclination, the degree of circularity, and the time for one complete circuit of

our planet are fairly well fixed.

Speed is of little practical value to space forces, compared to the advantage it holds for air forces. While the absolute speed of a space vehicle greatly exceeds that of an airplane, the airplane's speed is much less constraining. Due to orbital mechanics, altering a satellite's speed actually reduces its ability to do its job, since a change in speed results in different orbital parameters. Interestingly, some space systems with nearly zero speed relative to Earth have the most value. Those satellites in geosynchronous orbit perform valuable tasks, yet are nearly stationary, relying on their low net ground velocity to take advantage of a tremendous Earth overview.

Range is also of little practical value. A satellite with a ten-year operating lifetime may be placed into an orbit that will result in reentry several hundred thousand millenia after launch. Such a satellite will circle the earth billions of times before its atmospheric reentry. Such vast range is useless.

Flexibility of space forces is problematical, since they are mostly oriented toward accomplishing a single mission, with little capability to do anything else. For instance, a global positioning system satellite provides navigation information to terrestrial forces. A defense meteorological satellite provides weather information. Neither is flexible enough to have a simple software change or the replacement of some black box and then to be ready to assume each other's missions. Even if a satellite could be designed to carry out either navigation or weather observation, the orbits required for the two missions are so distinctly different and incompatible that such flexibility would have no practical purpose. The flexibility of space forces is sharply reduced by the demands of high reliability and the environment in which they operate. Technologically sophisticated, highly reliable space forces are essentially the antithesis of the flexibility ascribed to aerospace forces in *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*.

The Wrong Capabilities

Our manual on basic doctrine addresses capabilities in this statement: "Each force derives its intrinsic capabilities from the characteristics and medium in which it operates."¹⁴ Within four pages of having described this truth, the manual loses the point that the medium and the characteristics of space and air forces are so fundamentally different that the capabilities of each must also be fundamentally different. Here it states that the capabilities of aerospace forces are to be responsive, mobile, and survivable; to show presence; to deliver destructive firepower; and to provide unparalleled observation.¹⁵ Of these capabilities, only the last is directly related to space forces. All of the other capabilities relate essentially to air forces. The different characteristics and capabilities ascribed to space forces are not such that merely "doing them better" would allow them to be like air forces. These are inherent due to the inherent differences between air and space.

The Wrong Missions and Tasks

Basic Aerospace Doctrine breaks aerospace activities into Air Force missions and specialized tasks. These categories claim to encompass "the most current guidance on those assigned military responsibilities and functions for which the Air Force must prepare forces."¹⁶ Air Force missions are summaries of the overall objectives attained by aerospace forces' employment. Air Force specialized tasks are those activities which "enhance the execution and successful completion of Air Force missions."¹⁷ Yet of all the missions and specialized tasks, none are related to space, nor are they discussed in such a way that they could apply to space.

Department of Defense Directive 5160.32 designates the Air Force as the DOD executive agency for space launch and tasks the Air Force with all launch and orbital support op-

erations for the DOD.¹⁸ Thus, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* is wrong when it claims that the categorization of Air Force missions and specialized tasks incorporates "the most current guidance on . . . assigned military responsibilities. . . ."¹⁹ It fails to list the space missions or specialized tasks for which the Air Force is the DOD executive agent. In the previous edition of AFM 1-1, there was a discussion of space operations, yet that was eliminated in the revision in spite of the DOD directive and the extensive space operations experience of the Air Force.

Thus, the entire fabric of *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* is woven for air forces and is inappropriate for space forces. Its "force fit" does not agree with our experiences in space for more than a quarter of a century, in peace, crisis, and conflict. We have come to understand in detail the differences in the environment, characteristics, capabilities, missions, and specialized tasks. Those listed in the manual really apply to air forces and not space forces. Other components are needed for a doctrine useful to space.²⁰

The Right Doctrine

The nature of the place we call space is that the environment exhibits global coverage, vastness, and free access, but not versatility or legal and physical boundaries. Space forces are characterized by their inhospitable environment, constrained maneuverability, endurance, and technical sophistication—not by their speed, range, and flexibility. More useful measures might describe how long a satellite operates in orbit and the lifetime of each particular orbit, measured in days in space or years, ad infinitum.

The differences in the environment and characteristics result in the need for a doctrine that speaks more eloquently and correctly about the capabilities of space forces. Such are the cornerstones on which the U.S. Air Force must build a doctrine that accu-


rately imparts “to all Air Force personnel a basis for understanding the use of aerospace forces in peace and war.”²¹ These words by General Charles Gabriel in the foreword to *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* are most important. We must recognize that space is a place and not a mission—but it is a *different* place than the air.

Those functions that can be supported from space best illustrate the capabilities of space forces. The speculative diagram shown in Figure 1 divides the functions supported by space forces into both support and combat roles involving four major types of activities. The long-term trend seems to be from those activities on the left to those on the right. The shift from traditional support roles toward incorporation of more active and participative military roles is analogous to the airplane and its integration into military operations. The U.S. Army first relegated the airplane to support roles such as battlefield observation and courier missions. Later, the airplane was allowed to evolve into more combative roles, such as close air support and interdiction, and ultimately to strategic air power. While there are no force application space systems presently, should the President decide to develop

a ballistic missile defense based on the Strategic Defense Initiative technologies, such systems would fall under that category. Many of the activities outlined in the figure fall technically into either Air Force missions or specialized tasks.

Of the four major types of activities listed on the figure, one in particular would seem appropriately called an Air Force mission. That is space control. This is the space age counterpoint to the Navy’s mission of sea control and the Air Force’s counterair. It consists of “providing freedom of action in space for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy.”²² The air-launched antisatellite currently undergoing development testing is an example of a space control system. It would seem, then, that not only is space a place from which Air Force missions are supported or enhanced, but also it is a place in which the Air Force *has* missions. However, just as General Mitchell tried his best to get the “old guard” military to recognize that the air was an arena in which valuable missions could be performed, today we should be recognizing that there are missions performed in space which are not air missions. Hopefully, we shall not be guilty of trying to prevent tampering with the sacred

Figure 1. Functions for space forces



functions of the horse cavalry ourselves.

There are other examples that AFM 1-1 should have treated as missions or, at the very least, as specialized tasks associated with space. Space support functions of space launch and orbital operations are candidates, especially considering their unique attributes, their support and enhancement of other Air Force missions and tasks, and their assignment to the Air Force as their DOD executive agency.

The Need for the Right Stuff

The omission of explicit reference to space in favor of the term *aerospace* did little doctrinal justice for an important segment of the Air Force and our national security. Without a doctrine, the growing importance of space forces will not diminish, but the overall effectiveness of space forces could be hurt, since doctrine is the foundation of strategy. However, my discussion of this doctrinal gap should not be mistaken for a justification to establish a separate space service in a manner similar to the separation of air and ground forces in the late 1940s. Although some of the same seeds for separation are present, the establishment of the Air Force Space Command as a line organization could be a positive step to integrate space forces into the framework of the Air Force, if accompanied by appropriate doctrine.

Asked for his view of severing the air arm from the Army, Major Horace Hickam put it succinctly: "I am confident that no general thinks he can control the Navy or no admiral thinks he can operate an army, but some of them think they can operate an air force."²³ Neither the Navy nor the Army were doctrinally prepared to integrate air operations into their services. We have the benefit of much more employment experience and understanding of space systems than the early air pioneers had when they began their advocacy. Yet without a space doctrine today, the Air Force is in much the same position as the

Army of sixty years ago.

The past twenty-seven years of operating space systems in both peace and war have resulted in considerable valuable experience. It is on that experience that a space doctrine must be based. With far less experience in aerial warfare and air operations, Lieutenant Henry "Hap" Arnold wrote a visionary article titled "Aircraft and War" in a 1913 issue of the *Infantry Journal*. He cited uses of aircraft in peacetime maneuvers, as well as limited combat experience in tactical, brushfire wars. He explained that the use of aircraft for reconnaissance had been confirmed, and he further conjectured that aircraft could be used for air superiority, messenger service, forward air controlling, air transport, and offensive operations.²⁴ Whatever Lieutenant Arnold's expectations were in 1913, he laid the intuitive doctrinal foundation, which eventually led to his prominence in the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service. After only ten years of the aircraft's existence and even less demonstration of its practical value, he was able to see the importance of air forces in the future of warfare. By 1945, his thinking was that "any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security."²⁵ The Air Force has had space equipment operational for more than a quarter century, but it does not have a space doctrine to match.

Doctrine alone, however, is insufficient without a proper organizational infrastructure. The importance of space and the need for space organization were emphasized in the formation of Air Force Space Command. The future holds a more striking reiteration by the imminent formation of the Unified Space Command. The Air Force ought to be the doctrinal leader of the new Unified Command. As Major General I. B. Holley has stated, "... one can say with assurance: doctrine and organization are intricately and probably inextricably related."²⁶

There are considerable omissions in our *Basic Aerospace Doctrine* to justify another needed publication, *Space Doctrine*.

We are on the verge of a great age in space when it will be of the utmost importance to exploit the spacecraft as a weapon to its fullest potential in our struggle for survival. . . . We must explore the full range of the offensive and defensive capabilities of spacecraft and study no less avidly their limitations. . . . We must not delay our effort to conceptualize the eventual combatant role of spacecraft even if current treaty obligations defer the actual development of hardware.²⁷

If doctrine is “the building material for strategy” and is “fundamental to sound judgment,” then we are not keeping faith with our experience and the lessons of the past.²⁸ Our roots as a separate service owe a great deal to the lack of foresight that prevailed with respect to the airplane, except on the part of a few great captains who were exceptional early aviators. Today, we are in a far better position to understand the nature of space forces than the people who objected to the

airplane’s challenging the sacred functions of the horse cavalry.

SPACE forces are vital to our national security. They support and perform integral roles and missions for the U.S. Air Force. They have done so for more than a quarter of a century, in peace, crisis, and conflict. For that length of time, the Air Force has not been keeping its space doctrine ahead of its equipment as General Arnold told us we must do. If we can learn anything from the past and the genesis of the Air Force, it must be that space doctrine as an explicit entity is more necessary today than at any time in the past. In *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, General Gabriel tells us all to “study, evaluate, and know our doctrine—for each of us, as professional airmen, has a responsibility to be articulate and knowledgeable advocates of aerospace power.”²⁹

So, *Space Doctrine*, quo vadis?

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. I. B. Holley, Jr., “Looking Backward to See Ahead in Space,” speech delivered to Second Annual Military Space Symposium, 12 October 1982.

2. DeWitt S. Copp, *A Few Great Captains* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. xvi.

3. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, 16 March 1984, p. v.

6. Major General I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR (Ret), “Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft: The Search for Doctrine,” *Air University Review*, September-October 1983, p. 4.

7. General James V. Hartinger, “AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,” letter, dated 23 June 1983.

8. Air Force Manual 1-6, *Military Space Doctrine*, 15 October 1982. Page 8 of AFM 1-6 mentions the revision of AFM 1-1, which was to become the current *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*, and explains that AFM 1-1 was “being revised to recognize space as a medium and not as a separate mission.”

9. AFM 1-1, p. 1-3.

10. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 2-2.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Professor I. B. Holley, Jr., *Ideas and Weapons* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 19.

14. AFM 1-1, p. 1-3.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 3-2.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 3-3.

18. Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, *Development of Space Systems*, 8 September 1970.

19. AFM 1-1, p. 3-2.

20. Holley, *Ideas*, p. 39. Professor Holley lays out a good historical analogy for the chicken and egg argument of weapon selection and doctrine. In 1917, there was no clearly defined doctrine of aerial warfare. However, aircraft had to be bought to support the war. The types of aircraft—bomber, pursuit, scout, etc.—were selected arbitrarily since there was no “realization of the importance of determining doctrine before settling detailed questions regarding characteristics for each type [of aircraft].” The selection of proper force mix, then, was clearly shown to be a fallout of proper doctrine selection, subsequent development of the proper strategy and tactics, and finally weapons decisions. The ad hoc nature of space systems development has had a similar, though luckily less-damaging effect in our day.

21. AFM 1-1, p. iii.

22. *Air Force Space Plan*, Hq USAF, Washington, D.C., March 1983, p. 5-1.

23. Copp, p. xv.

24. Holley, “Looking Backward,” *op. cit.*

25. General of the Air Force H. H. Arnold, quoted in Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, 14 February 1979, p. 4-11.

26. Holley, “Looking Backward,” *op. cit.*


27. Holley, “Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft,” p. 10.

28. AFM 1-1, frontispiece.

29. *Ibid.*, p. iii.


CHINA'S SECURITY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SAMUEL D. MCCORMICK



THE Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continuing conflict there, and the importance of Gulf oil to the U.S. and other Western economic systems—all remind U.S. military professionals of our nation's major security concerns in Southwest Asia. The economic, political, and strategic importance of the area prompts the involvement of many extraregional polities in the security affairs of the region, directly through military intervention, less directly through security assistance programs and arms sales/transfers, or through diplomatic initiatives. One such actor in the region—whose regional activities receive very little attention, even by professionals involved in studying regional security

challenges—is the People's Republic of China (PRC). The purposes of this article are twofold: to explore China's security involvement in Southwest Asia, the scope of its activities, and its motivations for involvement; and to note their implications for U.S. and regional security interests. In this article, the term *Southwest Asia* (SWA) should be understood as coinciding with the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) (see map), which includes all of the Arabian Peninsula (extended northward to include Jordan and Iraq), Egypt, the Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Kenya, plus Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This culturally, ethnically, and geographically diverse area cannot be considered as a single region



except in one respect: as the AOR of a new U.S. unified command, it is the subject of regionally unique U.S. policies, objectives, and initiatives.

Importance of the Region

The United States has compelling interests in the security and stability of the region, which have been articulated in sequential presidential doctrines since the Second World War. These culminated in the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force) in January 1983. Beyond the obvious importance of access to the region's petroleum resources for the economic health of the Western economic system, the United States is interested in the security and stability of the area's moderate regimes and in keeping the area free of Soviet hegemony. The United States also recognizes the strategic importance of the region, both as a land bridge between Eurasia and Africa and as an air and sea communications crossroads that contains such important geographical constrictions as the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab, and the Strait

of Hormuz. Finally, the United States strongly values establishment of an enduring and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Israel and one of its primary adversaries (Syria) are outside the defined boundaries of the region, the instability and tension thrown off by the struggle have a profound impact on intraregional security. Indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict is viewed by many of the leaders of the area as the most serious and certainly most enduring security issue they face.

For several reasons, Southwest Asia is also important to China. First, from the standpoint of China's security, Chinese Communist leaders since Mao have viewed the region—especially the portion comprising Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—as a barrier to the encirclement of China. They have thus been very sensitive to any major outside power with the might to threaten China, whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union, involving itself in the affairs of the region.

Chinese concern about encirclement has been manifested especially at two specific times since the Communists came to power. The first

was during the early 1950s, when U.S. diplomacy in the Eisenhower years was reflected in John Foster Dulles's efforts to establish collective security pacts to contain communism. The second period of concern has been more or less continuous since the early 1970s. In the wake of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, increasing Soviet adventurism throughout the Third World, and with China's perceptions of declining U.S. military power relative to the Soviet Union and diminished national resolve in the United States following the American withdrawal from Vietnam, China came to view the Soviet Union as its most immediate security threat. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a variety of Soviet activities in South Arabia and the Horn of Africa, and thinly veiled 1985 Soviet threats against Pakistan over aid to the resistance in Afghanistan have done little to allay Chinese concerns.

The second aspect of Southwest Asia's importance to China is linked to the way in which China views itself, the region, and the world. In the Chinese view, after the Second World War, there was a vacuum in Southwest Asia (and in much of the Third World) left by the necessary but rather hasty withdrawal of Western European powers. The United States began stepping in to fill this vacuum. Initially, the Chinese supported Soviet efforts to oust U.S. influence from Southwest Asia and the Third World, making the area safe for the socialist revolution. Soon it became apparent to China, however, that the Soviets merely wanted to supplant U.S. "imperialism" with Soviet "imperialism." Because the Chinese believed that in the oil resources and the strategic location of Southwest Asia lay the potential for economic control of the Third World, outside intervention by either the United States or the Soviet Union was cause for concern. Thus, the goal of Chinese actions shifted toward preventing the control of the Southwest Asia region—and the rest of the Third World—by any extraregional power. China not only prefers that regional disputes be settled by regional actors but also

insists that no major Southwest Asia security issue, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or Afghanistan, will be settled satisfactorily until the superpowers have ceased to interfere.¹

Southwest Asia: A Security Assistance Crossroads

With the plethora of critical regional security issues and the importance of the area to so many, it is no surprise that extraregional powers would vie for influence and that this competition should spread into the security assistance/arms transfer arena. Thus, since the mid-1970s, a greater share of U.S. arms sales and transfers have gone to the Middle East/Southwest Asia region (including Israel) than to any other in the world, while the Soviets have transferred tremendous quantities of armaments to their client states, sometimes reequipping the same states following successive Israeli victories. The area has received the greatest share of Chinese arms transfers also.

The Arab oil embargo during the late 1970s and attendant transfer of capital to the region have meant that many regional states have had the ability to purchase the very latest conventional weaponry and that their future conflicts would be even more lethal than past ones. The Iran-Iraq War, with many thousands killed in action thus far, seems to be bearing this out.

With some of the latest technology weaponry being transferred to the region, one might wonder how China could be competitive. It is widely held that China's latest military equipment is merely a modification, however good, of generations-old Soviet systems. Why would any regional state turn to China for its defense needs when more advanced weaponry was available, either from the West or from the Soviet Union?

The answer lies in the turbulent politics in the region and individual states' relationships with the superpowers. With political bedpartners in the region shifting like the sands of Arabia over the past twenty years, there are

several major regional states (Egypt, for example) whose armed forces were once largely equipped by the Soviets but which since have cut themselves off from Soviet supply channels, spare parts, and defense credits. For these states, China offers an alternative in its enhanced older-generation equipment and parts, often provided at generous terms, which can keep presently equipped forces functioning.

Two types of weapon systems, which together comprise some of China's most significant arms transfers, illustrate this situation. The first category is fighter aircraft; the second category is armored fighting vehicles, especially main battle tanks.

Almost all Chinese fighter aircraft presently in production are based on Soviet aircraft designs transferred to China and approved for production in China in the late 1950s. These aircraft have been modified and enhanced substantially, sometimes to the point that a new design and designation have emerged. At times these designs have incorporated Soviet technology acquired without Soviet consent. Major systems with underlying Soviet designs include the J-5 (MiG-15); J-6 (MiG-19); Q-5, a twin-engined, ground-attack aircraft derived from the J-6; J-7 (MiG-21); J-8, a new design based on advanced Soviet (MiG-23) and other technology acquired from various sources.

Production of the J-6 began in 1958. Together with the twin-seat trainer variant, the J-6 has proved a durable design. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, 140 J-6 aircraft were transferred to Pakistan (export designations F-6 and FT-6).² These Pakistani aircraft have since been modified with additional equipment to accommodate the U.S. Sidewinder AAM for improved air-to-air combat capability and auxiliary fuel tanks for longer range. China exported 280 J-6 aircraft during China's fifth Five Year Plan (1976-80) and has made further deliveries in the early 1980s.³

The twin-engine Q-5 attack aircraft, designated the A-5 for export, was developed in the early 1970s, again from the venerable J-6. It

uses the same powerplant but is larger than the J-6. Deliveries of this aircraft to Pakistan began in 1983 and continue today.⁴

The J-7 (export designation F-7) was copied from a Soviet MiG-21 delivered around 1960 but never intended by the Soviets for production in China. Because the MiG-21 design was transferred to several Soviet clients in Southwest Asia and elsewhere, China has found a market for the J-7's component parts and engines and for reconditioning of Soviet-made equipment among those states (such as Egypt) with strained or curtailed relations with the Soviets.

The J-8 is a new Chinese Mach 2, delta-wing, supersonic fighter that reportedly incorporates advanced Soviet technology acquired from MiG-23 aircraft supplied to China by Egypt, in addition to modern technologies acquired from other sources. J-8 development was started in the early 1970s. Use of full capabilities of the aircraft design has reportedly been slowed by problems in copying and reproducing advanced-capability power plants.⁵

China also has incorporated Soviet main battle tank (MBT) technology into two systems that have been transferred by China in considerable quantities to regional states but which have been modified to incorporate advanced technology and capabilities.

The Type 69 MBT (Soviet T62) entered production in 1969. It differs from the earlier Type 59 (Soviet T54), which it replaced in production, by enhancements in armament and the fire control system (including laser range finder and night vision equipment), as well as the obvious structural changes. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that 260 Type 69s have been transferred to Iraq.⁶ The earlier Type 59 was transferred to Pakistan in very substantial quantities. About eighty light tanks of Chinese origin have been transferred to the Sudan.⁷

All of these systems—both aircraft and tanks—are not competitive with the latest Western or Soviet technology. However, they

do represent levels of technology that can be absorbed and successfully employed by many nations in Southwest Asia and throughout the Third World.

China's Increasing Involvement

China's economic and security involvement in Southwest Asia was quite limited until after 1976, with one exception, because of several factors. The first factor was the limitation of what China could provide to the area, given its own economic constraints and older-generation military technology that often was unattractive in the face of Western or Soviet willingness to transfer more modern systems. The second factor was Communist China's demonstrated reticence toward involvement in security alliance structures. That hesitation continues to the present, although China's desire for economic interaction has been on the rise.

China's shifting views

In considering the character, directions, and scope of China's security involvement and foreign policy toward Southwest Asia, one analyst has suggested three distinct phases: 1949-63; 1963-74; and 1974 to the present.⁸ These will be used as a convenient framework for this analysis.

During the first decade and a half of the Communist regime's leadership in Beijing (1949-63), China's actions were ideological reflections of the bipolar environment. China firmly supported Soviet foreign policy positions and vituperatively attacked U.S. and Western policy positions and actions (including the establishment of collective security pacts with Third World nations). During this 1949-63 period, Chinese weapons transfers and security assistance to Southwest Asia were almost nonexistent.

In 1963, after increasing disillusionment on a variety of ideological and practical matters, China split from the Soviet camp formally and bitterly. This break marked the beginning of a

new phase of China's interaction in Southwest Asia, which was to extend through the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War, and the Arab oil embargo. This ten-year period was one of transition from the earlier policy alignment with Moscow to China's present policy positions. The split with Moscow was accompanied by a demonstrated willingness on the part of China to compete with the Soviet Union for influence, especially in the Third World. This competition proceeded from ideological bases rather than from economic goals or interests. Such grants of aid and developmental economic assistance as were extended were used to produce a measure of political influence. Securing access to strategic or other raw materials, gaining foreign markets, and improving economic conditions in underdeveloped parts of the region were only tangentially important. Sino-Soviet rivalry, as well as Sino-Western competition, in Southwest Asia was virtually an extension of a broader political/ideological struggle and had few overtones of competition for markets and resources for economic gain.

The 1963-74 period marked the beginning of significant Chinese security assistance and arms transfers to Southwest Asia, with transfers to Pakistan especially significant. Also, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli (Six Day) War, China began providing arms and military/ideological training to radical substate actors, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Dhofar insurgents in Oman, as well as support for the new Marxist regime in South Yemen. These efforts were aimed at supporting local movements of "national liberation" that contested extraregional ("imperialist") forces in Southwest Asia. China's support for these movements was in consonance with its view that regional security would be obtained only when extraregional involvement in regional affairs had been stopped.

Since 1974, China's involvement has assumed the character and orientation found today (al-

though in the mid-1980s a change might be occurring again). The transition was conditioned by the change in regional political dynamics brought on by the massive transfer of wealth into the center of Southwest Asia as an accompaniment to the Arab oil embargo. In addition, China became more worried about the danger posed by the Soviet Union. Third, China perceived that the United States was not confronting the Soviet challenge firmly enough, even though only the United States had the power to do so successfully.

The improved economic condition that many regional states achieved brought a new independence and importance to their actions in the global arena. The moderate and oil-blessed states were able to dispense some of their new-found wealth to wean other moderate regional states from radical or Communist influences. Economics became a most powerful factor in the political dynamics of regional states' interactions with extraregional powers.⁹ The oil-

rich central states of Southwest Asia and, through their largesse, other less-blessed Middle East states had less need of extraregional political advice, military assistance grants, and strings-attached arms transfers. Since most of what the Soviet Union had to offer was in the military assistance/arms transfer realm, Soviet contributions and interactions with these states have declined since 1974. Surprisingly, China's links have increased since the mid-1970s.

For China after the mid-1970s, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao Zedong, changes in its view of the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet relations, the need for economic revitalization internally to support the Four Modernizations (China's plan to upgrade

During Bright Star, American and Egyptian pilots got a chance to work together. This publicity shot shows two USAF aircraft—an A-10 and an F-16—in formation with a UMig-15 and a Soviet-built MiG-21 of the Egyptian Air Force.



its agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military), and changing political dynamics in Southwest Asia combined to alter the directions of China's involvement in the region. The perceptual changes wrought during the 1970s, one analyst has noted, were so significant that ideology itself became of marginal importance to China's foreign relations in Southwest Asia.¹⁰ Thus, increasingly since the late 1970s, China has been working to strengthen relations with conservative and socialist states alike in the area while cutting or substantially loosening its ties with radical, revolutionary, or dissident actors at the substate level.

So profound was this change in outlook that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the guiding precepts of China's former interaction in SWA—essentially, to provide support for the socialist revolution against the forces of reaction—were replaced by the concept of building the widest possible front against Soviet aggression and



Guns blazing, a Chinese-built F-7 makes a firing run during Bright Star. The F-7 only resembles the earlier model Soviet MiG-21. It is, in fact, a far more capable aircraft. . . . American pilots (below) look over a Chinese F-6, placed on display by the Egyptians during Bright Star. The Egyptians operate five squadrons of F-6s and one F-7 squadron, with forty additional F-7s on order.



hegemony. China believed that the Soviet Union had a deliberate, well-conceived, even time-phased strategy to strangle the Third World and Western economic system through control of the oil and other resources of Southwest Asia and Africa, in the process outflanking and wrapping around Communist China. In the Chinese view, the Soviet Union had become the premier threat to world peace because, unlike its superpower rival (the United States), the Soviets had come to "imperialism" late, cloaking their actions in the guise of Marxism-Leninism as justification, and were more likely to encourage the use of force of arms, either directly or through surrogates, to effect political change since they could not compete economically with the West. Thus in September 1979, fully three months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister noted that the Soviet Union, "... with a view to encircling Europe, controlling strategic routes, seizing resources, and speeding up its expansion and strategic development for global hegemony, has increasingly directed the spearheads of its aggression at Africa [and] the Middle East."¹¹

the exception: Pakistan

Although China's security involvement in Southwest Asia was limited prior to the late 1970s, an exception was Pakistan, with whom China has had pragmatic and enduring aid, trade, and military assistance agreements. Pakistan has been the principal recipient of Chinese military assistance since the mid-1960s. Thus today, a large share of Pakistan's military systems are of Chinese origin, either manufactured in China and delivered to Pakistan or manufactured in Pakistan from Chinese designs. Pakistan also has been the largest recipient of Chinese developmental economic aid in a relationship that dates back to the mid-1950s. Trade between the two nations has been modest as a total percentage of imports and exports but is important to both parties. The two coun-

tries are linked across their common borders by highways that have considerable strategic as well as economic importance.

What are the Chinese motives for this relationship, which is as close a one as China maintains with any state? Obviously, one important one is having Pakistan as a segment in the barrier to Soviet encirclement of China. Pakistan also represents a potential ally and political/military counterpoint to a hostile India, although China has lately tried for closer Sino-Indian relations. Additionally, Chinese aid to Pakistan serves as a model of what China can do for other Third World states. The economic factor is more important here than with other countries with whom China trades because an economically prosperous Pakistan is likely to be a more stable Pakistan, as well as a more lucrative trading partner.

Since the early 1980s, with renewed Western interest in the security and stability of Pakistan, advanced Western weaponry has been flowing into the country again. China has been content to emphasize Sino-Pakistani economic and trade relations, while continuing Sino-Pakistani arms transfers at a modest level. Because the Chinese see increased U.S./Western security assistance to Pakistan as improving Pakistan's defense against Soviet aggression, they welcome it. In fact, one analyst has noted that the Chinese recognize that they cannot stop a Soviet thrust into Pakistan but the United States may be able to. Thus the unusual situation exists wherein China is looking, none too covertly, to the West and the United States to secure Pakistan's territorial integrity against Soviet aggression.¹²

From Pakistan's perspective, the aid and military assistance that China has rendered reduce overdependence on the West—a supply source which has, from Pakistan's view, proved uncertain from time to time. The Chinese connection also has obviated the need for Soviet security assistance, which was offered to Pakistan in 1966, after the 1965 U.S. arms embargo, and which China preempted with its assistance.

recent trends and future prospects

While ideology has diminished as a director of China's interaction in Southwest Asia, economic interaction has increased. Chinese trade and official delegations have traveled frequently and extensively throughout Southwest Asia in the first half of the 1980s, especially to the oil-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula, promoting the benefits of trade with and investment in China. This aspect of China's involvement in Southwest Asia can be expected to increase in coming years, perhaps substantially, as may Arab investment in China.

In the 1980s, the security assistance/arms transfer aspect of China's involvement in Arab nations in the region cannot be considered insignificant. This circumstance is a substantial change from previous periods, for China's security involvement in Southwest Asia traditionally was the least important dimension.¹³ Prior to 1976, China had provided small arms, military training, and political indoctrination to some substate actors involved in wars of national liberation, most notably in connection with the Arab-Israeli War, the Dhofar rebellion (Oman), and other Gulf "liberation front" movements, as well as to the newly independent Marxist regime of South Yemen, but no significant Sino-Arab arms transfers occurred.

Loss of access to Soviet equipment or the desire to seek alternatives, coupled with China's policy reorientation and more pragmatic approach, opened the door for Chinese security assistance and increasing arms transfers in Southwest Asia at an unprecedented level. Attrition of Soviet systems through several regional conflicts has served to accelerate China's involvement. In fact, China is perhaps the only state that can provide immediate, substantial materiel support to many weapon systems of Soviet clients when the Soviets turn off the tap.

Currently, four states in Southwest Asia are notable for the quantity of weapons of Chinese origin in their inventories. These states are

Egypt (with more than 150 F-6/FT-6/F-7 on hand or on order, plus submarines and contract work on other systems), Iraq (260 T-69 and reportedly some F-6 and F-7 aircraft), Pakistan (more than 200 F-6/FT-6 and A-5 on hand or on order, plus 1000 T-59), and the Sudan (eight F-5, six F-6 and six more on order, and seventy-eight light tanks).¹⁴ The scope of China's security involvement is evident, and Chinese security involvement has, in the 1980s, a significant impact on the military balance in Southwest Asia.

Sino-Arab arms transfers picked up in 1976, shortly after President Anwar Sadat withdrew Egypt from Soviet-Egyptian treaty commitments. China was immediately forthcoming with weapons and support. China's new ambassador noted that Egypt could "rely on China for all its needs."¹⁵ Military relations were a subject of discussion when President Hosni Mubarak visited China in 1983. The Egyptian foreign minister later commented on China's forthcoming attitude and reasonable approach to arms transfers and attendant financial arrangements. In August 1983, an article in *Aviation Week and Space Technology* reported at length on Chinese security assistance and arms transfers to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), noting that both the F-6 and F-7 aircraft were being assembled in Egypt by Chinese technicians and EAF personnel. The EAF commander was quoted as saying that the Chinese F-7 "is an economical aircraft, . . . good for fighter pilot training to increase flying hours and proficiency. Egypt also is getting the F-6 from China for air defense training and close air support."¹⁶

The tremendous attrition of arms that Iraq experienced in the early years of the Iran-Iraq War—arms that the Soviets were reluctant to replace for fear of angering Iran—forced Iraq to turn to China for both aircraft and tanks. Several sources have reported the transfer of a considerable number of F-6 and F-7 aircraft and T-69 tanks to Iraq through other Middle East intermediaries. China denies these sales—

it too, would not like to anger Iran, which is seen as a potentially lucrative economic market for Chinese wares when the war is over. Nevertheless, the presence of Chinese-built tanks in Iraq is sufficiently well confirmed that the International Institute for Strategic Studies lists Iraq as possessing 260 T-69 main battle tanks, while *Aviation Week and Space Technology* has recorded the transfer of both F-6 and F-7 aircraft.¹⁷

Whatever the financial terms at which the arms are transferred, the interaction in Southwest Asia yields an important advantage of considerable value to China's future national security. Through their contacts with regional armed forces, the Chinese have gained access to advanced Soviet (and probably Western) technology that heretofore was denied them but which is urgently needed to upgrade China's armed forces. Additionally, they have been able to keep abreast of Soviet military employment doctrines and tactics through study of several regional conflicts.

Interestingly, the Soviets have not seemed to want to counter actively China's increasing security assistance and arms transfer activities in the region. One Israeli analyst notes that "the Chinese arms sales . . . alleviated the never-ending burden of their military supply to the Arabs, prevented Western monopoly of the market, and helped maintain the infrastructure for future deliveries of more advanced Soviet weapons."¹⁸ This Soviet acquiescence also is consistent with a lessening of Sino-Soviet tensions that seems to be taking place in the mid-1980s—a softening which appears desirable to both parties.

It appears that both China and the Soviet Union are subduing some of the sharp hostility characteristic of the past two decades. The reasons, from China's perspective, are fairly clear. Quite apart from internal political dynamics, which do play a part here, China desires a reduction in regional tensions that will permit it to advance its Four Modernizations, improve its economy, and encourage foreign investment

in China. China, however, still actively denounces Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Analysts have speculated on the extent of China's covert support of Afghan insurgents, which may have exceeded \$100 million from 1981 through 1984.¹⁹ The Soviets have repeatedly denounced both the United States and China for the continuing Afghan resistance. China denies any support for the resistance and undoubtedly is concerned about the conflict expanding into Pakistan.

Implications for U.S. Security Interests in the Region

Given U.S. objectives in Southwest Asia, it is important that the United States develop positive relationships with China that are enduring and stable. For more than two decades after the PRC came into existence, the United States and China faced each other with acid hostility. By the early 1970s, changes in the attitudes and world views of both countries made possible a reassessment and a mutual conclusion that continued overt hostility was not in the best interests of either. Establishment of diplomatic relations and increased economic ties have provided a basis for better communication.

From a political and security outlook, U.S. and Chinese views of the major threats to global peace are more similar than dissimilar and have provided an additional basis for communication. As a U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs (NEA) pointed out in a policy statement in 1982, "our parallel interests in containing the Soviet Union have been repeatedly reaffirmed, and we are in fundamental agreement that the Soviets remain the principal threat to the peace of the world."²⁰

In this "parallel interest in containing the Soviets" and watchful deterrence against Soviet aggression, China has been a more vocal advocate than the United States through the early 1980s. The United States, China, and Southwest Asian regional leaders all share the

goal of preventing Soviet hegemony over any subarea of the Southwest Asia region, and all are concerned about continuing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

China's increasing economic activities in Southwest Asia and in the Western economic system generally are, and should be, encouraged as a move toward greater cooperation, communications, and stabilizing interdependence. The present Chinese security assistance in Southwest Asia, and even some growth of this involvement in the future, should not be cause for excessive U.S. apprehension. On the contrary, it permits those regional states with Soviet-based military systems to maintain their defensive capabilities without returning to the Soviet Union for refitting nor total reequipping with Western military systems that would cost money and effort better devoted to economic and social development.

While the United States and China share a number of important policy views, including recognition of the threat posed by Soviet expansion, a desire for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and a desire for a permanent, stable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be incorrect to state that the U.S. and Chinese positions on these issues are congruent. There are important differences, especially as to paths and processes to achieving the goals. It is important to bear in mind that while

China considers the Soviet Union as the primary threat to world peace, it also perceives the United States to be part of the problem. In the Chinese view, many desired objectives—stability in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa; a satisfactory long-term resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; freedom in Afghanistan; and resolution of other Southwest Asia security issues—will not be achieved until both superpowers and other extraregional states have ceased to interfere in the affairs of Southwest Asia. This sentiment applies in a broader sense to superpower and developed-nation involvement anywhere in the Third World.

For its part, the United States recalls, wisely, that there remain basic problems to be overcome in U.S.-China relations, problems that arise from the fundamentally different political and economic ideologies and systems of the two nations. Nevertheless, there is enough common basis in our goals and policy positions toward Southwest Asia that the United States and China can both interact in the region very acceptably.

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
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THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

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This is not an ordinary crisis situation, but a megacrisis, quite unprecedented . . . In the present and the foreseeable future, whichever power wishes to control or influence one-fourth of the world's population of 1 billion in South Asia, or three-fourths of the world's oil resources in the Gulf region and thereby the economies of Japan and Western Europe, that power will control the region around Hindu Kush—present-day Afghanistan.

Noor A. Husain¹



THE initial reaction of the Afghan people to the coup of April 1978 that overthrew the government of Mohammad Daoud was relatively passive. That summer, however, as the true Marxist colors of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) were revealed, resistance emerged. Beginning in Nuristan and Badakhshan, rural opposition spread rapidly and reached most provinces within ten months. The first urban uprising occurred in Herāt in March 1979, and many other cities and towns soon were affected. The resistance continued to grow in scope, although the number of *muja-hidin* (freedom fighters) was relatively small. Operating in a country that is a paradise for guerrillas, the *muja-hidin* laid ambushes, attacked outposts, and assassinated provincial officials. In the cities and towns, they encouraged demonstrations and strikes. By the end of 1979, virtually no part of the country, except the major cities, was securely controlled by the government. Nevertheless, the resistance was unable to oust the DRA because of the lack of arms, cohesion, and leadership.²

Becoming increasingly disillusioned by the DRA's inability to cope with the situation and dissatisfied with the policies and attitude of Hafizullah Amin, the head of state, the Soviet Union decided that direct military intervention was necessary. After quietly introducing military elements piecemeal in December 1979, a massive airlift began on Christmas Eve, and during the night of 27 December, Soviet forces murdered Amin and seized control of Kabul. Motorized rifle divisions swung down the two highways from the Soviet Union through western and central Afghanistan, capturing Afghan army and air bases and controlling the highway network. Babrak Karmal was installed swiftly as the new president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.³

The invasion was a classic Soviet military operation employing deception, speed, and substantial force. The airlift involved about 30 percent of the Soviet military and civilian transport aircraft.⁴ Although some analysts crit-

icized the employment of what seemed to be an ill-suited, heavy-armored force, most likely it was not intended for counterinsurgency operations but for dealing with the possibility that the DRA's own military units might offer resistance—as some did.⁵

Within weeks the Soviets also occupied Herāt, Kandahar, and the few other major cities; and they fully dominated the government. But the Afghans, instead of being intimidated by the invasion, now were doubly incensed—against the DRA as the obvious Soviet puppet and against the Soviets themselves as an unwelcome occupying foreign power seeking to subvert Afghanistan's society and religion totally. The Soviets soon had about 85,000 troops in Afghanistan but, because of the mounting resistance, found it necessary to garrison forces in many locations, thus overextending themselves and making it difficult to handle even small-scale opposition. As American analyst Joseph J. Collins has noted, the Soviets blundered in that they ignored Clausewitz's fundamental dictum: know the kind of war in which you are engaging. The result was that they entered Afghanistan without a suitable tactical doctrine.⁶

Once in command, the Soviets endeavored to rebuild the dispirited DRA Army with the objective of having it bear the brunt of the fighting. However, they have not succeeded. It is estimated that the Afghan army now numbers less than 40,000 men—less than one-half its size prior to the April 1978 coup, primarily because of continuing desertion. As a result, most military operations are joint Soviet/DRA affairs, and the Soviet combat role continues to expand.⁷

Several Soviet military weaknesses were evident in the early operations. Inexperience in guerrilla warfare was made even more apparent by junior officers not trained to make battlefield decisions. The problem was exacerbated by the use of outdated field communications that made it difficult for higher headquarters to command from the rear. Moreover, a number of the Central Asian soldiers ap-



An unexploded bomb in a field whose only importance is that it is by all rights Afghan and not Russian provides an example of technology failing to dominate the will of a proud and independent people.

peared to have little appetite to fight their ethnic Muslim brethren.⁸

For more effective management, the Soviets divided Afghanistan into seven military districts and introduced organizational changes in their ground forces. Probably the most important organizational change was the development of the reinforced rifle battalion containing antiair and artillery support and a tank company. Those additions provided the battalion with greater striking and sustaining power.⁹ Another organizational development was the creation of the 40th Army, with its headquarters in Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R., to command the Afghanistan theater of operations.¹⁰

Although initially, Soviet operations were directed primarily against the *mujahidin*, once the Soviets realized the popular support for the resistance movement, they deliberately turned to a terrorist strategy of "migratory genocide" and "rubblization." The tempo of their operations intensified appreciably in 1984 and even further the next year after Mikhail Gorbachev

came to power. Fighter-bombers and medium bombers hit targets deep inside guerrilla territory, seeking to destroy the village infrastructure supporting the *mujahidin*. "Free-fire" zones were created along the main roads and extended back to the hills behind them, and the villages within these zones were "virtually obliterated." In addition, field crops, food storage facilities, and the irrigation systems so vital to Afghan agriculture were bombed in the attempt to drive the people off the land.¹¹ Soviet aircraft also deliberately attacked civilian caravans coming into or leaving the country, thus causing many casualties among women and children. Small bombs shaped as toys or other attractive objects were used with the intent to maim children, and these caused many livestock casualties as well. Large enhanced-blast bombs that explode in midair sending out lethal shock waves have been used also.¹²

In this type of warfare, the helicopter has proved to be invaluable for a number of roles: ferrying troops into battle, providing close air support of ground forces in combat, and attacking villages or isolated bands of *mujahidin*. Air assault operations, usually of company or battalion strength, have been most successful when combined with motorized rifle unit operations. The Soviets find helicopters better suited than fixed-wing aircraft for close air support, probably because of the limited *mujahidin* antiair capabilities. There are approximately 325 Soviet helicopters based in Afghanistan, of which perhaps one-half are Mi-24 Hind gunships. The helicopters, operated usually in groups of from two to six, often are flown close to the ground for protection. These "nap-of-the-earth" tactics are demanding of both aircraft and crews and have contributed to improved pilot proficiency.¹³

In 1985, the Soviet strategy moved beyond mere control of the urban centers and the highway network. The heaviest fighting took place in and around Kabul and in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan. Near Kabul, Soviet/DRA forces destroyed most of the vil-

lages to create a vacuum for better security of the capital. In retaliation, the *mujahidin* launched frequent rocket attacks at the city; and small-scale firefights occurred almost nightly within Kabul.¹⁴

The three major Soviet offensives of the year were in eastern and southern Afghanistan and were intended to close off supply routes to Pakistan. They took place in the Kunar Valley during May and June, in the Panjshir Valley in July, and in Paktia Province during August and September. Each drive was a division-sized operation involving approximately 10,000 Soviet personnel and between 1000 and 2000 DRA troops. They commenced with prestrike attacks by helicopter gunships and fighter-bombers. Elite commandos and paratroops (*spetsnaz*) were transported in by helicopter to eliminate *mujahidin* defensive positions and to cut off escape. Then came armored attacks involving as many as 100 tanks. Casualties were heavy on both sides in each operation, and

the battles in Paktia Province were among the bloodiest of the war.¹⁵

In each offensive the Soviets prevailed after hard fighting, then withdrew, thus failing to achieve decisive success. The mines they placed to block the trails were removed quickly, and supplies once more flowed through.¹⁶

Despite more than six years of combat in Afghanistan, the Soviets still have weaknesses in their forces. The very fact that their military journals stress mountain warfare, physical fitness, and initiative is indicative of some problems.¹⁷ Replacements sent to Afghanistan usually lack sufficient training, are low in morale, and show little enthusiasm for combat. Drug addiction is a growing problem. As a result of these conditions within regular Soviet units, greater reliance has been placed on the elite Slavic commandos and paratroops, who are adept at small-unit operations, even though total Soviet troop strength has increased to about 118,000.¹⁸

The Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship brings an impressive load of firepower to the battlefield. Its pilots can fire machine guns and rockets or drop bombs before and after delivering a squad of Soviet troops.

WHAT is the nature of the Afghan *mujahidin* that makes him so formidable



able against superior Soviet military force? Perfectly at ease with his harsh environment, for centuries the Afghan has been respected as an able guerrilla. Possessing great courage, daring, and remarkable stamina, he is driven by a strict code of honor demanding implacable vengeance if it is violated. Loyalties are to family and tribe rather than to a government or a nation. Throughout the struggle with the Soviets, *mujahidin* morale has remained high. Dedicated to what they perceive as a holy war (*jihad*) for their Islamic faith and cultural traditions, the Afghans are ready to continue indefinitely. It is estimated that there are about 90,000 *mujahidin*, of whom about 20,000 are active at any one time.¹⁹

The initial *mujahidin* resistance was based on traditional Afghan warfare, with few signs of any methodical approach to the problems of fighting against a modern army. Tribal groups fought en masse in set battles with no specialized functions allocated to particular soldiers.²⁰

Slowly, more organized warfare developed. Several provinces have a military commander who divides them into sector commands. The sectors are further subdivided into fighting units of twenty-five to thirty-five men including specialists assigned to handle mortars, rocket-launchers, or heavy machine guns. One of the most notable commanders is Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose forces continue to operate in the Panjshir Valley despite repeated Soviet offensives. In coordination with residents of the valley, Massoud developed a well-organized military-political structure featuring representative political, financial, and other committees. He also has coordinated military operations with other commanders of northern and central Afghanistan. "Organization and training," Massoud has said, "are more important than weapons."²¹

Tactically, while guerrilla operations of hundreds of men have been launched occasionally, small units of thirty to forty men more frequently are used. The *mujahidin* prefer to set ambushes by bridges or defiles, to destroy

the bridges or block the roads, and then to fire from the concealed positions they have taken in the surrounding heights. If the enemy has a strong advance guard, it is allowed to pass before the main element is hit. After the engagement, the *mujahidin* then quickly withdraw.²²

Despite their martial qualities and intimate knowledge of the terrain, the *mujahidin* operate under severe handicaps, including shortages of arms, medicine, and food. And in spite of the Afghans' reputed prowess in guerrilla warfare, many accounts cite poor tactical planning and a lack of weapons training. One observer reported that "the rebels still walk into ambushes because of improper training and only rarely coordinate attacks in ways that would stretch Soviet defenses." He described one ill-conceived ambush as "more like Keystone Kops."²³ Another noted that the *mujahidin* "spend as much time praying as working out tactics or maintaining their weapons." His film crew was more apprehensive about being accidentally shot by the *mujahidin* than of being hit by the Soviets.²⁴

Providing military assistance for the resistance is a major consideration of the United States and other nations. A CIA pipeline was established rapidly after the Soviet invasion, and approximately \$75 million annually has been provided for a variety of weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical supplies. These provisions are slipped into Afghanistan somewhat surreptitiously by truck or animal caravan, with caution taken not to involve the Pakistan government officially in this traffic.²⁵

The more distant the location is from Pakistan, the more difficult it is to supply arms and supplies there. Some items reach the *mujahidin* from Iran, but many so routed go to Shi'ite groups whose support of the resistance is questionable.²⁶

Since 1980, there have been repeated *mujahidin* complaints about the quantity and quality of the arms received. Generally the fighters request more heavy machine guns, mines,

rocket grenades, and—as most essential—more effective anti-aircraft weapons.²⁷ Charges continue to be levied that many of the arms intended for the *mujahidin* never reach the fighting areas. There are accusations that the Pakistanis divert some for themselves, that the resistance political parties based in Pakistan retain others, and that the *mujahidin* are stockpiling some in Afghanistan for future use.²⁸

Nevertheless, according to a number of reports, the arms situation improved during 1985 and resulted in greater *mujahidin* capability against enemy ground and air attack. That was reflected in engagements throughout the country and particularly evident during the Paktia offensive, where the *mujahidin* were able to maintain a fighting force of from 3000 to 5000 men in action.²⁹ Among the weapons introduced in 1985 were Chinese 107-mm multi-rocket launchers and an improved SAM-7, and the *mujahidin* anticipated that Swiss Oerlikon 20-mm cannon and possibly British Blowpipe portable missiles for air defense would be available this year. Because of the heavy fighting in 1985, the U.S. Congress reportedly appropriated \$250 million as an emergency fund for arms and ammunition.³⁰ Nonetheless, the availability of arms remains spotty as some areas continue to have weapons and ammunition shortages.³¹

AFTER more than six years of war, Soviet control of Afghanistan is far from complete, and the resistance continues to hold most of the country. But the Soviets' increased viciousness is taking a toll as they escalate the terrorization of the people.³² Since the war began, probably more than 200,000 Afghans have been killed and more than one-third of the population has been forced to flee to Pakistan, Iran, or the Afghan cities. Agricultural production is estimated to be less than 25 percent of prewar levels in some areas. There has been enormous slaughter of livestock, and many surviving animals are in poor health. Food

shortages have resulted in "very acute signs of severe societal stress," and the famine in places has been compared to that in Ethiopia.³³

The Soviets, too, have suffered losses, although far fewer than the Afghans. As many as 60,000 have been killed or wounded in battle. Others were evacuated from Afghanistan because of disease. The estimated financial cost to the Soviets has exceeded \$20 billion.³⁴

At the Geneva summit conference in November 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev was quoted as saying that the Soviets would like to get out of Afghanistan.³⁵ However, most signs indicate that they intend to remain. While there are suggestions that the Soviets may be backing away from the Brezhnev Doctrine (once a Communist state, always a Communist state),³⁶ they are working energetically to recast Afghanistan political, social, and economic life in a Communist mold. That objective is reflected in the control exercised over national policy, newspapers, professional organizations, and the bureaucracy. Communist party membership and proficiency in the Russian language have become prerequisites for advancement, and the KHAD, the Afghan government's secret police, is everywhere.³⁷

U.S. policy has consistently supported the U.N. resolutions for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, a nonaligned Afghanistan, the free return of the refugees, and the people's right of self-determination in creating their own government.³⁸ Unfortunately, the Geneva rounds of indirect talks sponsored by the United Nations to achieve those objectives have been stymied by failure to reach agreement on a timetable for a Soviet withdrawal.

It generally is agreed that a critical challenge that the resistance faces is to establish unified political and military leadership, since, without it, the efforts of both fighters and supporters are fragmented and resources wasted. The political parties of the resistance, based in Pakistan, are divided ideologically along a spectrum of Islamic and secular beliefs. In addition, there are bitter personal and tribal rivalries.³⁹

Under pressure from the foreign nations that support the resistance, an alliance was formed in May 1985 of the seven major resistance political parties, the "Islamic Unity of *Mujahidin*." Although the alliance is loosely structured, it provides some coordination for military operations and may ultimately bring the unity that is imperative if the resistance is to achieve the diplomatic legitimacy and influence necessary for official international sanction and support. Late in 1985, the alliance began petitioning for representation in international bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and it planned to establish offices around the world to assist in publicizing the Afghanistan situation.⁴⁰

IN any event, the war has long escalated beyond the stage in which an ill-equipped and tactically unprepared *mujahidin* force can by itself force a Soviet withdrawal. Fortunately, that force is now better armed, organized, and professionally skilled than it was initially, and it can improve its position with more extensive military operations, including a more active campaign to disrupt urban life in Kabul and elsewhere. Nevertheless, nations sympathetic to the plight of the Afghans must grapple with the fact that extensive foreign assistance—diplomatic and military—is essential to an active resistance movement and for an independent Afghanistan.

Wichita, Kansas

Notes

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

40. Culley, p. 1; *AF*, July 1985, p. 3, and November 1985, pp. 1, 11, and 14-15; and Magnus, p. 204.

coming . . .

in our May-June issue

- Strategic and Tactical Mobility
- Courage for Manned Space Flight
- Clausewitz and Airplanes
- Intelligence as Cinderella

Iran and Iraq both employ the deadly ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft gun. Because Kharg Island's refineries are perhaps Iran's most vital target, they are well protected by an array of guns, including the ZSU-23-4s.



THE AIR WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

DAVID SEGAL

AFTER nearly five years of fighting, the Iraqi Air Force has finally come into its own as an important—some say decisive—factor in the Gulf War with Iran. It now shows a previously unseen effectiveness in ground support and tactical operations and has undertaken its first real strategic bombing campaign with at least moderate success.

Three factors have combined to bring about this air power enhancement: newer and better tactics, largely due to combat experience and French training; a recent massive influx of Soviet aircraft and ordnance; and, above all, Iran's destruction of its own Air Force through





political purges and lack of proper maintenance.

Iran Murders Its Own Air Force

Before Khomeini seized power on 11 February 1979, the U.S.-trained Iranian Imperial Air Force was widely regarded as second only to Israel's in the Middle East—more than a match for Iraq and a serious adversary for even the Soviet Union. The Khomeini regime, however, regarded it as a waste of money that rightfully belonged to the *mostazafin* (poor oppressed masses).

One of the new government's first acts was a purge of the armed forces, particularly the officer corps, which was (probably correctly) thought to be a hotbed of monarchist sentiment. The Air Force, where virtually the entire fighting element—the combat pilots—is composed of officers, was especially hard hit. To make matters worse, Iran's best combat pilots had been trained in the United States and Israel, making them particularly suspect.


After the Iraqi invasion of 22 September 1980, skilled pilots in Iran were hastily rehabilitated—some going directly from prison cells, where they had been awaiting execution, to the

China has supplied both Iran and Iraq with F-6 fighters similar to Soviet-built MiG-19s (right). . . . The Iranian F-4s (below), obtained from the United States in the seventies, are reportedly short of spares and virtually unusable.





The Soviets provided Iraq with more than 100 MiG-23s (right), which Iraqi pilots regard highly, as well as approximately thirty MiG-25s (below). The Iraqis appear to be using the MiG-25s as escorts for their Tupolev bombers.




cockpits of F-4s and F-5s to defend the regime that had been about to shoot them. One such case, Colonel Mohammed Mo'ezzi, became Iran's most distinguished combat pilot and most famous early war hero. However, in June 1981, Mo'ezzi took his leave of the Islamic Republic for good, taking his F-4 and deposed President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr with him.

By July 1981, the Iranian regulars, backed by hordes of Revolutionary Guards, had stopped the Iraqis cold and driven them back behind the old borders. In a stunning display of ingratitude, once the immediate danger had passed,

the mullahs resumed their purge of the armed forces.

That purge, which still goes on, has been the most devastating destruction of a military force by its own government since Stalin's Red Army purges of 1936-38. According to various Israeli, Iraqi, Amnesty International, State Department, and Iranian exile sources, more than 5000 Iranian officers have been imprisoned, executed, or forced into exile. Those who remain are supervised by "spiritual guidance officers" in much the same way that the post-purge Red Army line officers were subordinated to political



At least seven supersonic Tu-22 Blinders (below) are known to be in service in Iraq, and more are rumored in the Iraqi force. Blinders can drop conventional bombs or can carry AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missiles. . . . As many as eight ancient Tu-16 Badgers (facing page), formerly of the Egyptian Air Force, are flying in Iraq. During its heyday under the shah, the Imperial Iranian Air Force would have made short work of the Iraqi bomber force.

commissars. Last year, the process was completed when all Iranian armed forces were subordinated to Mohsen Rezaie, Khomeini's hand-picked Revolutionary Guards Commander, better known for blind obedience than for military prowess.

Under this kind of strain, the Air Force's command structure and morale have totally collapsed. Since January 1984, Iran has had three different Air Force commanders (Major Mo'inifar, Colonel Sadiri and, now, Colonel Sadiq), while the current Deputy Commander of the service, who represented the Air Force at the 11 February 1985 Revolution Day celebrations, is *Airman* Bazargan.

Iran's aircraft are, if anything, in even worse shape than its unintelligible command structure and organization. Khomeini's virulently anti-Western policies provoked an ongoing Western arms embargo, and one former close friend, France, is now a major Iraqi arms supplier.

The consequent shortage of replacement parts for American equipment is hurting Iran very badly, especially in the Air Force. Early in the war, Israel provided some spare parts and

technical assistance to prevent an outright Iraqi victory, but this aid came to a halt by 1983, Israeli sources say. Iran, of course, is buying whatever U.S. parts it can illegally, but these purchases are not even enough for ordinary maintenance, let alone active combat.

Given the difficulty of obtaining hard information from Iran these days, even the best estimates of Iranian air strength are "scientifically calculated guesses." However, a quick comparison of present and prewar figures clearly shows Iran's dramatic deterioration.¹ Before the war, Iran had an estimated 456 American-made combat aircraft, including seventy-seven F-14 Tomcats with Phoenix missile systems. Only about seventy U.S. aircraft still appear to be operational, including three Tomcats. These were shown in the 1985 Revolution Day fly-by, which is widely believed to have included every Iranian F-4, F-5, and F-14 still capable of flying.

Soviet-type equipment has become dominant in Iran's ground forces, however, and rumors abound that the Air Force has *several hundred* MiG-19 and MiG-21 types, provided by China, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Most



of these are said to be Chinese F-6s (improved MiG-19 clones).

Reliable sources say that Iran signed a \$1.45 billion oil-for-arms agreement with China in March 1984, with deliveries starting April 1985, and that speaker of the Iranian *Majlis* (Parliament) Hashemi Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati were in Beijing more recently to negotiate further agreements. Additionally, Iran signed a \$133.3 million agreement with East Germany in May 1985, trading oil for "technical assistance," while Revolutionary Guards commanders and Iranian pilots reportedly have received training in East Germany and Bulgaria.

The Chinese firmly deny having any arms deal "with Iran or anybody else," but, while Iranian diplomats will not confirm reports of a Chinese arms deal, they also refuse to deny them. One Iranian spokesman used the preposterous dodge that Iran leaves all official comment on trade with China to the Chinese.

Whatever the denials, Chinese T-59/69 tanks are showing up in Iranian units, but there is no sign of any F-6s yet. Iraq, however, has broken diplomatic relations with both Libya and North

Korea for supplying weapons, including aircraft, to Iran. That Iraq has not broken with China too, may have something to do with the fact that Iraq buys Chinese small arms and T-54/55, MiG-19, and MiG-21 clones.

The absence of Iranian F-6s from the battlefields can easily be explained by a lack of trained pilots (hence, the training in East Germany and Bulgaria). If Iran really has these Chinese MiG-19 copies, they should not be sneered at, even though the original design is thirty-two-years old. With Chinese improvements, the F-6 has outstanding dogfight maneuverability, and its 30-mm NR-30 guns have more than twice the kinetic energy of the Aden or DEFA of similar caliber. It carries the Atoll air-to-air missile, while two 551-pound bombs or weapons pods make it extremely effective in the ground-support role.

Still, this plane (particularly when flown and maintained by Iranians) is not about to wrest air superiority from Iraq's MiG-23s, MiG-25s, and Mirage F-1s. Iran's Air Force, unable to seriously contest Iraq's recent massive bombing of Iranian cities, has been virtually out of the war this year.

Iraq's Air Blockade

In contrast, by strangling Iran's vulnerable economy and destroying civilian morale, the Iraqi Air Force has recently become Iraq's most potent tool for ending the five-year-long war. Serious economic warfare began in March 1984 when Iraq proclaimed a blockade of shipping and the vital Kharg Island oil terminal, which accounts for 80 percent of Iran's exports. One unusual feature of this war is that both sides get most of their hard currency for arms and military supplies from a single major source, oil exports; and a reduction of these exports can seriously impair either side's fighting ability.

Early in the war, Iraqi oil exports plummeted from 1.5 million barrels a day to a mere 700,000, as the Gulf was closed to Iraqi shipping, while Iran's Arab ally, Syria, shut Iraq's main export pipeline, which ran through Syrian territory. At that time, when Iran's Air Force was still functional and its Navy dominated the Gulf (as it still does), Iran boosted daily oil shipments to more than two million barrels. Iraq got by on aid from the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Since then, the Iraqis have more than doubled the capacity of their Turkish pipeline and are transshipping oil through Saudi ports, boosting their exports to nearly two million barrels per day. Meanwhile, their blockade has cut Iran's exports to a mere 500,000 barrels daily.

The Iraqi Navy, never a match for Iran's, has been virtually inactive since the war broke out, and the Iraqi blockade is, perhaps, the only example of a successful economic blockade carried out by air power alone. Since March 1984, Iranian oil exports have fallen nearly 55 percent, as the Iraqi Air Force hit more than 130 "naval targets" (a euphemism for oil tankers) and launched several damaging air raids on Kharg Island, Iran's most vital target. Kharg Island is heavily defended by potent concentrations of anti-aircraft guns, including the deadly Soviet ZSU-23-4, and surface-to-air missiles, mainly U.S.-made Hawks and Soviet SA-7

Strelas. It is one of the few places that the Iranian Air Force still actively defends, flying from bases in Bushehr, in Shiraz, and on Kharg itself. Without Kharg's oil revenues, Iran cannot hope to finance its own defense, let alone invade Iraq.

The War of the Cities: Iraq's First Strategic Bombing Effort

A unilateral cease-fire in the Iraqi Air Force's first real strategic bombing campaign, the so-called war of the cities, which aimed at breaking civilian morale and disrupting military targets, expired on 30 June 1985. Another, more intense, effort is in the offing.

Iraq's two efforts early in 1985, from 14 March to 7 April and 25 May to 15 June, were reportedly very effective. Opposition from the Iranian Air Force was negligible to nonexistent, as the Iraqis hit air bases and military and industrial targets all over Iran (in Tabriz, Urmia, Rasht, Bakhteran, Hamadan, Tehran, Isfahan, Dezful, Ahvaz, Kharg, Bushehr, and Shiraz).


The Soviets have supplied Iraq with as many as fifteen SS-12 Scaleboard medium-range surface-to-surface missiles (right). . . . Libya is thought to have provided Iran with the dozen Soviet SS-1 Scud medium-range missiles (far right, facing page) that have fallen on Baghdad.



Even Iraq's lumbering old Tu-16 bombers were getting through, presumably with MiG-25 and Mirage F-1 escorts, as the Iraqis hit targets as far away as Kashan, more than 360 miles from their own bases. Iran's official *Kayhan* daily confirmed this, reporting that Tehran was being bombed by "Tupolevs (Tu-16 Badger and Tu-22 Blinder bombers) flying at very high altitudes."

Both Tupolevs can carry about nine tons of bombs or AS-5 Kelt and AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missiles with standoff ranges of more than 100 and 185 miles, respectively. The "large rockets" that hit Tehran during the last two Iraqi blitzes were probably Kelts and Kitchens, delivered by Iraq's Badgers and Blinders operating with impunity for the first time in this war.

There are no reliable figures on the size of the Iraq's bomber force, but *Military Balance* estimates in 1985 (seven Tu-22s and eight Tu-16s) were almost certainly too low. Reliable sources report that new Soviet Tu-22 deliveries to Iraq started in March 1984. A total of thirty serviceable Iraqi Tupolevs would not be an impossible estimate.



The brunt of Iraq's bombing offensive, borne by nearly 600 smaller Iraqi combat planes, has fallen on Tehran in an effort to crush Iranian morale. One source in Tehran said that he could see twenty Iraqi planes at one time just in his area of the city, while the Iraqis boasted of 180-plane raids on the Iranian capital. Whatever the real numbers, antiwar feeling in Tehran was at an all-time high, as the Iraqis hit the city an average of twice a day and, on two occasions, six times.

Tehran's military and economic targets, however, were by no means overlooked. Among the areas hit were the Bagh-e Saba Revolutionary Guard Barracks, Tehran's main power station, the Military Staff College, the Military Academy, the main army barracks, and the Abbas Abbad Army Base. Southern Tehran's locomotive works and the heavy industrial area near Javadieh were also hit, and even the three military airfields that were supposed to protect the city—Mehrabad, Jey, and Qual'eh Murgeh—were repeatedly attacked with impunity. The only real opposition came from the city's anti-aircraft guns, and that was ineffective, sources in the city say.

According to local residents, conditions in Tehran during the Iraqi bombings were very difficult. Fires blazed out of control as fire-fighters struggled with low pressure from broken water mains. Bombed streets, power failures, and nonworking traffic signals made Tehran traffic—difficult at the best of times—nearly impossible, and automobile collisions were frequent. Tehran's hospitals overflowed with casualties. The daily toll was reckoned "in the hundreds," and there were frequent emergency radio appeals for blood donors. For the first time in the war, Tehran suffered serious food shortages because of the collapse of transportation and food distribution facilities. Food spoiled as refrigeration failed during power outages, and, in some areas, even water was scarce, as water mains burst and electric pumps failed.

Obviously, the Iraqis hope that strategic

bombing alone will shatter Iranian morale and force Khomeini to negotiate. In fact, when the bombing started in March 1985, Iraqi President Saddam Hasein said that it would continue until Iran agreed to stop the war. Since then, however, there have been two bombing halts for no clear military reason, such as air losses or failure to hit the targets. It is anybody's guess whether the bombing was stopped as a propaganda ploy (it has certainly been used as such) or because of logistic considerations.

It is, however, already quite clear that Iraqi Air Force Commander Air-Marshal Hamid Sha'aban's April 1985 statement that the Iraqi Air Force could strike "anywhere deep inside Iranian territory" was no boast.

The Missile War

Iran's only reply to Iraq's bombing campaign has been to fire about a dozen Soviet Scud-B SSMs, presumed to be of Libyan origin, at Bagdad—not exactly a missile blitz. Iranian claims that Iran is manufacturing its own long-range SSMs are dismissed by most experts.

Even in this field, the Iranians are outclassed by Iraq, which has a few Scud Bs of its own and an apparently limitless supply of Frog-7s, which have been unleashed on Iran's border towns and troop concentrations. The Iraqis also have an ace-in-the-hole in the form of fifteen Soviet-made Scaleboard missiles.

The Scaleboard has a 560-mile range, which places it in the "near-strategic" category, and, in the Soviet version, it is thought to carry a one-megaton nuclear warhead. There is no known conventional warhead, and there is something of a mystery about what the Iraqis are arming their Scaleboards with. If Iraq decides to launch them, it will be the first time the formidable Soviet missile has been used in actual combat.

The Iraqi Buildup

However interesting these missiles may be, their destructive potential does not begin to



The Iraqi Air Force has approximately fifty Su-20 Fitter C ground attack fighters (above). While the plane looks imposing, most pilots who have flown the Su-20 consider it a "clunker." . . . Such is not the case with the Mi-24 Hind D attack helicopter, approximately fifty of which are operated by Iraq. There are no Western equivalents to the Hind.



compare with the sheer destructive power of Iraq's estimated 330 MiG-23, Su-7, Su-20, and Super Etendard attack planes and 300 MiG-19/21/25, and Mirage F-1 interceptors. This formidable buildup of air power appears to be the result of a February 1984 Soviet decision to actively help Iraq win the war, even though the Soviets know as well as anyone else that Iran is the strategic prize in the region. After five years of having every overture for an alliance rejected emphatically by Iran's anti-Communist theocracy, the Soviets appear to have decided that they cannot have any real

influence in Iran as long as the mullahs rule. That unfortunate situation, of course, can be remedied by an Iraqi victory, which would leave the Soviets free to manipulate the resulting power vacuum in neighboring Iran.

Among the items reportedly shipped to Iraq in February and March of 1984 were Tu-22 Blinder bombers, MiG-23 Flogger ground-attack planes, SS-12 Scaleboard SSMs, Mi-24 helicopter gunships, large numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, and huge quantities of munitions. These shipments still continue on a reduced scale.

Additionally, informed sources say that Iraq has obtained Soviet fuel-air explosives. These munitions release a fine aerosol of volatile chemicals over a wide area, which is then ignited by a second charge, causing lethal shock waves. *Jane's Defense Weekly* reported the Soviets using 500-kilo fuel-air bombs, delivered by Su-17 fighter bombers, on Afghan resistance fighters. These reportedly left craters thirty feet in diameter and eighteen feet deep, killing people and animals in a quarter-mile radius. A 1000-pound bomb could blow down a high-rise building, and one or two large ones could destroy an airfield and kill everyone on it.

Iraq's New Ground-Support Tactics

Iraq's impressive air power buildup cannot be fully used without a suitable tactical doctrine for its employment. Fortunately for the Iraqis, a suitable doctrine seems to have emerged last year, after nearly four years of combat. Thanks largely to Iran's military purges, shoddy maintenance, spare parts shortage, and unintelligible command structure, the Iraqis gained air superiority fairly early in the war, but they did not have the foggiest idea what to do with it. They had little combat experience and employed rigid Soviet-style tactics. Besides, until the massive influx of new Soviet equipment in 1984, the Iraqis had to conserve aircraft and ordnance.

Early war reports from experienced correspondents, such as Drew Middleton of the *New York Times*, indicated that Iraqi pilots were gun-shy in the face of Iranian SAMs and anti-aircraft fire: their idea of close ground support was to drop bombs in the general direction of the enemy from high altitudes and run. Increased combat experience and the gradual disintegration of Iran's Air Force and air defenses, however, seem to have corrected this problem.

At first, interceptions and air strikes were rigidly coordinated by ground-based control officers, and individual pilot initiative was

strongly discouraged. It was almost unheard of for Iraqi pilots to break formation or go after targets of opportunity, and, because targets of opportunity were verboten, effective supply interdiction and strikes on enemy ground formations were nearly impossible.

This situation has changed. The Iraqi Air Force's recent French training has made a big difference, proving to be of even greater value than its new French equipment. Pilot initiative is now encouraged, targets of opportunity are aggressively sought, interception tactics are up to the formation commander, and close ground support means just that.

It is perhaps ironic that the Iraqi Air Force achieved an impressive fighting ability by absorbing an enormous influx of Soviet equipment while abandoning Soviet doctrine.

The Iraqi Air Force and Offensive Ground Operations

Besides its normal air superiority and ground-support missions, Iraq's Air Force plays an integral and vital role in the Iraqi Army's new combined-arms operations. While Iraqi ground operations are beyond the scope of this article, a brief outline might explain the Air Force's role in them.

In early 1984, the Iraqi Army was able to abandon its static hold-at-all-costs defensive tactics in favor of a more mobile defense in depth. The Iraqis now deliberately allow the enemy to penetrate a selected area of the front and pour in reserves. Then, while artillery pins them in place and air strikes interdict their reinforcements, the Iranian penetration forces are cut up and annihilated by hard-hitting Iraqi armored and mechanized units attacking from one or both flanks with air, artillery, and infantry support. So far, the new tactics have worked on the Iranians, mostly Revolutionary Guards, every time. U.S. estimates say that more than 23,000 Iranians were killed in their March 1985 Kheibar II attack.

These new Iraqi tactics can be used offen-

sively also, with the Air Force providing protection from enemy air strikes and aerial reconnaissance and playing the role of flying artillery.

For reasons that cannot be detailed here, there is a general expectation in informed circles that the Iraqi Army is about to launch its first major offensive operation since 1982. If so, the Air Force's flying artillery role is particularly vital, since most of Iraq's artillery is not self-propelled and would be hard-pressed to keep up with any real breakthrough. This disadvantage can be offset only by close cooperation with the Iraqi Air Force.

In the event of a major Iraqi offensive, however, Iraq's Air Force has a much more vital

mission than just ground support: that of preventing or destroying Iranian troop concentrations and interdicting Iranian supplies and reinforcements. In fact, without the Iraqi Air Force's unquestioned supremacy and demonstrated ability to perform those missions, an Iraqi offensive against Iran's three-to-one numerical superiority would be completely unthinkable.

Denver, Colorado

Note

1. The base figures come from *The Military Balance 1985*, but I have modified them with more recent information from my own sources in Iran and elsewhere.

Right from the start, young officers learn that promotion goes to the polite, well-rounded man who can keep a tidy desk and avoid any eccentricity in taste or conduct. An overintense interest in the military arts is rated as an eccentricity and is thus to be avoided (except in the Army, the one service where self-reform is under way).

Edward N. Luttwak
The Pentagon and the Art of War, p. 198


CLAUSEWITZ: EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES TO WAR

COLONEL HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., USA (RET)

WOKE up at 0300 and it was raining like hell," noted General George S. Patton, Jr., in his diary on 8 November 1944. "I actually got nervous and got up and read Rommel's book, *Infantry Attacks*. It was most helpful, as he described all the rains he had in September 1914, and also the fact that, in spite of the heavy rains, the Germans got along."¹ This was the incident—sited, with poetic license, over a year-and-a-half earlier at El-Guettar in North Africa—that is immortalized in the movie *Patton* when George C. Scott shakes his fist at the attacking panzers and shouts, "You S.O.B., I've read your book!"

Twenty years later, America's military commander in Vietnam also sought to read his enemy's book. In his assessment of the military theories and philosophies of war that influenced the strategic thinking of General Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese general-in-chief, General William C. Westmoreland wrote in his autobiography that General Giap "studied at a Communist military school in China, where he apparently absorbed the teach-

ings of Sun Tzu and of the pedagogue of modern revolutionary warfare, Mao Tse-tung."² General Westmoreland kept beside his bed in Saigon "Mao Tse-tung's little red book on theories of guerrilla warfare"³ and bragged that he had "long [been] a student of the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, who," General Westmoreland stated, "may be called the Clausewitz of the Orient."⁴ Later, in an address to the staff and faculty of the Chinese National War College in Taiwan, General Westmoreland



noted that he "discussed the principles of Sun Tzu as the enemy was practicing them in Vietnam."⁵ His fascination with Eastern approaches to war was revealed by the fact that in the index to his autobiography, General Westmoreland had no listing for Clausewitz but included six listings for Sun Tzu.

But General Westmoreland was reading the wrong book. One of the most famous aphorisms in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* is that in order to achieve victory, one must "know the enemy and know yourself."⁶ In Vietnam, the American military failed both of these tests, a failure that grew out of false distinctions drawn between Eastern and Western approaches to war.

"Know Yourself"

A major reason such false distinctions were drawn was that the American Vietnam-era military did not "know itself." Within its ranks a vacuum existed on Western approaches to war. The American military has never been noted for its attention to the theories and philosophies of war. If there ever was an American philosopher of war, it was Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, who was particularly influential in the Civil War. His concentration on fixed rules and geometric and algebraic formulas became so pervasive that in 1869 then Commanding General of the Army William Tecumseh Sherman warned the graduating class at the United States Military Academy against the "insidious and most dangerous mistake" that one could "sit in ease and comfort in his office chair and . . . with figures and algebraic symbols, master the great game of war."⁷

While Jominian influence waned (only to return with a vengeance during the Vietnam War), it was replaced by military theories derived from the post-Civil War writings of Brevet Major General Emory Upton.⁸ Reflecting these views, a 1936 Army Command and General Staff School manual, *The Principles*

of Strategy, stated boldly: "Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics end."⁹ The very antithesis of Clausewitzian theory, this neo-Uptonian approach was reflected in the American conduct of World War II. As Bernard Brodie has noted, "supporters of the Clausewitzian ideal of keeping political aims always at the forefront of strategic consideration, and, on the other hand, those inclined to the traditional military preference for keeping them out altogether . . . played out in a tug of war between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt."¹⁰

During the Korean War, reflecting the Uptonian mind-set (a mind-set shared by most of the senior American generals of World War II), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified before the Senate in 1951 that "the general definition which for many decades has been acceptable was that war was an ultimate process of politics; that when all of the political means failed, we then go to force."¹¹ This was a direct rejection of the Clausewitzian belief that "war should never be thought of as something *autonomous* but always as an *instrument of policy*."¹²

The relief of General MacArthur from command during the Korean War over just such policy issues marked the end of these neo-Uptonian theories. While there was a brief attempt after the Korean War to begin to build a theoretical structure for U.S. military policy on Clausewitzian principles—the Army's 1954 *Field Service Regulations*, for example, emphasized that "since war is a political act, its broad and final objectives are political; therefore, its conduct must conform to policy and its outcome realize the objectives of policy"¹³—these Clausewitzian beginnings were soon overtaken by the impact of nuclear weapons on American military thought. Historian Russell Weigley has commented on the result:

A national military policy and strategy relying upon massive nuclear retaliation for nearly all the uses of force left the Army uncertain of its

place in the policy and strategy, uncertain that civilians recognized a need even for the Army's existence and uncertain therefore of the Service's whole future.¹⁴

When President John F. Kennedy took office, this vacuum was filled at the managerial level by the neo-Jominian policies of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and their emphasis on hard data, quantification, and computerization. At the operational level, it was filled by the social science-derived theories of "counterinsurgency."¹⁵ Adopting "counterinsurgency" as the basis of Army doctrine required defining the enemy in terms of "insurgency," which, in turn, led to what General Westmoreland had called "the pedagogue of modern revolutionary warfare, Mao Tse-tung," and to the military philosophies of Sun Tzu from which it was commonly believed Mao's theories were derived.

"Know Your Enemy"

In his masterful 1963 translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret), devoted an entire chapter to "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung" and emphasized that Mao had "been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought, [an influence] apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and tactics." General Griffith went on to conclude:

It has often been said that had Western leaders read Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, they would have been somewhat better equipped than they were to deal with him. Some familiarity with Mao's speeches and writings, together with the major works which provide their conceptual framework, would assist leaders of the present generation to an equal degree. From any collection of such works, *The Art of War* could not be omitted.¹⁶

Commenting on such beliefs, Raymond Aron observed:

Some people are inclined to see Mao as anti-Clausewitzian, as being more in the tradition of classical Chinese writings. . . . Certainly Mao sometimes quoted Sun Tzu, and inasmuch as a

non-Chinese-speaking commentator, who is also ignorant of the military thought of classical China, can risk a judgment, he appears to have been inspired by certain aspects of the age-old wisdom forged by the oldest empire in the world. Besides, wars fought between conflicting states before imperial unification in some ways resemble the civil wars.¹⁷

Because Vietnam-era American military leaders were not only "ignorant of the military thought of classical China" but also not well grounded in classical Western military philosophy either, it was not apparent to them that while Sun Tzu's *Art of War* was important to an understanding of Maoist theory, it was not the basis of that theory. Above all, Mao's theories rested on what Clausewitz called the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the army¹⁸ and especially depended on the mobilization of the people. It is critical to understand that Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, on the other hand, fits into the category of what in the West is known as eighteenth-century military literature. As Clausewitz explained:

In the eighteenth century, . . . war was still an affair for governments alone, and the people's role was simply that of an instrument. . . . The executive . . . represented the state in its foreign relations. . . . The people's part has been extinguished. . . . War thus became solely the concern of the government to the extent that governments parted company with their peoples and behaved as if they were themselves the state.¹⁹

Thus, while Sun Tzu remains an important philosopher of war, the one thing he most definitely was not is the "Clausewitz of the Orient." As Griffith makes clear in his introduction to *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu flourished during the 150 years between 450 and 300 B.C., in what was known as the period of the "Warring States." Like eighteenth-century Europe, China was then divided into a number of separate countries—Ch'in, Chin, Yen, Ch'i, Lu, Sung, Chou, Ch'u, and Wu—each of which had its own armies. Sun Tzu was a native of Ch'i who began as an advisor to the king of Wu. According to the ancient chronicles, forces

under his command "defeated the strong state of Ch'u to the west and entered Ying; to the north, he intimidated Ch'i and Chin."²⁰ As Lionel Giles put it so well in his earlier translation of *The Art of War*, "the only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried on between various feudal princes."²¹ Moreover, Sun Tzu's victories were based on what Raymond Aron has called "the school of ruse, deceit, and indirect action."²²

The oriental strategisms contained in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, while valuable, are more comparable to those in Niccolò Machiavelli's similarly titled *Arte della Guerra* (Art of war). Just as Machiavelli influenced Carl von Clausewitz,²³ so Sun Tzu influenced Mao Tse-tung. But there were other more powerful and fundamental influences. In order to understand Mao, as Raymond Aron has written, "laws of war themselves, followed by laws of revolutionary war, and finally laws resulting from the peculiarities of China, have to be understood."²⁴ There was a syncretic relationship between these laws, laws rooted in the peasant revolutions of China's past. As Mao himself said, "in thousands of years of history . . . it was peasant uprisings that brought about most dynastic changes."²⁵

The Chinese Clausewitz

A key to the fundamental classical influences on Mao Tse-tung's theories of war was contained in the marginal notes that he wrote in his ethics text in 1917:

When we read history, we always praise the time of the Warring States, the time of the struggle between Liu Chi and Hsiang Yu, the time of Han Wu-Ti's battle with the Huns, . . . the periods when the situation is constantly changing, and when talents were continually emerging.²⁶

Mao—who, in his speeches, continually referred to the Chinese people as *Han jen* or "Men of Han"—found the roots of his military theory in the beginnings of the Han dynasty in the third century B.C.

In 230 B.C., the kingdom of Ch'in, which had been hardened by constant warfare with its barbarian neighbors, descended on the rest of China. Ch'in's army was completely ruthless. Ch'in adopted more modern and efficient methods of warfare, including the use of mobile cavalry, while the other Chinese states were still engaging in rather chivalrous warfare with strict rules of proper conduct. Ch'in had universal conscription to man three armies. One army, composed of all able-bodied men, served as the warriors; the second, consisting of all able-bodied women, constructed the defenses and carried provisions; and the third, consisting of the old and feeble, foraged and guarded the cattle.²⁷ In 221 B.C., the last of the separate states fell, and Ch'in emerged as the victor. China was completely unified for the first time in her history and took her modern name, China, from the state of Ch'in.

Instituting a set of particularly harsh laws with a political philosophy known as "Legalism," the Ch'in dynasty began to come apart soon after it was founded, and revolts broke out throughout the empire. Out of these revolts arose the father of Chinese revolutionary war, Liu Chi—a man who in important ways was China's Clausewitz. Born a simple peasant in 248 B.C. in the village of Chung-yang in P'ei Commandery (the present Kiangsu Province), Liu Chi worked his way to a minor position as a village official under the Ch'in dynasty. Condemned to death because several prisoners assigned to his care escaped, he subsequently fled to the hills and became the leader of an outlaw band. In October 209 B.C., at the age of forty, he was summoned with his band to join the revolt of the chief magistrate of P'ei Commandery against the hated Ch'in dynasty. When the chief magistrate vacillated, Liu Chi killed him and assumed the leadership of the local revolt.²⁸

The banner of revolution had been raised the previous August by another peasant, Ch'en She, also under sentence of death (for being late in reporting for duty, due to heavy rains). The harsh Ch'in laws had exactly the opposite effect

from their intent. Men already under sentence of death for minor infractions felt that they had nothing to lose and everything to gain in joining a revolt.

Sensing the need for an ideological basis for their revolution, the rebels turned to the political philosophy of Confucianism. Since the Ch'in emperors had been so violently against Confucianism, the people felt that there must be some merit in a philosophy that was antipathetic to Legalism. Capitalizing on the people's respect for Confucianism and the people's resentment of the harsh and tyrannical rule of the Ch'in, the rebels were successful in promoting a general revolution, which spread throughout the empire. However, rebel Ch'en She was defeated and assassinated by his own charioteer. The leadership of the overall revolt passed to Hsiang Yu, an aristocrat and a descendant of famous generals. In order to legitimize the rebellion and bring in further recruits, Hsiang Yu set up a puppet government headed by King Huai of the state of Ch'u. In November 207 B.C., King Huai united the rebel armies, appointing Hsiang Yu to the command of one field army and Liu Chi to the command of another smaller field army. The two chief protagonists for the imperial throne, the aristocrat Hsiang Yu and the peasant Liu Chi, were nominally united in a common cause.

Liu Chi was sent to the west to subjugate the Ch'in capital, while Hsiang Yu moved north against the main Ch'in army. Hsiang Yu was a capable and ruthless general. He crossed the Chang River in the face of a superior force, burned his boats, destroyed all but three days' worth of his provisions, and boldly attacked the enemy. In a series of nine battles, he defeated the enemy decisively, captured the generals, and burned their camps. He then turned on the remaining Ch'in general, Chang Han. Chang Han suffered a minor defeat and, although he had 200,000 soldiers left, surrendered on the promise of a kingdom. When the surrendered Ch'in army showed signs of discontent about the actions of its general, Hsiang

Yu had the entire 200,000-man force massacred. He then started for the capital of Ch'in, leading an army said to number 400,000 men.

Meanwhile, Liu Chi had been working his way westward with his small force. On the road, he met a party of Confucian scholars and paid his respects in a rather peculiar manner:

Some Confucians came to Liu Chi in full costume, with their scholar's bonnets on. . . . In order to show contempt for them, Liu Chi suddenly snatched off a bonnet and urinated into it. . . . He had an aversion to the sight of Confucian scholars.²⁹

Later, a village elder and Confucian scholar, Li Yi-chi, called on Liu Chi, who received him squatting on a bed, with two maids washing his feet. Li Yi-chi rebuked him, saying, "If your honor firmly wishes to destroy the utterly inhuman dynasty of Ch'in, it is not fitting that you should interview your senior squatting down."³⁰ Liu Chi, in a famous incident, begged the scholar's pardon and conducted him to a seat of honor. Li Yi-chi became Liu Chi's political advisor and psychological warfare expert, advising him on the methods to win hearts and minds. As we shall see, these slights to the Confucian scholars (who were to become the official historians of Imperial China) were to have effects that have extended into our own time.

In November 207 B.C., Liu Chi entered the state of Ch'in through a little-used southern pass and defeated the Ch'in armies that were defending the capital. Refusing to execute the defeated generals of Ch'in, Liu Chi sealed up the depositories, treasuries, and libraries of the Ch'in emperor and encamped his men outside the capital. He issued strict orders to his troops; "the soldiers were ordered, wherever they went, not to be rude, nor to pillage, so that the people of Ch'in were delighted."³¹

In a further attempt to win the popular support of the people, Liu Chi issued a famous proclamation to the defeated enemy:

Fathers and Elders, you have suffered long enough from the cruel laws of the Ch'in; those who spoke

ill or criticized the government have been cruelly executed with their relatives, those who talked in private have been publicly executed in the market place. . . . I am merely going to agree with you upon a code of laws in three articles: he who kills anyone will be put to death; he who wounds anyone will be punished according to his offense; as to the remainder I am repealing and doing away with the laws of the Ch'in. . . . All that I have come for is to deliver your Elders from harm. I do not have any intention of exploiting or tyrannizing over you. Do not be afraid.³²

Even though the harsh Ch'in laws were not actually repealed until after Liu Chi's death, his propagandist theme was effective. The people flocked to him with gifts of cattle, sheep, wine, and food for his troops. Liu Chi refused the offerings, saying, "In the government granaries there is much grain; I do not wish to be a burden on the people."³³ Liu Chi ensured that news of his generosity was disseminated throughout the kingdom of Ch'in, and the people, expecting death, rape, pillage, and plunder from their conquerors, worshipped him.

In the meantime, Hsiang Yu approached the Ch'in capital from the east with his army of 400,000 men, greatly outnumbering Liu Chi's army of approximately 100,000. Hsiang Yu was so outraged that a mere peasant had beaten him to the Ch'in capital that he wanted to attack Liu Chi immediately. Chang Liang, Liu Chi's advisor, dissuaded him, pointing out that all the treasure had been sealed up, awaiting Hsiang Yu's arrival. Hsiang Yu vented his rage on the Ch'in capital. He abrogated Liu Chi's promises, executed the Ch'in emperor who had surrendered to Liu Chi, massacred the people, and burned the palaces and courts of the Ch'in regime.

King Kuai was placed on the throne as I Huang-ti or third emperor. In reality, the third emperor was only a puppet, for Hsiang Yu kept the actual power to himself. He reestablished the old feudal empire destroyed by the first emperor, dividing the empire among his subordinates. Liu Chi was virtually exiled to

the kingdom of Han, in present Shensi and Szechuan provinces, away from central China. Incensed by his shabby treatment but badly outnumbered, Liu Chi departed for Han with only 30,000 troops. But, most important, he left with the goodwill of the people of Ch'in.

Liu Chi brooded in his far-off kingdom and plotted with his advisors. He cast about for a suitable area from which to launch his revolt against Hsiang Yu and decided finally on the kingdom of Ch'in as his base of operations. In words that Clausewitz echoed two thousand years later in his discussion on the selection of guerrilla base areas, Liu Chi enumerated the strategic advantages of Ch'in:

Ch'in is a country with an excellent geographical situation. It is girdled by the Yellow River, with mountains as barriers, separated from the rest of the world along a thousand *li* (300 miles) of border. . . . The strength of Ch'in is proportionate to double that of a hundred enemy. Its geographical situation is convenient and favorable; when it sends down its troops from the passes upon the nobles, it is like a person on the top of a high building upsetting water into a tile gutter.³⁴

Leaving his general, Han Hsin, as King of Han, Liu Chi marched against Ch'in and secured the capital as his base of operation. His earlier generosity paid handsome dividends, for the people of Ch'in flocked to his banner. In order to ensure their continued support, Liu Chi opened the imperial pastures, enclosures, gardens, and ponds to the common people to make cultivated fields; he exempted the families of his soldiers from taxes for one year; he appointed the *san-lo* (village elders) to rule over their own villages and exempted them from forced labor and garrison service; he proclaimed an amnesty for criminals; he provided shrouds, coverlets, coffins, encoffining, and return to the family for burial for all soldiers who died in his service; he promoted to noble rank all those who brought 10,000 troops into his service; and he exempted the neighboring states of Shu and Han, which had been heavily burdened with furnishing supplies for his army,

from land taxes and contributions for two years.³⁵ After the tyranny of the Ch'in and the cruelty of Hsiang Yu, Liu Chi was looked upon as the savior of the people.

In November 106 B.C., Hsiang Yu made a fatal mistake. Seizing total power, he executed the puppet third emperor, and, in so doing, relieved his rival, Liu Chi, of his fealty to the imperial throne. Liu Chi quickly raised an army of 560,000 troops, captured Hsiang Yu's capital, and "liberated" the absent leader's concubines and treasures. But Hsiang Yu returned to his capital with a picked army of 30,000 men and attacked Liu Chi's army on the banks of the Sui River. Liu Chi was routed, and so many men were killed that the flow of the river was blocked. Liu Chi learned a bitter lesson. From that point on, he avoided pitched battles, kept his field forces mobile, attacked Hsiang Yu's army only when its leader was absent, and maintained a secure base area in Ch'in under his Grand Councilor, Hsiang Ho. Most significantly, he capitalized on the goodwill of the people of Ch'in. After every defeat, Liu Chi was able to raise a new army immediately—even the old, the weak, and the young flocked to him. Although his army lost several major engagements, his advisors were captured and boiled alive, and the nobles deserted him, the common people never lost faith in him.

Losing most of his battles, Liu Chi nevertheless won the war. In January 202 B.C., Hsiang Yu committed suicide after being wounded ten times. His immortal final words were: "Heaven has forsaken me. I have never made a military error."³⁶ But Hsiang Yu had made the gravest error of them all, for it is axiomatic in Chinese history that heaven forsakes only those who have committed the cardinal sin of losing the hearts of the people.³⁷

After being entreated three times by his subordinates, Liu Chi finally consented to become emperor, and on 28 February 202 B.C., he ascended the imperial throne as Han Kao Tsu, the founder of the Han dynasty, one of the greatest of the Chinese dynasties.³⁸

THIS brief overview of the first successful peasant revolution in Chinese history and especially the emphasis in the ancient texts on the importance of winning the confidence of the common people makes clear the critical influence of Liu Chi on Mao Tse-tung's theories. Thus, the foreword to a 1947 article in Mao's *Selected Works* states:

From the earliest days, Comrade Mao Tse-tung required that his soldiers speak politely to the masses, pay fairly for all purchases, never impress the people into forced labor, or hit or swear at people.

The article reveals (without giving credit to the similar guidance set down by Liu Chi in 206 B.C.) that Mao issued strict orders to his troops in the spring of 1928:

- Obey orders in all your actions.
- Don't take anything from the workers and peasants.

- Turn in all things taken from local bullies.

These "Three Main Rules of Discipline" were added to in the summer of 1928, with the "Six Points for Attention":

- Put back the doors you have taken down for bed boards.

- Put back the straw you have used for bedding.

- Speak politely.

- Pay fairly for what you buy.

- Return everything you borrow.

- Pay for anything you damage.

In 1929, two additional points for attention were added: "Don't bathe within sight of women" and "Don't search the pockets of captives."³⁹ Just as a disciplined soldiery won support for Liu Chi in 206 B.C., the discipline of Mao's troops favorably impressed the peasants of the twentieth century. The Clausewitzian "remarkable trinity" had been established, a "remarkable trinity" first created by Liu Chi in the third century B.C.

In 1935-36, Mao again emulated his early predecessor when his Red Army escaped from

Nationalist encirclement in South China and made the famous Long March to a new base area in the north. This new base area in Yen-an was in the ancient state of Ch'in in precisely the same place that the "Chinese Clausewitz" Liu Chi had established his base—the mountain stronghold that dominated the North China plain, which contained the bulk of China's population.

But these "Chinese Clausewitzian" roots of Mao Tse-tung thought were not apparent to those seeking the basis of his military theories. They were not apparent because they were deliberately obscured by Mao himself. Because of some unusual and little-known facts about Chinese historiography, it was quite impolitic for Mao to identify with Liu Chi. Mao would use his precursor's revolutionary strategies but would refuse to acknowledge his debt to the originator of peasant revolutionary warfare. China, with several milleniums of recorded history, had reduced most personages to historical models or stereotypes. The facts were selected to fit the stereotypes. Chinese historians had one fundamental concern: to create models that would inspire men and mold their conduct."⁴⁰ This selection was common not only in official histories but also in popular plays, in popular fiction, and in education, where, traditionally, teaching by imitation had relied heavily on models and precedents more than rules.

By an odd quirk of history, possibly because of his contempt for the Confucian scholars who were also the official historians, Liu Chi was relegated to an obscure position in Chinese folk legend. His principal opponent, Hsiang Yu, on the other hand, was exemplified as an example of the brave and fearless warrior who was the embodiment of a military leader.⁴¹ Liu Chi was portrayed in Chinese popular fiction as a monument of hypocrisy compared to his straightforward, noble, artless rival, Hsiang Yu.⁴²

Mao perpetuated the legend that he drew his inspiration from the bandit heroes of such

popular romantic novels as *Water Margin* and *Tales of Three Kingdoms*, whose fictional deeds were modeled on the actual exploits of Liu Chi.⁴³ Both Mao's rivals among the returned-student intelligentsia of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao's mortal (Chinese Nationalist) enemies were quite content to accept and perpetuate the legend that popular but tawdry romantic novels of the common people had influenced the peasant mentality of Mao Tse-tung, rather than consider the possibility that Mao might have been influenced by respectable classical texts.⁴⁴

WHILE in the East there was a question of whether Mao Tse-tung had read and profited from the ancient chronicles of Chinese history, in the West there was another question. "Does all this mean that Mao Tse-tung studied Clausewitz?" asked Raymond Aron (who may well have also asked, "Does all this mean that Clausewitz had studied Liu Chi?"). Answering his own question, he said:

I cannot say so, [but] the thought processes seem to be the same for the simple reason that they reflect common sense and use the same concepts. In the middle of the object (war) man is both subject and object because war is struggle and involves two enemies, each with a brain. Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung [and Liu Chi] both state that man decides all.⁴⁵

Echoing the same theme, Michael Howard notes that while war resolves itself into "a struggle for the control of territory" such

control over territory involves also control over the people who live there, and here again the Clausewitzian insights have a lasting relevance.

. . . Mao Tse-tung and the theorists of revolutionary warfare gave to this social dimension an overriding importance which perhaps it deserves only in the context of "wars of national liberation"; but it is one that strategists under any circumstances ignore at their peril. . . . If the people themselves are not prepared if necessary to take part in the defence of their country, they cannot in the long run be protected.⁴⁶

The lasting legacy of the military philoso-

phies of Liu Chi, Clausewitz, and Mao Tse-tung is reflected in the fact that the People's Republic of China, alone of the major powers, lists "political mobilization" as one of its principles of war.⁴⁷ During the Vietnam War, the United States was so mesmerized by its ill-thought-out doctrines of counterinsurgency that it expended its efforts in a futile attempt to "win the hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese people, disregarding the fact that the first task was to establish its own "remarkable trinity"—to "win the hearts and minds" of the American people in support of that war. Instead, the American people were deliberately excluded from the strategic equation, first by the academic limited-war theorists and then by their commander in chief. Ultimately, the United States found, to its sorrow, that Clausewitz knew what he was talking about when he warned that

a theory that ignores [the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the army and the government] . . . would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.⁴⁸

As I have discussed in detail elsewhere,⁴⁹ it

was not the wily and inscrutable oriental strategisms of Sun Tzu that caused our undoing in Vietnam. It was failure to understand and appreciate the lasting relevance of classic Western military theories and the importance of the principles of war. The great irony is that while the United States ignored these "Western" approaches to war, the North Vietnamese Army followed them almost to the letter. It was not so much that American commanders read the wrong book on the art and science of war as it was that, in too many cases, they had read no such book at all.

One of the aftereffects of the Vietnam War has been a reappraisal of the importance of military history and classic military theory. Today, we are experiencing a revival in the study of the fundamentals of military art and science. All of this gives hope that by the bedside of any future American battlefield commander will be that most valuable of military texts, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*. With that frame of reference, as a guide, a commander can then shout with confidence at any enemy he might face, "You S.O.B., I've read *the book!*"

Washington, D.C.

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
AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, USA (Ret), has been selected by the *Air University Review* Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the *Review* during fiscal year 1985. His article, "The French Air Force in 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics?" was previously designated the outstanding article in the September-October 1985 issue. The other bimonthly winners for 1984-85 were Lieutenant Colonel John E. Lawyer, USAF, "Beyond Deterrence: The Strategic Defense Option," November-December 1984; Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines," January-February 1985; Dr. Dennis E. Showalter, "A Dubious Heritage: Military Legacy of the Russo-German War," March-April 1985; Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala, "Is a Soviet 'Bolt from the Blue' Impossible?" and Dr. William P. Snyder, "Educating Military Officers," May-June 1985; and Dr. Donald M. Snow, "BMD, SDI, and Future Policy: Issues and Prospects," July-August 1985.

THE DOWNFALL OF MARCOS

DR. H. MONTE HILL.

THE martial law era in the Republic of the Philippines is over. President Ferdinand E. Marcos resigned and fled the Philippines on 26 February 1986 after it became apparent that he could no longer maintain power in the face of an irreversible and growing demand among all segments of the Philippine polity that his leading political opponent, Corazon Aquino, be installed as the legitimate winner of the 7 February 1986 presidential election.



Why was Marcos—a brilliant politician by all accounts—unable to continue to maintain his power as he had done successfully for years? When one analyzes the circumstances of the people of the Philippines and traces Marcos's responses to the changing forces within his country, the reasons for the Marcos regime's downfall became increasingly apparent: Marcos—famed for his adeptness at the "art of the politically possible"—lost political power because he and his close associates by 1977-78 had drifted intellectually into a groupthink mentality characterized by an illusion of invulnerability, which, in turn, caused top martial law administrators to lose their ability to assess accurately and realistically the impact of the regime's policies on the Philippines and the United States.

Martial Law: The Whys and Hows

The manifest goals of the martial law regime in the Philippines have been stated numerous times. Marcos has written that "... the decision to impose martial law entailed much more than saving the Philippine Republic by restoring peace and order. . . . Our ultimate goal is to bring honest and sweeping reforms throughout all areas of national life."¹ Marcos's ostensible goal in controlling political participation, then, was the radical but relatively peaceful transformation of the existing Philippine society into a modern, "truly democratic" nation in which the mass of Philippine citizens would enjoy a decent standard of living.

However, critics of the regime charge that the real goal of the regime was self-aggrandizement, not reforms for the public good:

Martial law pure and simple has been a facade masking the exploitation of our people and their natural resources by Marcos, his family, and close friends. Any benefits, and there have been few, that have reached the people have been accidental and not the result of deliberate martial law policies.²

One or a combination of these motives stimu-

lated Ferdinand E. Marcos to devise and implement his martial law strategy and interrelated set of tactics.

Although a brilliant politician, Marcos concluded that to monopolize political power his actions must conform or appear to conform to the general and deep-rooted Philippine political value system. Most important of these are *utang ng loob* (debt of honor), *pakikisama* (smooth interpersonal relationships), *amor propio* (self-esteem), *hiya* (shame), patron-client ties, *pamilya* (kinship ties), and authoritarian benevolent leadership.³ Marcos's strategy also took into account the more recently emergent Philippine development ideology that has as its essence nationalism and the elevation of Philippine living standards through centralized rational planning and modern technology.⁴

The martial law regime also planned to maintain itself by mobilizing and channeling citizen participation through a seemingly new and democratic constitution and a series of referendums, plebiscites, elections, and mass organizations that, in fact, would be carefully controlled to ensure outcomes favorable to the regime.⁵ The management of alienated social elements was to be handled in four interrelated ways: co-optation; imprisonment, exile, or execution of unco-optative citizens; compromise on minor policy differences; and "cooling-off" mechanisms to relieve pressures of discontent against the regime.⁶

Marcos moved quickly to implement the aforementioned plan of action during the August 1971 to September 1972 period. There is widespread belief that he helped to create the appearance of a crisis situation by staging a series of terroristic acts aimed at public facilities and officials. Included among them are the grenade attack on a Liberal party rally in August 1971; bombings of Quezon City Hall, the Nawasa public water works, and the National Post Office; and apparent assassination attempts on both Marcos and longtime political ally Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.⁷

Assuming the role of a traditional authori-

tarian and benevolent leader, Marcos used these events as justification to cancel the 1972 national elections, ban political parties, dissolve Congress, and suspend the 1935 American-style constitution and replace it in 1973 with a new document. The new constitution permitted Marcos to rule by decree, eliminated the vice-presidential position, centralized power in the national bureaucracy, and provided for a *Barangay* (village) representation. The document also provided for a national assembly and made voting compulsory for all eligible citizens.

Marcos moved to solidify his power by also conforming to traditional Philippine kinship and personal values. He entrusted key positions in the government to relatives or to close friends from his own native province of Ilokos Norte or from his wife's native province of Leyte. Within the Marcos family, for example, several individuals assumed extraordinarily high profiles in the regime's affairs. The First Lady, Imelda, was Human Settlements Minister, Metro Manila Governor, and a diplomatic troubleshooter; daughter Imee was a member of the National Assembly and head of the *Kabataang Barangay* (youth organization); son Bong Bong was appointed as a military officer and as governor of Ilokos Norte Province. Among key military leaders were Marcos's cousins Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Deputy Defense Minister Carmelo Barbero, and General Fabian Ver (Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff).⁸

The regime also established a number of government-sponsored organizations designed to mobilize and channel the interests of the major Philippine socioeconomic segments. The most important of these organizations were *barrio* associations called *Samahang Nayons*, for rural citizens; the *Katipunaang Magagawang Filipino*, for labor; the *Kabataang Barangay*, for youth; and *Barangay* (village) associations, for village and urban area residents. The regime claimed that these organizations, along with electoral events such as referendums, provided Filipino voters with sufficient input

into public policymaking.⁹

A systematic propaganda blitz to mold and reinforce Philippine public opinion toward the regime was a high priority of martial law rule also. The propaganda campaign included a broad and imprecise statement of ideology designed to describe and explain existing conditions and what could be attained under Marcos's leadership. It was designed to provide sufficient flexibility to permit modification of the regime's policies in line with changing political circumstances.¹⁰

The major theme of martial propaganda was that liberal, American-style democracy had failed in the Philippines because it perpetuated, rather than replaced, the authoritarian and fragmented traditional Philippine political culture which permitted only a small elite to participate meaningfully in public policymaking. As a result, the republic, after independence, had drifted into chaotic civil unrest with a variety of independent, armed, and divergent political factions—groups based on personalistic ties rather than on issues or general principles—who settled their political differences through street fighting, assassination, and corruption.¹¹

Marcos propaganda went on to argue that these chaotic conditions were being exploited by Muslim dissidents and the Communist left, who wished either to succeed from the republic or to establish a Marxist dictatorship. This situation could be reversed only if the Philippine population surrendered for the present and immediate future the democratic privileges they held under American-style democracy.¹²

Martial law propaganda also promised a new and better way of life if Filipinos supported Marcos's leadership. The regime would benevolently assume guardianship of the public order to regenerate the nation through the development of new institutional arrangements that would conform to traditional indigenous political values and serve as the foundation for a prosperous and stable democratic system. In short, under the tutelage of Marcos, martial

law would be used as a vehicle to create a "New Society" based on seven pillars: moral regeneration, nationalism, internationalism, freedom of belief, self-reliance, social justice, Barangay democracy, unity, and identity.¹³

Martial law propaganda also reflected the regime's efforts to capitalize on the deep-rooted Philippine value of *amor propio* (self-esteem) by emphasizing Marcos's charismatic personality. It portrayed the Philippine president as a slightly mysterious, distant, omnipotent, and inspired father figure through which the destiny of the Philippine people was being realized. Because Marcos was the commanding central character of the regime, his fate and the fate of the nation were proclaimed as indivisible.¹⁴

The regime employed a large staff of skilled mass media and communication specialists to saturate the Philippines and the international community with this message. A well-orchestrated stream of printed and electronic materials was produced and distributed by the government. Mass demonstrations were staged by the regime. Official portraits, statues, and busts of the First Couple were prominently displayed in all public facilities, on government documents, and in the mass media.¹⁵

Periodically, Marcos modified martial law electoral policies to demonstrate his conformity to benevolent leadership, staging referendums, plebiscites, and elections. He also activated the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) in 1978, lifted the bans that prohibited political parties and foreign travel, lifted the curfew in some areas, and declared amnesty for some political opponents (both in prison and in hiding). Other policy revisions that the regime took to demonstrate benevolence were the nominal lifting of martial law in 1981, the transfer of police supervision from the military to mayors in 1985, and the restoration of the vice-presidential position in 1986.¹⁶

While the regime allocated an annual average of only 1.1 percent of the Philippine gross national product to defense, it expanded its

armed forces from 60,000 to approximately 250,000 in 1985.¹⁷ Most of the defense budget was expended on the military's elite units, which received frequent and generous pay increases, promotions, liberal fringe benefits, and first-rate equipment. Few resources were allocated toward equipping, training, or rewarding nonelite military forces that were charged by the regime with primary maintenance of law and order.¹⁸

Throughout his thirteen years of martial law rule, Marcos used these forces to manage potential and real opposition unsusceptible to persuasion. Coercion took many forms: the threat and actual carrying out of kidnappings, assassinations, torture, internment, censorship, confiscation of property, and the deportation of critics.¹⁹

The regime also utilized the military to terminate the two ongoing insurgency groups: the Islamic Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Communist New People's Army (NPA). Government counterinsurgency efforts included co-optation of rebels through a program of amnesty; economic development of the affected areas; diplomatic initiatives to undercut external support; partial autonomy for Muslim areas; and a military campaign of preemptive and retaliatory strikes.²⁰

Martial Law: The Impact and Results

The martial law regime's efforts to control political participation were reasonably effective until 1977-78. Marcos was able to seize and maintain near-absolute policymaking power, as the apparent logic of his rhetoric, his political fearlessness, and his personal charisma inspired confidence and support both within the Philippine public and in the international community. The Philippine economy grew at a steady annual rate, a land reform program was initiated, law and order seemed improved, the Muslim and Communist rebellions were contained, and urban employment increased.²¹

The Philippine electorate during this period



**Military Interests
in the Philippines**

A stable, prosperous, friendly, and democratic Philippines is vital to U.S. interests in Asia. Clark Air Base, the largest U.S. air base abroad, plays a key role in countering the Soviet air and naval presence in Vietnam, a few hundred miles to the east.



U.S. naval facilities at Subic Bay (above) and Cubi Point (left) would be difficult and extremely expensive to duplicate elsewhere. Base agreements with the Philippine government will be reviewed in 1991.

appeared to view Marcos as a president exercising capable, informed leadership in conformity with traditional Philippine political values. Stresses and excesses of the regime were ignored or viewed as random and unintended or as the price to be paid for progress. Moreover, most of those citizens who were not supportive of martial law were neutral or passive. Only a relatively small minority within the Church, the traditional leadership elite, the two insurgencies, and international human rights groups participated in active antiregime activities.²²

However, the success of martial law public policy decisions during these early years apparently stimulated within the top martial law leadership a groupthink mentality with the following characteristics:

- an illusion of invulnerability that created excessive optimism and encouraged Marcos to take extreme risks;
- an unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of martial law, inclining Marcos and his close associates to ignore the ethical and moral consequences of their decisions;
- the rationalization and discounting of warnings regarding existing martial law policies and actions;
- stereotyped views of Marcos's political enemies as too evil, weak, or stupid to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate or serious concern;
- the refusal of Marcos to tolerate differences of opinion within the regime itself; and
- the protection of Marcos and his advisors from adverse information that might shatter their self-complacency about the effectiveness of their decisions.²³

In short, the success of the martial law regime during the 1972-78 period caused Marcos to believe in his own propaganda—namely, that he was omnipotent and incapable of making unwise decisions. This attitude caused the top martial law leadership to lose touch with both Philippine and international political realities. As a result, President Marcos in 1977

began to deviate from the carefully thought-out pre-1972 strategy of conforming to traditional Philippine political values.

For one thing, Marcos became more inflexible and tended to rely increasingly on expensive, inconsistent, and unfocused sanctions to achieve martial law policy goals. The carrying out and coverup of torture and extraordinary killings—such as that of former Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr., in 1983—became blatant and rampant.²⁴ For another, the Philippine economy began to decline as President Marcos and other high-level martial law officials began to enrich themselves through open and widespread corruption.²⁵ Finally, the more blatant use of fraud in the 7 February 1986 national election was indisputable evidence to many Filipinos and foreigners alike that the Philippine Chief Executive was not conforming to traditional Philippine political values.²⁶

The repeated use of such capricious control techniques and self-enrichment tactics intensified and expanded resentment over time and gradually alienated many Filipinos and foreigners who previously had been supportive or passive. As one observer noted: “Many Filipinos argued that a benevolent leader doesn't kill and imprison his people. He doesn't take the bread out of children's mouths to enrich himself.”²⁷

As perceptions changed among the populace, an increasing number of Filipinos of all socioeconomic levels no longer accepted Marcos's efforts to package the nation as being in a national crisis that could be resolved only through a Marcos-led authoritarian government. By 1978, Marcos no longer was viewed by most Filipinos as decisive, omnipotent, legitimate, and moral.²⁸ Instead, many Filipinos perceived Marcos as an ambitious and unscrupulous Southeast Asian caudillo, who, from the very beginning, had used the crisis rationale as a vehicle to subordinate the Philippine electoral process to the private interests of himself, his family, and his *palidins*. Others perceived that a national crisis had indeed ex-

isted in 1972 (and perhaps a need for martial law), but they began to insist that even in national emergencies there must be conformance with basic Philippine political values.²⁹

In particular, the assassination of former Senator Aquino in August 1983 magnified and illuminated the excesses of the regime and punctured the aura that had been built up around the person of Marcos. While it is impossible to gauge the exact impact of the Aquino murder, it is apparent that Aquino's death mobilized latent as well as overt partisan groups, ushered in a period of intense anti-Marcos political activities, and forced Marcos on the defensive.³⁰

Because of an apparent groupthink mentality, Marcos failed to take into account the many symptoms of deep-seated discontent with his regime's policies. Among them were increased foreign travel and emigration, crime rate increases, flight of capital, drops in investment, the recent defection of top business leaders,

massive street demonstrations, and an increase in the number, strength, and activities of opposition groups, including the Communist New People's Army. Another clear sign of widespread discontent that Marcos ignored was the outcome of the government-staged National Assembly elections of 1984, in which the opposition gained sixty two additional seats.³¹

Marcos exhibited a groupthink mental syndrome also when he fired Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino for taking positions "incompatible with those of the government and myself." There also were celebrated confrontations between Marcos and Labor Minister Blas Ople and between Mrs. Marcos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile about the president's health, the Philippine foreign debt, and defense policies.³²

Marcos's drift into a groupthink mentality also prevented him from accurately assessing the adverse impact that his policies were having on Philippine relations with other coun-

Aquino and Laurel: the successors. The real winners in this nearly bloodless revolution will be the Philippine people if true democracy can take hold.



tries. Although the Islamic nations did not sever diplomatic relations with the Marcos government, they were critical of the regime's policies toward Filipino Muslims and continued to support the MNLF, according the latter official observer status at the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference and providing funding for the group. In addition, Libya permitted the MNLF to locate its headquarters in Tripoli and was rumored (along with Malaysia) to be providing direct support to MNLF combat operations.³³

Marcos also failed to take into account the strains that his regime's policies placed on Philippine relations with the countries of Western Europe and North America. For example, West Germany and the United States canceled important state visits and began to denounce Marcos in increasingly forceful language.³⁴ The leaders of these two countries also threatened to terminate or suspend assistance programs for the Philippines.³⁵ Beginning in 1985, the Reagan administration—primarily out of concern for the security of its Clark and Subic military bases—openly pressured the Marcos regime to initiate political and military reforms and to pay greater attention to the plight of the Philippine poor.³⁶

Other indications (and ultimate impact) of Marcos's adherence to groupthink mentality were his failure to win the recent 7 February 1986 national election (or to win legitimately) and his unrealistic determination to remain in power in spite of insurmountable obstacles. As one commentator put it, "Marcos is one of the most brilliant political leaders of the post-World War II era. But Marcos's belief that he

could remain in power until the last desperate moment clearly was not the reasoning of a rational person."³⁷

PHILIPPINE President Ferdinand E. Marcos—one of the most powerful authoritarian leaders in the post-World War II era—was forced to abdicate in February 1986. Marcos's general strategy to seize and maintain absolute policymaking power in the Philippines was one of taking actions that would mesh well with traditional Philippine political values. Prominent among these values are self-esteem, smooth interpersonal relationships, kinship ties, debts of gratitude, shame, and paternalistic benevolent authoritarian leadership. The regime also utilized sanctions to control anti-regime behavior of citizens who refused to comply voluntarily with martial law policies.

These strategies and tactics on the whole were effective in managing the political behavior of the Philippine electorate during the early years of martial law rule. The regime was considered legitimate by most Philippine citizens through the mid-1970s. However, beginning in 1978, Marcos and his close associates drifted into a groupthink mentality characterized by a sense of infallibility and omnipotence. This turn of mind caused Marcos to deviate from traditional Philippine political values and to so alienate Filipino citizens that in February 1986 they chose to replace Marcos with Corazon Aquino, the widow of slain opposition leader Benigno Aquino. Marcos and his immediate family and close friends now reside in Hawaii.

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North Carolina*

Notes

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines* (Manila: published by Marcos, 1971), p. 53.

2. Raul Manglapuz, interview, 16 March 1981, Dekalb, Illinois.

3. H. Monte Hill, "Philippine Martial Law: A Case Study in the Management of Political Participation," paper delivered at the

annual conference of the Southeastern United States Region, Association of Asian Scholars, Raleigh, North Carolina, 16 January 1986, p. 3.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Kenneth E. Bauzon, "Martial Law in the Philippines: Paradigms of Explanation," *Asia Quarterly*, Nos. 2-3, 1977, p. 206.

6. Hill, p. 4.
7. Bauzon, p. 210.
8. Discussions of nepotism and cronyism in the martial law regime, among other sources, are found in Sidney Silliman, "The Philippines in 1983," *Asian Survey*, February 1983, pp. 149-58; and "Now Showing: Hidden Wealth," *Veritas*, 15 September 1985, p. 1.
9. Marcos, pp. 124-34.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-82.
12. *Ibid.*
13. "The Imelda Factor," *Asiaweek*, 22 March 1985, pp. 20-25.
14. For example, see Hartzell Spence, *For Every Tear A Victory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); *Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines* (Manila: National Media Production Center, 1973); and Bauzon, *op. cit.*
15. Perhaps the most prominent examples of the regime's propaganda effort are the huge Mount Rushmore-type sculpture of Marcos in Luzon, the Marcos bridge that spans the San Juanico Straits between Leyte and Samar, and Marcos State University in Mindanao.
16. Hill, p. 11.
17. "Marx, Mao, and Marcos," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 November 1985, pp. 52-61.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Annual Report* (London: Amnesty International, 1985), p. 16.
20. Lela Noble, "Emergency Politics in the Philippines," *Asian Survey*, February 1978, p. 362.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-58; "The New Society: Two Years After," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 September 1974, pp. 36-37.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Alan C. Elms, *Personality in Politics* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 148-60.
24. Hill, p. 16.
25. "Now Showing: Hidden Wealth," *op. cit.*
26. "U.S. Mixed Diplomacy, Pressure in Philippines," *Fayetteville Times*, 25 February 1986, p. 1.
27. Kenneth E. Bauzon, interview on "Crosscurrents" television program, WPSU, Pembroke, North Carolina, 15 January 1986.
28. "Marcos behind in Pre-Election Polls," *Fayetteville Times*, 3 January 1986, p. 2.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Hill, p. 17.
31. "Opposition to Marcos Mounts in Wake of Aquino Killing," *Asiaweek*, 10 October 1983, p. 7; "Philippine Upheaval No Surprise to Prof.," *The Robesonian*, 26 February 1986, p. 1.
32. "The Imelda Factor," *op. cit.*; "Marcos Shakes up Cabinet: Tolentino, Ople out of Jobs," *Philippine News*, 13-19 March 1985, p. 1.
33. Kenneth E. Bauzon, "The Religious Experience in the Formation of the UMMAH in the Philippines," *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Asian Studies* (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1981), p. 27.
34. "Can Marcos Hang On?" *Newsweek*, 3 October 1983, p. 16.
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36. "U.S. Puts Reform Pressures on Marcos," *Fayetteville Times*, 18 October 1985, p. 11-A.
37. "Philippine Upheaval No Surprise to Prof.," *op. cit.*

A deep, great, genuine sincerity is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic.

Thomas Carlyle
Heroes and Hero-Worship




**military
affairs
abroad**

NEW ZEALAND AIR POWER REQUIREMENTS AND FORCE DETERMINANTS

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG

SUCCESSIVE New Zealand governments have based their country's defense on the concept of effective deterrence via the pursuit of a policy of collective security. Prior to the Second World War, New Zealand's defenses were fully integrated into the British Imperial de-

fense system. Since 1951, however, Wellington has aligned itself with the United States and Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. The New Zealanders' continued adherence to this defense policy is due to New Zealand's small resource base and its traditional commitment to West-



ern values and interests. The population of New Zealand is only 3.3 million, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) numbers 12,443 regulars, the economy is essentially based on the export of agricultural products, and there is little heavy industry. For a nation with such slender defense resources, considerable worldwide economic and trade interests, and a heavy dependence on sea transport of its exports and imports, defense alignment with other Western nations was the only viable option open to New Zealand officials following the failure of British military power in the Far East during the Second World War.

At the same time, it must be stressed that due to the geographic remoteness of New Zealand and the lack of any immediate threats to that country, defense expenditures have been kept to the absolute minimum. The defense vote for financial year 1984-85, for example, will be just

under \$NZ 775 million.¹ Consequently, the development of the individual services of the NZDF has been contingent on limited funding and then only for the most pressing requirements. Because of the small size of the three services of the NZDF, particular emphasis has been placed on developing the capability to operate within larger allied formations, even at the expense of creating joint NZDF operational capabilities and doctrines. Moreover, as NZDF units have traditionally operated within these larger formations, the acquisition of expensive combat support weapons and the development of an adequate logistic support structure for independent New Zealand operations have often been deferred for financial considerations.

It is in the light of New Zealand's current situation—stringent financial limitations, few direct threats, and a traditional reliance on allies for equipment and supply—that the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) must be analyzed. With a budget of only \$NZ 250 million in financial year 1984-85 and a force of approximately forty combat-capable aircraft and 4325 regular officers and airmen, the New Zealand

Counterinsurgency, training, and light strike missions are performed by the RNZAF's sixteen BAC-167 Strikemasters. The Strikemasters below are participating in an exercise at Queenstown.



Air Staff must provide for the air power requirements of New Zealand in addition to those required by treaty commitments for Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.² Yet in spite of its resource limitations, the RNZAF has managed to develop a professional volunteer service that maintains operational capabilities in the five basic air roles expected of a modern air force: strike, maritime reconnaissance, training, transport, and helicopter operations. (See Table I.)

To appreciate air power determinants in New Zealand, however, one must understand the relationship between the RNZAF and New Zealand's allies in both the logistic support and the operational areas. Indeed, the relationship that has developed between the RNZAF and its Anglo-Saxon allies' air forces has become so close that the continuation of modern air operations in New Zealand is dependent on the maintenance of these ties. Moreover, beyond describing the extent of the RNZAF's dependence on external support and the Western Security Community's arrangement for maritime security in the South Pacific, I shall also argue later in this article that the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) government's stand on access to New Zealand ports by U.S. Navy vessels and the resulting downgrading in the ANZUS defense relationship will inevitably damage the operational effectiveness of the RNZAF and impede the pursuit and protection of Western interests in the South Pacific region.

Since the mid-1970s, a major shift has taken place in the direction of New Zealand defense policy. Prior to the 1978 *Defence Review* (an official white paper), the focus of the NZDF as a whole was oriented toward the Southeast Asian region. New Zealand Army units were stationed in Malaysia and Singapore, naval units regularly deployed there, and, until they were finally withdrawn in 1966, RNZAF Canberra B-12 bombers of 75 Squadron were based in Singapore. The 1978 *Defence Review* officially called for changing New Zealand defense policy, however, reorienting the direction of the

NZDF efforts toward the South Pacific.³ There were good reasons for this policy adjustment besides the overall improvement in the Southeast Asian security situation. The long-standing ANZUS strategy in the South Pacific has been to deny the region to the Soviet Union, but since the early-1970s, the Soviet Navy has continued to expand its presence in the region. In 1976 and 1977, the Soviet Union attempted unsuccessfully to establish its first resident diplomatic missions in Tonga and Fiji. With a growing number of newly independent micro-island states emerging in Melanesia and Polynesia, the ANZUS nations could no longer take the region's political and strategic stability for granted.⁴

In line with Australian and U.S. initiatives, maritime capabilities in the region needed to be expanded as ground operations in Southeast Asia diminished and became less likely as a future course of action. New Zealand also had its own compelling reasons for improving its maritime forces. The New Zealand economy is heavily dependent on both the export of 25 percent of its gross domestic product and the importation of industrial goods and many raw materials, especially petroleum. As the Soviet Navy has increased its presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans, increased concern has developed about the security of New Zealand's sea-lines of communication. As it now stands, approximately 99 percent of New Zealand's trade is seaborne.

The RNZAF, perforce, has had to alter its former orientation from meeting contingencies in the Southeast Asian environment to improving its maritime surveillance and strike capability. Fortunately, the existing inventory of P-3B Orion maritime patrol and A-4K Skyhawk attack aircraft is well suited for these requirements. Moreover, the RNZAF's task is made easier since the air threat to New Zealand is not assessed as credible and thus the RNZAF does not need to provide a modern air defense system for the country.⁵ Therefore, resources have been concentrated on improving the op-

operational functions and force strength related to maritime missions. The five Orions, which were purchased in 1966, have undergone extensive upgrading of their sensor and computer systems.⁶ A modernization of the Orions'

weapons delivery and electronic warfare systems is scheduled to begin shortly. On 31 March 1985, a part-life former Royal Australian Air Force P-3B was purchased from the Lockheed Corporation, which will be modi-

Table I. Royal New Zealand Air Force

Personnel: 4325 regulars; 1003 reservists and territorials

Aircraft

Strike: nine A-4K; three TA-4K; eight A-4G; two TA-4G Skyhawk
 Maritime: six P-3B (updated) Orion
 Trainers: sixteen BAC-167 Strikemaster Mk.88; four T6/24 Airtourer; fifteen CT-4 Airtrainer; three F-27 Friendship
 Transport: five C-130H Hercules; two Boeing 727-100C; three Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; six Hawker Siddeley Andover C.1
 Helicopters: twelve UH-1D/H Iroquois; nine 47G Sioux (to retire); seven WASP HAS.1 (operated on behalf of the Royal New Zealand Navy)

Organization

Air Staff, Wellington: provides central command and control
 Operations Group, RNZAF Base, Auckland: commands all air, combat operational training, fighter attack, maritime patrol, air transport, and helicopter operations
 Support Group, RNZAF Base, Wigram: commands all air, group, and support functions

Bases

RNZAF Base, Auckland
 Whenuapai: 5 Squadron (P-3B)
 40 Squadron (C-130H; 727-100C)
 42 Squadron (Andover C.1)
 Royal New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff College
 Defence Environmental Medical Unit
 Hobsonville: 3 Squadron (UH-1D/H; 47G; WASP)
 RNZAF Base, Ohakea: 75 Squadron (A-4G/K)
 2 Squadron (A-4G/K; TA-4G/K)
 14 Squadron (BAC-167 Mk.88)
 RNZAF Base, Woodbourne: RNZAF Cessna Flight
 No. 1 Repair Depot
 General Service Training School
 RNZAF Base, Te Rapa: No. 1 Stores Depot
 RNZAF Base, Wigram: Flying Training Wing
 — Pilot Training Squadron (T6/24; CT-4)
 — Central Flying School (47G)
 — Air Electronics Training Squadron (F-27)
 Command Training Squadron

Forces and Elements Overseas

New Zealand Force Southeast Asia, Singapore
 Air element: one helicopter support unit (three UH-1H) based at Kangaw, Singapore
 Multinational Force and Observers Aviation Support Group, Sinai
 Air element: one helicopter support unit (two UH-1 leased from the U.S. government) in conjunction with Australian forces

fied to the existing RNZAF's standards.⁷ The Skyhawks are to undergo an updating of their avionics and weapons delivery systems, including head up displays and new radars, and will be structurally refurbished under a \$NZ 140 million contract with a U.S. firm. Ten additional Skyhawk G-series aircraft were purchased from the Royal Australian Navy in July 1984 for \$NZ 69 million. These Skyhawks are to be modified to K-series standards and will undergo the same modernization.⁸ Interested in obtaining a force multiplier for the Skyhawk force, the NZLP has elected to follow the directives of the 1983 *Defence Review* and is studying the possibility of acquiring an air-to-air refueling capability. This acquisition will most likely take the form of converting some of the RNZAF's C-130H Hercules for the mission.

Two fighter-bomber squadrons equipped with A-4 Skyhawks are due for extensive upgrading that will include new radars, head up displays, and a refueling capability.

With such a small force of modern aircraft, the RNZAF is unable to maintain an adequate structure to provide for its complete support requirements. This is not to say that the RNZAF is completely dependent on overseas sources for all of its support maintenance needs. Although small, RNZAF Support Group is capable of all stages of maintenance with the exception of completely rebuilding an airplane.⁹ When modifications are undertaken in-country, the facilities of Air New Zealand, the commercial airline, are often used. Beyond these exceptions, however, the RNZAF simply cannot realize the economies of scale as can larger air forces. Hence, the RNZAF is dependent on its allies, mainly the United States, for its support requirements.

The beginnings of the post-World War II relationship between the RNZAF and the U.S. Air Force date back to the early-1960s, when the first "Airmen-to-Airmen" talks and other bilateral discussions on mutual assistance were



Despite its modest size, New Zealand's military serves around the world. The UH-1D H Iroquois helicopters (right) are part of the Sinai peacekeeping force. Even as they patrol the desert, an Andover (below) helps guard the sea lanes of the South Pacific.





The P-3 Orions (above) play an important role in keeping track of Soviet naval movements in the South Pacific. New Zealand's five Orions have been extensively refurbished and are due for further modernization. . . . Some of the RNZAF's C-130s (right) may be fitted with inflight refueling equipment as part of the program aimed at force multiplication of the A-4s.




held.¹⁰ Although the RNZAF had been established and developed along the lines of the Royal Air Force, defense ties with Britain overall were scaled back during the 1960s as Britain progressively ran down its presence in the Far East and concentrated force development on the combat requirements of the European theater. Since that time, the RNZAF has largely reequipped itself with U.S.-manufactured aircraft and has adopted many of the USAF's doctrines, tactics, etc.¹¹

The logistic support side of the New Zealand-United States air power relationship was initially formalized on 20 May 1965 with the signing of a cooperative logistics agreement and subsequent implementing of procedural arrangements for the supply support of RNZAF aircraft by the U.S. Air Force (1965) and U.S. Navy (1966 and 1967). This agreement was upgraded to a memorandum of understanding in 1982.¹² These agreements have been beneficial from the standpoint of the RNZAF for two reasons. First, should New Zealand become involved in a conflict, the assurance of logistic support from a superpower in its general re-

gion (vis-à-vis in Western Europe) is important for defense planning. Second, the RNZAF's requests for materiel from U.S. sources receive the same priority as the United States Armed Services. Since the RNZAF Support Group is able to depend on a secure flow of weapons, spares, ammunition, and other items from the United States, there is less need to maintain expensive war reserves. Thus, the logistic support relationship with the United States has allowed the RNZAF to keep support costs at a minimum, thereby allowing resources to be directed to training and operational missions.¹³ As an illustration of this dependence, in 1981, approximately 60 percent of all RNZAF purchases were from U.S. sources.¹⁴

Although the relationship with the United States is important in terms of support and supply, the RNZAF also maintains beneficial relationships with other allies. In recent years, the bilateral defense relationship with Australia has grown considerably, particularly in the area of logistic support and maritime surveillance coordination. In addition, although aircraft requirements differ between the two air



forces, increased cooperation is expected in the field of training.¹⁵ The RNZAF is also a member of the little-known Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), which includes the air forces and naval air units of the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. By taking part in the activities of the ASCC, the RNZAF has access to the latest developments in modern air operations and technology. Although the original objective of the ASCC was to ensure that member air forces were able to conduct combined operations (which in itself is important for a small air force like the RNZAF), it has grown to include such areas as the exchange of information and coordination of research and development projects, cost-free trials of equipment, etc. Because helpful information is provided by the members to one another essentially without cost, the RNZAF has realized further financial savings that can be used elsewhere.¹⁶

Beyond the support and force modernization functions of the RNZAF, which are highly dependent on external sources, the operational side of New Zealand air power is also closely integrated with allied security arrangements. New Zealand remains committed to the security of Malaysia and Singapore via the Five Powers Defense Arrangements.¹⁷ The RNZAF provides personnel for the Integrated Air Defence System headquarters at Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia, and its Skyhawk aircraft deploy to Singapore every year for joint exercises under this arrangement.

However, the defense arrangement that has become progressively more important to New Zealand's immediate security is the Radford-Collins Agreement of 1951.¹⁸ This maritime security arrangement, named after its signatories, Admiral William Radford, U.S. Navy, and Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, Royal Australian Navy, provides for the implementation of allied naval control and protection of shipping in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The present members of the agreement are assigned "areas of maritime responsibility," where, in times of

tension or conflict, each nation is to provide command and control of shipping as well as direct antisubmarine warfare operations. In recognition of its limited defense capability, New Zealand is not expected to be able to provide for all the vessels and aircraft that would be required for the complete security of the New Zealand area.¹⁹

The RNZAF and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), working jointly, are responsible for maintaining an adequate level of forces to contribute to the security of New Zealand's area of responsibility. With the growth in Soviet naval activity in the region, the Radford-Collins agreement has taken on added significance. Indeed, the formal orientation of the RNZAF is publicly stated to be to contribute "to the effective maritime control over New Zealand territorial waters, the EEZ [exclusive economic zone], and the South Pacific."²⁰

Should certain political and international trends continue, it can be expected that the RNZAF will continue to direct an ever-increasing proportion of its resources and attention to maritime missions. In terms of domestic New Zealand politics, it is becoming increasingly evident that the "blue-water" element of the RNZN may be phased out once the present force of four Leander-class frigates reach the end of their operational life in the 1990s, in part because of the continually rising costs of maintaining and operating modern surface combatants and also because of the evident lack of political will to undertake the heavy financial burdens for the replacement of the retiring vessels.²¹

While New Zealand officials contemplate the future structure of the RNZN and the South Pacific continues to see increased Soviet naval activity, an additional maritime development may complicate the equation. If the Antarctic Treaty is not renewed in 1991 but is allowed to lapse, the oceans to the south of New Zealand, now infrequently traveled, may experience a significant increase in resource exploration and extraction now restricted by the treaty.

Should this eventuality come to pass, increased naval activity by outside powers to support territorial or resource claims could follow. Thus, future trends in New Zealand defense clearly call for improving the NZDF's maritime force structure.

Regardless of whether the RNZN loses its blue-water capability, the RNZAF will certainly continue to expand and improve its maritime elements. However, as New Zealand is clearly incapable of providing for the requirements of its allocated "area of maritime responsibility" under Radford-Collins, it is difficult to see how the RNZAF *alone* will be able to meet New Zealand's immediate maritime security needs (especially in the area of modern antisubmarine warfare) and contribute to collective security arrangements as well. The obvious option for New Zealand then is to continue, if not expand, its collective security arrangements. The continuation of the operational effectiveness of the RNZAF and the overall security of the country would seem to dictate such a policy course.

Surprisingly, the present New Zealand Labour Party government has taken a different view. Many in New Zealand feel that their country's security can be best enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Consequently, military aircraft and warships from "nuclear" countries are prohibited from using New Zealand's airfields and ports unless they are nonnuclear-propelled and declared to be not nuclear-armed. The United States, in keeping with its long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying which aircraft or ships are carrying nuclear weapons, has responded to the NZLP government's initiatives by reducing its level of defense cooperation with New Zealand as a sign of its displeasure. Exercises, personnel exchanges, and intelligence contacts have been either discontinued or reduced from previous levels. In the important area of supply, the United States Department of Defense has stated

that in light of the present NZLP government's policies, New Zealand will be treated as a friendly government but no longer as an ally in meeting supply requests.²² Wellington, for its part, has declared that it wants to continue the ANZUS relationship but in nonnuclear areas. The NZLP government has offered to provide a greater proportion of its own defense requirements, particularly in the area of maritime surveillance.²³ The response from Washington has been that port access makes possible the operational demonstration of deterrence implicit in the treaty and that, without such visits, there can be no resumption of close defense relations.

Washington has been placed in a dilemma, as it is not in the U.S. interest to contribute to the lowering of the operational effectiveness of a traditionally close ally's defense force. Yet, at the same time, Washington has been fearful of the possible extraregional effects that the NZLP government's policies might have on other allies with large antinuclear popular movements.²⁴ Unless a major diplomatic breakthrough or a change in the NZLP government's policy occurs, the RNZAF may well find its task of providing for the air power requirements of New Zealand progressively more difficult and expensive.

CLEARLY, there is more at stake in the present strain in New Zealand-United States relations than the continued capability of a Western air force to operate its aircraft efficiently. Unwittingly, the present New Zealand government has been perceived to have called into question the ANZUS strategy of "strategic denial" of the South Pacific to the Soviet Union. Should bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, it is not difficult to see that it will be Western interests in the South Pacific which will suffer, not simply those of the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. *Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand for Year Ending 31 March 1985*, New Zealand "Ministry of Defence" (Wellington: Government Printer, 1985), pp. 74-76.

2. *Ibid.*; and New Zealand Parliament, *Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR)*, (1984) G. 4 Ministry of Defence, p. 43.

3. *AJHR (1978) Defence Review*, p. 11.

4. *AJHR (1983) G. 4a Defence Review*, pp. 9-10. This official concern about Soviet motives in the Far East is articulated in this defense white paper.

5. See the New Zealand Ministry of Defence's assessment of a Soviet air attack from bases in Indochina in *New Zealand Times*, 28 October 1984.

6. For a description of this updating, see Benjamin M. Elson, "New Zealand Updates P-3B Electronics," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 9 January 1984, p. 75. A copy of the agreement with the United States providing for the Orion's modification can be found in *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS)* 10231, 3 August 1981.

7. *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 1 April 1985. The cost of the aircraft and its updating to RNZAF Orion standards is placed at \$NZ 19 million.

8. Information provided by RNZAF Operations Group, October 1984.

9. Benjamin M. Elson, "New Zealand Updates Its Military Inventory," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 13 July 1981, pp. 129-36.

10. David Filer, *The New Zealand Armed Services: Their Development in Relation to Defence Policy, 1946-1972* (M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 1972), p. 107.

11. It is interesting to note that although the RNZAF has strong ties with the United States Air Force, its principal combat aircraft are not flown by the U.S. Air Force but by the United States Navy.

12. The latter agreement can be found in *TIAS* 10542, 21 June 1982.

13. The 1983 *Defence Review* identified the requirement to increase the range of air weapons so as to improve the RNZAF's ability to mount independent operations, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 34-35. It is expected, however, that the NZDF will attempt to continue to

purchase ammunition, missiles, and other items in conjunction with U.S. purchases, thereby taking advantage of lower unit costs and prompt delivery. See remarks by former Chief of Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Neil Anderson, RNZN, *New Zealand Times*, 21 October 1984.

14. Information (dated December 1981) provided by the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, October 1984.

15. Information provided by RNZAF Support Group, October 1984.

16. For details on the ASCC, see the pamphlet issued by the ASCC Management Committee, "Air Standardization Coordinating Committee," June 1984, Hq USAF XOXX-ISO, Washington, D.C. It must be pointed out that as a full member of the ASCC, the RNZAF is expected to contribute to the general pool of information as well.

17. For details of New Zealand's presence in Malaysia and Singapore, see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Five Power Defence Arrangements* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1971).

18. This agreement has only recently become publicly acknowledged to exist. As it is still an operational arrangement, its precise details remain privileged information. General information on Radford-Collins can be found in the *Star* (Christchurch), 11 February 1985; and in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, volume XII, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 99-100, 328. Note that the agreement was amended in 1977 by the ANZUS MARSAR Agreement.

19. Filer, p. 142. New Zealand's "area of maritime responsibility" is reported to be from south of the equator to the Antarctic and between 170° E to 160° W. See Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship between Australia and New Zealand," paper presented at the conference on the ANZAC Connection, Canberra, Australian National University, 10-11 May 1984, p. 23.

20. *Estimates*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

21. See Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1985, p. 51.

22. *Washington Post*, 21 February 1985.

23. *Washington Post*, 3 March 1985.

24. See Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's television interview remarks reported in the *Washington Post*, 15 February 1985.



IRA C. EAKER ESSAY COMPETITION

Air University is pleased to announce the annual Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition. The objective of this competition is to encourage the development and open discussion of innovative air power ideas and concepts in a dynamic and interactive forum, much as General Ira C. Eaker and his colleagues approached the challenges in developing air power in the '30s and '40s. *Air University Review* is proud to be a part of this very significant competition honoring General Eaker's achievements and memorializing the indomitable spirit of the air power enthusiasts of his time.

Topic areas for the essay competition are military strategy and tactics, doctrine, professionalism, ethics and values, esprit de corps, or any combination thereof.

ENTRY RULES

—Essays must be *original* and *specifically* written for the competition. Only one entry per person may be submitted.

—Entries must be a minimum of 2000 words and a maximum of 4000 words.

—Essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, and on standard-sized paper.

—The competition is open to active-duty members of the regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard; Air Force Academy and AFROTC cadets; and Civil Air Patrol members. Competition judges, *Air University Review* staff members, and cash-award winners of the last annual competition are ineligible for cash awards.

—A separate coversheet should include the essay title, author's name, rank, duty/home addresses, and duty/home phone numbers. The author's name must not appear on the essay itself. The title should be repeated at the top of the first page of the essay.

—Send entries to: Editor, *Air University Review*, Building 1211, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5511. All essays must be received or postmarked not later than 1 June 1986.

—Essays are submitted with the understanding that first-publication rights belong to the *Air University Review*.

ENTRIES NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULES WILL BE DISQUALIFIED.

First-, second-, and third-prize medallions will be awarded, as well as \$2000, \$1000, and \$500 United States Savings Bonds, respectively. Distinguished Honorable Mention and Honorable Mention certificates will be awarded also. Top winning essays will be published in the *Review*.

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R in my opinion

SECURITY FORESIGHT: A RATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FELIX F. MORAN

- 18 April 1983: American Embassy, Beirut; vehicle bomb; six lives lost and building destroyed.
- 23 October 1983: Marine Compound, Beirut; vehicle bomb; 2 lives lost and building destroyed.
- 20 September 1984: American Embassy Annex, Beirut; vehicle bomb; twenty-three lives lost and building heavily damaged.



THESE and other less serious attacks have all occurred since President Reagan stated that international terrorists would face "swift and effective retribution" if they continued to target U.S. interests throughout the world.¹ The fact that retribution has not been forthcoming illustrates the extent of the problem that our nation faces in dealing with the spreading cancer of terrorism. Like some other nations, we have enjoyed dramatic successes in combating this malignancy within our national borders, but acts of terrorism abroad continue to grow more frequent and more deadly.

Terrorism Trends

Contrary to popular belief, the history of political violence and terrorism did not begin with the disastrous bombing of the Marine Corps compound in Beirut. What is new is the form and degree of violence now threatening the stability of the world. In the 1970s, as noted by Brian M. Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, seizing embassies and kidnapping diplomats or business executives were common terrorist tactics. Positive steps to provide better security and national policies that forbade meeting terrorist demands resulted in a decline in embassy takeovers and kidnappings, but there was a corresponding rise in assassinations and bombings.² Now, large-scale attacks such as the bombings of the American Embassy and the

Marine Corps compound in Beirut have apparently become the favored tactic. The random killing of innocent bystanders, such as the devastating attacks on the Horse Guards parade in London, the railway station in Bologna, and the airports in Rome and Vienna, has also become common.

Evidence of this trend is borne out by a few basic statistics. Early in the 1970s, 80 percent of terrorist attacks were against property and only 20 percent against people. By the 1980s, one-half of all attacks were against people. Fatal incidents have grown 20 percent each year, with multiple fatalities increasing dramatically in 1983 and thereafter.³ Despite a slight decline in the total number of worldwide terrorist incidents during the 1980s, there has been a 13 percent increase in the number of deaths. Total terrorist activity has increased an alarming 400 percent since the Munich Olympics.⁴

For several reasons, it is unlikely that this trend will reverse itself. As Jenkins points out,

... terrorists have been brutalized by the protracted struggle, and the public has been numbed. If terrorists are to remain in the headlines in a world in which incidents of terrorism have become increasingly common and recover their lost coercive power over governments which have become more resistant, their acts of violence must become more spectacular. Terrorists have also become more technically proficient; they can build bigger and better bombs. At the same time, the terrorist has changed. Harder men and women have replaced the older generations of terrorists who took the time to debate the morality and utility of actions against selected individuals.⁵

How far the escalation will go is a matter for speculation. Terrorism could continue more or less unchanged, increase slowly, or take off like a speeding train in the form of mass casualty attacks like that on the Marine Corps compound in Beirut. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the ever-present possibility that a terrorist group may acquire and use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon to threaten a government into inconceivable concessions. While there are terrorists who argue that such action would only alienate their supporters,





Terrorism is a worldwide problem, although terrorist groups in various regions may vary in their objectives and tactics. The Shining Path, a Maoist group plaguing Peru, ranks among the most vicious.

disgust the public, provoke a repressive response, expose the organization to betrayal by those with less determination, a harder breed among them contends that wars are won by ruthless violence. History has shown that, particularly with terrorists, the hardliners more often than not prevail.⁶

What Makes a Terrorist?

Most terrorists are eighteen to twenty-eight years old, come from middle-class families, have had some college education, are politically oriented, and embrace Communist or anarchist philosophies. Many terrorists are women, who often become the most ruthless killers within the group. Some terrorists are

mercenaries who have at least partially embraced the cause of world communism, such as the infamous Carlos. The future will surely bring the day when the purely mercenary terrorist will range the world, dealing death for a price. Also, right-wing or reactionary terrorists have surfaced to counter the growing threat they see from leftist-led groups.⁷

Regardless of their affiliation, terrorists usually work within a group that has a definite organizational structure and hierarchy. The first or command element often consists of the older and more experienced terrorists who establish the organization's objectives. The second element is comprised of the operators or shooters. Sometimes former criminals or former

These Marines (facing page) are standing guard outside our embassy in Beirut after it was bombed in April 1983. They had better be as mean as they look. Despite the fact that there are more terrorist per square block in Beirut than anywhere else in the world, these troops are on duty with unloaded rifles.





Intimidation is a primary goal of terrorism. Despite two bombings of our embassy in Beirut, we're still open for business.

military personnel, these individuals actually conduct the planned attacks. They are often prone to irrational actions, giving little consideration to captives or hostages. The third terrorist element is composed of idealists usually assigned to logistical and support tasks. They meet the physical needs of the group, distribute propaganda, and guard prisoners. The idealist is not normally violent and sometimes exhibits a sense of reasonableness within the group, balancing the ruthlessness and fanaticism of the other members.⁸

The violence that terrorists practice is calculated and rational. Usually a group's immediate objectives, mainly psychological, are to generate fear among a populace, disrupt a government, induce a general loss of confidence in existing social orders or governmental policies, and provoke authorities to adopt repressive measures.⁹ Through terrorist violence, weak

organizations (and weak governments) are able to strike at their stronger enemies, usually with little likelihood of retaliation.


The more common types of violence committed by terrorists are bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Car bombs and, more recently, truck bombs driven by suicidal assassins have become favorite weapons. A wide variety of armament is readily available to most terrorist groups, including handheld automatic weapons, machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, explosives, and incendiary devices. Surface-to-air missiles are not unlikely in some terrorist arsenals. With weapons such as these, the possibilities for target selection and types of attack are very nearly limitless. Robbery committed to finance operations or acquire weapons also plays an important role in furthering terrorist objectives.

Most operations are seldom based on chance. They are meticulously planned and executed within a tight schedule, against lightly defended or unprotected targets. Both target selection and attack planning are based on lengthy surveillance. Terrorists may recruit or place an operative in a position of access to a targeted individual or facility to assist in either surveillance or execution. Attacks are usually rehearsed several times and may be aborted if the group encounters something unexpected or if it loses control of the situation.¹⁰

These operational concepts have produced an impressive success record. In more than 18,000 incidents since 1970, 91 percent of all terrorist attacks have been successful.¹¹ In each case, the terrorists were able to gain access to their intended target; damage or destroy facilities; injure, kidnap, or kill their victim; and gain media attention.

Impact on U.S. Facilities and National Policy

In the United States, terrorism and even the threat of terrorism have had a significant impact on the Department of Defense, the De-



A terrorist bomb exploding during happy hour on a Friday night could have had catastrophic results, as these before and after photos of the Rhein Main Officers' Club show. Fortunately, the bomb went off when the club was relatively empty.



partment of State, and, in a broader sense, the nation itself. Attacks against U.S. military targets increased from five in 1968 to forty-seven in 1985, for a total of more than 600. In our worst year, 1983, 249 lives were lost, eighty-four personnel were wounded, and nineteen facilities and twenty vehicles were damaged or destroyed.¹² Tens of millions of dollars have been spent to upgrade security—money that could have been better spent on personnel programs or weapons improvement and acquisition. Particularly in Europe, U.S. installations have become fortresslike, with concrete walls and fences surrounding key facilities. Access to many facilities has been curtailed, restricting

The Red Army terrorist group, a European anarchist group, used a car bomb at Rhein Main in an August 1985 attack. Two people were killed and eleven wounded.

the movement of potential adversaries and U.S. workers alike. The cost of such measures to the U.S. Air Force for the period 1980 through 1984 was more than \$105 million.¹³

The fact that U.S. national policy has been changed as a result of terrorism can hardly be denied. The U.S. Marine contingent to the multinational force was withdrawn from Beirut within a few short months of the October 1983 bombing. In retrospect, a relatively small force of terrorists moved a superior power to an action that it might not otherwise have taken.¹⁴

military action: a flawed solution

The solution seems so simple. The U.S. President and the Secretary of State have both gone on record supporting military action as retribution for an attack and as a preventive meas-



ure for future attacks. Secretary George P. Shultz has stated:

We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest, but we have no choice but to play it.¹⁵

This policy calling for a military response has been articulated by many observers, including Yonah Alexander, director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism. Alexander has stated emphatically that we "must severely punish and isolate terrorists and their sponsoring states."¹⁶

However, there are deep and basic flaws in this solution. One U.S. official who works directly on the government's antiterrorism programs said it best: "I don't believe it's feasible for us to retaliate because we are not an Old Testament society; we're a New Testament society. Retaliation is part and parcel of Israeli policy, . . . their religion, and their value system."¹⁷ This value system readily supports the vigorous Israeli policy of military action against terrorist groups and camps, even when located in civilian population centers. U.S. officials and other experts, including Robert H. Kupperman, terrorism analyst at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, generally believe that American society would reject such a policy if actually initiated.¹⁸

Even if our national conscience would allow such a policy, the preponderance of evidence suggests that preemptive and retaliatory strikes and assassinations do little to prevent or reduce terrorism. The Israelis have had such a strategy for years. Even precise surgical Entebbe-type operations have not ended acts of terrorism against Israel.¹⁹ If anything, the Israeli policy may have intensified Palestinian resolve to continue the fight. Certainly, at the least, Israel has incurred both diplomatic and economic setbacks—and, some observers have suggested, a moral loss as well.²⁰



The car that carried the Rhein Main bomb was completely obliterated. This sports car, parked near the exploding vehicle, was turned over by the force of the explosion.

Finally, despite Secretary of State Shultz's desire to avoid "a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control," many authorities believe that such escalation would be the actual result of U.S.-initiated strikes. The outcome could easily be an increase in terrorist incidents within this country, accompanied by subsequent countermeasures that threaten our civil liberties.²¹ As a minimum, implementing such a policy of retaliation would jeopardize important global ties with nations vital to our national interest, such as Saudi Arabia.²² Moreover, since the odds are against our actually striking suspected terrorists before or after an attack, the constant reiteration of such a reactive policy draws attention away from the real solution and merely creates false hope that a quick and easy fix to the terrorist problem is feasible.

security foresight: a rational defense against terrorism

Rather than accepting a static defense based on after-the-attack retaliatory action, we must de-

velop a long-term, well-planned, concerted defense. This effort must rely on the practice of security foresight to reduce the vulnerability of our people, aircraft, and facilities. This approach requires education and awareness training, positive security decisions during all types of planning, the development and use of sound procedures and effective physical security aids, and the presence of a fully equipped and well-trained security police force.

Security foresight begins with a population that is fully aware of the dynamics of the terrorist threat, the precautions to be taken for self-protection, and the application of proven methods for the protection of our aircraft and facilities. A trained and aware population is the single most cost-effective aspect of the Air Force's total defensive effort. Unfortunately, we have failed to take advantage of this fact. As noted in the USAF Antiterrorism Task Group Final Report, there are several serious shortfalls in our training program. Antiterrorism training has not been institutionalized across the Air Force. Professional military education courses do not adequately address combating terrorism. Aircrew members are not exposed to the mission-unique vulnerability that they face. Many senior commanders, decision makers, and security planners have not attended the USAF Special Operations School's Dynamics of International Terrorism course or the AFOSI Senior Officer Security Seminar. These deficiencies should be corrected without delay to ensure that security planners, decision makers, and commanders can formulate effective security plans.²³

Security foresight requires that a conscious security decision be made during the early stages of mission planning, installation construction and remodeling design, and weapon systems acquisition. Therefore, considerations for the defense of Air Force assets from terrorist attack must permeate every formal planning level, from Hq USAF to individual wings. Terrorism annexes should be developed in all supporting plans. Each installation resource pro-

tection plan should include measures to assess the local threat, determine vulnerabilities, and plan necessary measures to limit the impact of terrorism on mission accomplishment.²⁴ Public affairs and medical planners must be consulted in the earliest planning stages to ensure a coordinated and meaningful response to various forms of attack.²⁵

Current operational and contingency mission plans must also consider the terrorist threat. To ensure the security of crews, ground-support personnel, and aircraft, we must make decisions based on accurate threat estimates. Such security considerations as where to billet personnel, how to arm aircrews and ground support personnel, and how to deploy security police forces must be brought into the decision loop. These decisions are necessary at the beginning of the mission planning cycle rather than after a crisis develops.

Plans for installation construction and remodeling must also address security early in the design process. For example, we can no longer afford to haphazardly site vital facilities close to base perimeters, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Designs that allow easy and uncontrolled access to building interiors must be avoided.²⁶

Similarly, weapon system acquisition schemes must provide details of the security required once the system becomes operational. This planning is essential for long-range sizing of security forces to ensure that the limited resources available are utilized to the maximum extent possible.²⁷ In the early stages of systems development, electronic sensors and other automated devices can be included to reduce or assist security forces. After operational deployment, such security enhancements often become nearly cost-prohibitive.

Another aspect of security foresight is the implementation of sound procedures and the use of effective physical security aids to provide the commander with a flexible response to changing threats. It is essential that these procedures and physical security aids be tai-

lored to meet local conditions and threats rather than arbitrarily mandated from higher headquarters. Further, they must have day-to-day utility and sustainability. They cannot impair our ability to accomplish our mission. Wider use of electronic explosive detectors and intrusion alarms is necessary to provide greater security against the terrorist threat.²⁸ A side benefit, of course, is the increased availability of security forces, relieved from detection duty, as response forces. We must be cautious, however, not to adopt a siege mentality, isolated behind gates, chain-link fences, and concrete barricades. If we do, we may be safe, but we may also have forfeited the battle.

Finally, security foresight requires fully equipped and well-trained security police forces to respond to actual terrorist incidents. Trained hostage negotiators and special tactics teams are necessary for the resolution of hostage situations, aircraft hijackings, etc. Trained bodyguards and vehicle drivers are necessary for the protection of high-risk personnel.

Defense analyst Brian M. Jenkins has pointed out:

There is a basic asymmetry in defending against terrorist attacks. Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, and at any time. Governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all of the time. It is a virtual certainty that terrorists will attack whatever is least defended. And it is a certainty that there always will be something that is vulnerable.²⁹

Security foresight, more than retaliation and retribution, can significantly reduce that vulnerability and thereby protect Air Force assets.

Simple precautions and sound procedures would have prevented the Beirut tragedies. We need to pay some attention to Kupperman's summation: "We're not doing steady planning. . . . We're reacting. . . . We're not doing our job."³⁰ It's time we stopped dreaming about combat solutions for a security problem revealed by recent events. Military retaliation has not worked for the Israelis, and it will not work for us. It's time to start protecting ourselves and our assets against terrorism with the solid, down-to-earth security planning, practice, and action that security foresight requires.

Scott AFB, Illinois

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
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the
classic
approach

MAHAN'S CLASSICAL VIEW AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

DR. DONALD D. CHIPMAN

IN 1914, two years before Lieutenants Carl Spaatz and Benjamin Foulois flew America's first combat mission during the Mexican intervention, Alfred T. Mahan died. Thus one may ask, what could Mahan contribute to our modern understanding of war and leadership? Yet an investigation of Mahan's nearly 100 books and articles reveals numerous combat lessons which were true during his time and remain so today. These are the perennial warfare lessons found in the classical works of Mahan, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and others. While these concepts are not panaceas, at the very least they provide questions to investigate. As a classical military theorist, Mahan attempted to analyze war's nature in the maritime environment.

More specifically, like Clausewitz, Mahan investigated the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars. From this analysis, he wrote two classics: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*. In 1890, with the publication of the first book,



Mahan became the preeminent sea power historian and a classical theorist of naval warfare.

Mahan's writing career gained momentum when he joined the Naval War College faculty in 1885. There he was challenged to develop sea power principles as Jomini had produced land power principles. Thus he set to work describing how the British Royal Navy successfully defeated the French and others through sea power. Ironically, by the time he amplified



these principles, ships were no longer powered by sail, and many of his ideas became outdated. Yet in his sea power doctrine, there were specific, recurring leadership themes and concepts of war that even today remain relevant. As an instructor and, later, as Naval War College president, Mahan insisted that officers ought to study war. He agreed with Clausewitz that war was basically a human conflict of courage, honor, fear, and duty. However, in Mahan's time, few naval officers realized the importance of this human element. For most officers, war was some type of managerial exercise, a mathematical equation, or an engineering principle. Therefore, war studies were considered nonessential. According to Mahan, a typical naval officer believed that it was more important to

know how to build a gun, to design a ship, to understand the strength of materials, to observe the stars through a telescope, to be wise in chemistry and electricity, than to have ingrained in him the knowledge of the laws of war, to understand the tactical handling of his weapons, to be expert in questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics.¹

Mahan said that this military education was totally wrong, and he decided to require his fellow officers to study war. Because in those days, just as now, officers were busy handling many daily problems, Mahan assumed a never-ending task. "The complex developments of

the present day have reconciled us to specialists," he remarked.²

Wherever Mahan looked, he found naval officers more concerned with their careers than with anything else. One officer told him that since the Naval War College needed more students, the school should teach only practical lessons from the "real Navy." When Mahan asked what type, the officer commented: "If you want to attract officers to the college, give them something that will help them pass their next examinations."³

Mahan found that most officers wanted slick, quick answers to the world's most complex events: wars. Indeed, many believed that war was essentially a technical problem which could be harnessed by mechanical means. Mahan blamed this mentality on the U.S. Navy's approach to war, which, like the modern-day view, tended to glorify the technical aspects and underplay the human elements. If someone asked who was a gun authority or a navigational expert, noted Mahan, this specialist was easily named. The military journals were full of technical articles, he continued, yet seldom were there essays on the art of war. And what wonder then, stated Mahan,

that we find our noble calling undervalued in this day? Have we not ourselves much to blame for it in this exclusive devotion to the mechanical matters? Do we not hear, within and without, the

scornful cry of disparagement that everything is done by machinery in these days, and that we are waxing old and decaying, ready to vanish away? *Everything done by machinery! as if the subtlest and most comprehensive mind that ever wrought on this planet could devise a machine to meet the innumerable incidents of sea and naval war.*⁴

Mahan pleaded with officers to study war. He claimed that the best time for this activity was between wars. During peacetime, he continued, officers ought to study war's complicated aspects because attempts to classify war by hasty, simple rules would result in a "disaster of grave proportion."⁵ Before the squall strikes, he claimed,

there is time yet for study; there is time to imbibe the experience of the past, to become imbued, steeped in the external principles of war, by the study of its history and of the maxims of its masters. But the time of preparation will pass—someday the time of action will come. Can an admiral sit down and re-enforce his intellectual grasp of the problem before him by a study of history, which is simply a study of past experience? Not so; the time of action is upon him, and he must trust his horse sense.⁶

After developing his case for the study of war, Mahan described how leadership was essential. He would agree today with Martin van Creveld's statement, "The time has now come to examine a constituent of fighting power that, perhaps more than any other, decides the outcome of war: leadership."⁷ Indeed, Mahan's sea power doctrine depended on talented, aggressive leadership. Mahan defined sea power in terms of a navy capable of finding the enemy, defeating them, and gaining command of the sea. For Mahan, the eighteenth-century Royal Navy fulfilled his criteria of sea power. The English were victorious primarily because of the dynamic leadership of Admirals Sir Edward Hawke, George Anson, Richard Howe, John Jervis, and Horatio Nelson. These leaders possessed the tenacity to sail, fight, and win. They gained command of the sea, and they brought English sea power to fruition.

Throughout his works, Mahan made various leadership comments. For the most part, he

believed that naval leaders should be aggressive, courageous, and determined. In his mind, Nelson was the perfect combat leader.

During the 1890s, Mahan wrote a Nelson biography in which he glorified Nelson's battles and exploits. Yet, as a devoutly religious man, Mahan could not understand Nelson's behavior with Lady Hamilton. Critics claimed that Mahan whitewashed this part of Nelson's biography. After further investigation, Mahan had to admit that Lady Hamilton projected a "gloomy shadow over his hero."⁸ Years later, Mahan's biographer, Robert Seager, noted that Mahan could not conceive that "Nelson's combat temperament expressed itself in almost identical ways on King George's quarterdecks and in Lady Hamilton's boudoir."⁹

In addition to Nelson's biography, Mahan wrote numerous leadership books and articles. Among them were biographies of John P. Jones, Thomas Macdonough, David Farragut, John Jervis, and Edward Hawke. In nearly all of these, he compared these leaders to Nelson. For instance, during the Spanish-American War, U.S. Navy Commodore Winfield Schley failed to attack the Spanish fleet aggressively in a typical Nelson manner. Mahan castigated Schley for his lack of leadership. In fact, Mahan wrote to the Navy Department that Schley was totally "unfit for command."¹⁰ Nevertheless, when the Spanish decided to fight, Schley defeated them.

Mahan claimed that Nelson possessed several distinct leadership characteristics. The most important were Nelson's ability to analyze a battle situation quickly (coup d'oeil) and his determination to attack the enemy's weakness aggressively. Carl von Clausewitz was the first military writer to explain these leadership skills, noting:

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable. First, an intellect that even in the darkest hours, retains some glimmerings of inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is



Alfred T. Mahan (seated on the left) posed with officers of the cruiser U'SS Chicago, on which he served as commanding officer from 1893 to 1895. . . . The U'SS Chicago (right) was a hybrid, representing the phase between sail and steam-powered warships.

described by the French term *coup d'oeil*; the second is determination.¹¹

Mahan used similar terms and ideas in describing Nelson's and Admiral David Farragut's leadership qualities:

Nelson, for the most part, shone upon the battlefield by his tactical combinations, by the rapidity and boldness with which he carried out plans previously laid, or, on occasion, by the astonishing *coup d'oeil* and daring with which, in unforeseen crises, he snatched and secured escaping victory. Farragut in actual battles showed that careful adaptation of means to ends, which has a just claim to be considered tactical science; but his great merit was in clearness with which he recognized the decisive point of a campaign, or of a particular operation, and threw upon it the force under his direction.¹²



Mahan agreed with Clausewitz that the art of command included *coup d'oeil*. To be successful, a leader must analyze clearly the battle situation and then take action. Over and over, throughout modern military literature, these elements of leadership reappear. For instance,

S. L. A. Marshall wrote that leadership is, by rough approximation, "sixty percent the ability to anticipate and forty percent the ability to improve."¹³ Field Marshal Rommel's biographer, Desmond Young, noted that Rommel possessed "Fingerspitzengefuehl, that innate sense of what the enemy was about to do."¹⁴ Recently, Colonel John R. Boyd incorporated coup d'oeil and Fingerspitzengefuehl into modern terms. Boyd said that leadership was primarily "observation, orientation, decision, and action."¹⁵

Mahan recognized that leadership skill includes courage. Nelson often declared, "No captain can do very wrong who places his ship beside the enemy."¹⁶ However, he, like Mahan did not advocate rash action. Through experience and study, Nelson could predict French tactics. To ensure that all of his subordinates were knowledgeable and determined, Nelson invited each of his captains for the HMS *Victory* dinner. There they would discuss the next battle and the enemy's weaknesses. Thus Nelson built cohesion and a fighting spirit in his command. Often he called his fellow officers a

band of brothers.¹⁷ Unlike today, when rated and nonrated officers sometimes emphasize their differences, Nelson attempted to build morale by promoting a fraternal brotherhood. In other times and other wars, both General Robert E. Lee and Admiral Chester Nimitz similarly considered their officers as their brothers.¹⁸ Unfortunately, today many officers attend management schools where they learn that "familiarity breeds contempt" instead of Nelson's ideal, "familiarity bred cohesion."

Although most individuals are familiar with Nelson's Trafalgar victory and his comment "Thank God I have done my duty," few realize that Nelson spent many years in boring pursuit of the French fleet. Nelson's sense of duty was best described by his unyielding effort to bring the French into battle. According to Mahan, between June 1803, and July 1805, Nelson es-

In 1885, Mahan began lecturing at the newly organized Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he wrote his two classic volumes on sea power. Mahan believed that most naval officers relied too heavily on technology and were generally not interested in the art of war.



established a naval patrol off the Toulon coast. The HMS *Victory* participated, and during those two years Nelson remained aboard. Not once did he leave the ship. Mahan commented:

Other officers, especially of the frigates, got their occasional runs ashore; but his slight figure was continually in view, walking the quarterdeck, to the unconscious contentment of the men, thus reminded ever, that their Admiral shared their deprivations.¹⁹

According to Mahan, Nelson's sense of duty was inflamed by the "Nelson spirit"—which was, his desire to engage and defeat the enemy. Just before Trafalgar, in a letter to Lady Hamilton, Nelson wrote:

I have not a thought except on you and the French fleet; all my thoughts, plans, and toils tend to those two objects. . . . We cruise, cruise and one day so like another that they are hardly distinguishable, but hopes, blessed hopes, keeps us up, that some happy day the French may come out, then I shall consider my duty to my country fulfilled.²⁰

Recently, military theorist, Morris Janowitz claimed that the "warrior spirit" remains an essential ingredient of the armed forces. According to Janowitz, the warrior spirit is based on a psychological motive that drives the individual to seek success in combat regardless of personal safety.²¹ Here is an example of two classical military theorists agreeing. Both Mahan and Janowitz stated emphatically that the warrior spirit should be a significant part of an officer's professional education. Thus Janowitz noted:

Despite technical aspects of the current military establishment, *the need for heroic fighters persists*. . . . Units must have an organizational format and a fighter spirit which will enable them to operate effectively.²²

More recently, Colonel Harry Summers summarized the importance of the warrior spirit:

Peacetime training and education has one primary purpose—to strengthen and fortify the character and the will of those who would lead our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines into battle. It is this terrible ordeal of combat that, in the final analysis, defines the worth of our officer corps.²³

Thus, a thorough examination of Mahan's works reveals many lessons that are true today. Basically, war is a human conflict; leadership is essential, and duty is critical. Mahan was a man of his times, yet he echoed Clausewitz's principles; and more recently, Janowitz has repeated them. If Mahan were alive today, he would continue to emphasize that success in war is not totally dependent on technology, that combat victory continues to be dependent on the leader's warrior spirit, and that officers need to build cohesion. While he did not directly address Air Force employment, Mahan adds greatly to our modern understanding of war and leadership. Because his ideas transcend time and technical innovation to focus on the military professional and war, Mahan remains one of the all-time significant classical military theorists.

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes

1. Alfred T. Mahan, Letter to secretary of the Naval Institute, *Proceedings*, 27 November 1888, pp. 57-60.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.

3. Alfred T. Mahan, "The Practical Character of the Naval War College," *Proceedings*, June 1885.

4. Alfred T. Mahan, "Address of Captain A. T. Mahan, President of U.S. Naval War College," *Proceedings*, December 1888, pp. 621-99. Emphasis added.

5. Mahan, "The Practical Character of the Naval War College," pp. 153-66.

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7. Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 127.

8. Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1918), p. 257.

9. Robert Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His*

Letters (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1977), p. 341.

10. Alfred T. Mahan, Letter to John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, 12 December 1899, in *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, edited by Robert Seager II and Doris Maquire, vol. II (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 673.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 102.

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13. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), p. 108.

14. Desmond Young, *Rommel, The Desert Fox* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 116.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Barry D. Watts, *The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War* (Maxwell AFB,

Alabama: Air University Press, 1984), p. 116.

16. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), p. 435.

17. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of Sea Power of Great Britain*, vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923), pp. 341-46.

18. E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 197, and Douglas S. Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, vol. I (New York: Scribner, 1934), p. 26.

19. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson*, vol. II, p. 222.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-23.

21. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 32.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 33. Emphasis added.

23. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Warrior's Training and Education for Leadership and Readiness," *Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, 1 January 1985, p. 1.

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The Editor



You've got the stick

THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN ASIA, AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

DR. GERALD W. BERKLEY

THIS issue of the *Air University Review* is especially relevant as the United States and the countries of the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Western Pacific try to cope with the rapidly changing international and domestic environments during this last quarter of the twentieth century. Both the increasing multipolarity of international power in the area and the potential role of American military presence in these regions are causing the United States and the various countries, ranging from Afghanistan to New Zealand, to focus their attention on one another.

While in global terms these regions are often overshadowed by the likes of Europe and East Asia, elements are at work shifting the strategic center of gravity slowly toward the countries of the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Western Pacific. American, Russian, and Chinese involvement in these areas will intensify at a time of growing turbulence and fluidity in world affairs and when margins for maneuver and error are slender.

Few parts of the world have undergone a more rapid transformation than the countries of these regions. Since the early part of the twentieth century, the entire political organi-

zation has been rearranged. Several countries have recently gained independence; modern cities have emerged where there had been only villages or small towns; schools and universities have been established where the preceding generations were almost entirely illiterate; motorcycles and automobiles have frequently put horses, camels, donkeys, and water-buffalo out of work; and commercial airlines have now linked the countries of the Middle East, Southern Asia, and the Western Pacific with one another and with the rest of the world.

Diversity is the most striking characteristic of these regions. The geographic features vary from frigid snow-shrouded mountains to hot rain-soaked tropical jungles to sun-scorched deserts. Some areas contain large concentrations of population, while elsewhere one might travel for hours and not see another human being. The people speak a multitude of different languages; in some countries, the people cannot talk to one another because they have no common language. Religious beliefs range from Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism to Christianity; there are also a significant number of minor religious communities. Several serious conflicts in the areas suggest that there is

a distinct danger when religion is used as a means of gaining political ends.

There is also a matter of variation in physical appearance. The racial makeup and racial mixtures in the various areas offer striking dissimilarities. Differences in dress, social habits, and customs add to the divergency.

In spite of this diversity, however, most of the countries of these regions share common problems. Perhaps foremost is limited food production relative to growing populations. Some of these countries can afford to import their needs, but others are not so fortunate. Overpopulated lands also have people who are not properly housed or provided with medical care. Untold numbers of people in the Middle East,

Southern Asia, and the Western Pacific suffer from parasites that blind, cripple, kill, or, more commonly, merely enfeeble. Simultaneously, pollution, resulting from recent industrialization, is both a growing health problem and a serious threat to the natural environment.

The problems of overpopulation, insufficient food, inadequate medical care, and pollution cloud any hope for a better future. When you add to these conditions inept and corrupt leadership, as well as a real or imagined danger from external sources, then political unrest becomes inevitable.

Dr. Berkley is Associate Professor of History, Auburn University at Montgomery.

Letters

policy review revisited

In 1517 when Pope Leo X first heard of the uproar that Martin Luther was causing in Germany, he dismissed the affair as a fracas between quarrelsome monks. Judging from Colonel Ronald B. Johnston's letter in the January-February issue, the concern being expressed in this journal about the policy and security review process is nothing more than the squabbling of monks. The colonel expresses the top-down official impression of the review process; the monks at the bottom have a different perspective.

Let's begin with a quick look at how the review process works. After Colonel Johnston's office (SAF/PAS) receives a manuscript, it is "farmed out" to the office of the Air Staff, DOD, or major command headquarters that has responsibility for the subject treated in the manuscript. Officials in this office review the article and make a recommendation to Colonel Johnston's office with regard to publication. All too frequently, Colonel Johnston's statistics notwithstanding, reviewing officials recommend against clearing articles that are critical of established policies. Is this surprising? Certainly not, for these officials have vested interests in policies they

help to make. In other words, our policy and security review process is the bureaucratic equivalent of having the fox guard the hen coop.

How about some specific examples of manuscripts that were denied clearance while I was editor of the *Review*? One such manuscript claimed that general officer endorsements were distorting our promotion system and warping the professional attitudes of officers by leading them to seek positions where they could get an endorsement by a high-ranking officer. Reviewing officials decided that this article dealt only with isolated instances that were not representative of the situation in the U.S. Air Force.

Another clearance denial involved a manuscript that criticized the way a major command handled its share of the air war in Vietnam. This case is especially interesting because the same general view was subsequently expressed by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Guilmartin, USAF (Ret), in the November-December 1985 *Review*. (pp. 87-88) As a retired officer, Colonel Guilmartin is not required to clear his manuscripts; were he still on active duty, he, too, could have been denied the freedom to state his professional opinion on this matter.

In addition to suppressing critical articles, the

clearance process all too frequently generates threats, overt and covert, against a dissenter's career. I personally know of officers who have been told that the publication of articles they have written could be detrimental to their careers. I personally have been told at other times that if an officer believes the things he has written, he should leave the service. On one occasion, I was even told that the views expressed by a young captain might easily have been found in *Pravda*; the critic then went on to question the loyalty of the officer who had written the article.

Officers in the Air Force who attempt to publish critical views quickly find out how the "system" responds to dissenting articles. Surely, anyone can recognize the chilling effect that such treatment has on freedom of professional thought within an Air Force where one "good" OER can spell the end of a career! A retired colonel put it this way in the 14 July 1981 edition of the *Washington Star*: "Busy military strategic authors attempt this clearance process once or twice, then in frustration, quit writing for publication."

Having now looked at what can and does happen from time to time with articles that are denied clearance and having seen how the process tends to stifle dissenting views, let's look at the other side of the coin; let's examine what types of materials are being cleared through the review process. Look through the 1985 editions of *Air Force*. How many articles critical of current Air Force policies do you find? Look through a year's run of *Airman*. What kinds of stories do you see? The point here is not to be critical of other journals but rather to illustrate the kinds of publications that apparently make up the vast majority of the 1154 "cases" cleared by SAF/PAS through August 1985. These would seem to be manuscripts that tell the Air Force story. They are not articles that examine critically such key professional issues as: Is conventional strategic bombing any longer a valid mission? What is the justification for an independent Air Force?

Bright, energetic officers abound in the Air Force. But our policy and security review system tells them to keep their heads down and charge ahead within the established bounds of thinking. He who raises his head for a look around is apt to have it lopped off. As a result, we have failed to develop a cadre of thinking, writing officers who can generate new ideas and defend established ones.

All of this does not address two other very important points in Colonel Johnston's letter. For one thing, we should all understand what is entailed when he says that "all the services . . . do business *basically* [italics added] the same way." I can grant his point to the extent that all services operate under

the same DOD directive, but I know from personal liaison with the staffs of three other military journals that there are differences in the way the policies spelled out in that directive are carried out in practice.

The second point pertains to Colonel Johnston's reference to "each of us as DOD spokespersons." The implications here are most grave. Who has decided that every person in uniform is an official spokesperson? Do Colonel Johnston's words point to an unstated, unauthorized, and dangerous assumption on the part of public affairs officials about the responsibilities and priorities of the professional officer? What are the limits to such a policy? Isn't the full meaning here that we can have nothing other than official thoughts, that we can utter no words other than official words? Isn't it absurd to place an article by a lieutenant colonel in the *Air University Review* in the same category with a public speech by General Gabriel or Secretary Weinberger when they obviously are speaking *ex cathedra*? Isn't this a formula for ensuring that the only ideas pronounced are the ideas currently in vogue in the five-sided building? How does a new idea find its way into an organization bound by such restrictions?

I leave it to the readers of this journal to decide whether these are but arguments among quarrelsome monks or matters of grave consequence where the effectiveness of the Air Force officer corps is concerned.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Baucom, USAF
Office of Air Force History
Bolling AFB, D.C.

In response to Colonel Ronald B. Johnston's seemingly encouraging message on SAF/PAS's security and review policies (Letters, November-December 1985 issue), either some message traffic has flown unnoticed past his desk or I'm in an especially select group that routinely gets totally censored by our Pentagon watchdogs.

Colonel Johnston reports that last year only 1.5 percent of reviewed manuscripts were denied clearance for policy reasons; another small percentage were denied for security reasons. My experience shows that security denials extend to quoting the *Washington Post* newspaper, for instance, and that clearance for publication is denied because the censors simply do not like or do not agree with what the writer says. In the latest fiasco, I was told, in writing, that the required disclaimer did not amount to much because every reader would know that I was an Air

Force officer (presumably since my rank and service were attached to my name). This shows the level of honesty (not to say intelligence) in the appropriate departments, for I had omitted such information in the manuscript; but someone in SAF/PAS or OSD/PA had taken a pen and *written in* my rank and service by my name—then denied clearance in part because readers would know that I was in the U.S. Air Force! I could go on, but one gets the picture. When I objected and declared my intention to preserve my rights to speak and write, OSD/PA then tried to exert some clumsy pressure by writing to my boss, a general, who then was caught between a rock and a hard place. Since a potentially historic class-action lawsuit may be on the horizon—one that may be joined by a major university—this issue could be fraught with great danger to those on the wrong side of the Constitution.

This matter of policy review is a real problem, and I see little good and original thinking coming from the Air Force today. Perhaps SAF/PAS may suggest some remedies to this unhealthy and potentially disastrous situation—that is, if its spokesman can get the manuscript past the censors.

*Colonel Peter M. Dunn, USAF
Columbia, Missouri*

on linguistic barbarisms

I have been in the Air Force, active and reserve, for more than sixteen years now, and I never cease to be amazed at the things that we do to the English language in the name of national security. I have gotten


used to, even though I refuse to go along with, *orientate* (ouch), *impact* as a verb, *indicee* (singular of *indices*), *hummer* as a pronoun, *outstanding* as an article adjective, a *trend* based on one event, and all manner of redundancies (e.g., *SID departure*), hokey slang, outrageous acronyms, and questionable neologisms. I was still in high school and my father had not yet attended Air Command and Staff College in residence when *aerospace* (as in "brown-and-green Lockheed C-130 suborbital aerospace whisperjet," in which I have accumulated more than a few hours) emerged to supplant, for many purposes, both "air" and "space."

Nonetheless, a recent development deserves comment. My question is this: Clichés and hackneyed words and phrases come and go, but where was I when *war* became a mandatory, not to mention acceptable, prefix for *fighting*.

Warfighting (or *war-fighting*) is not only a stilted and awkward barbarism but a word that adds not one whit to the meaning that can be conveyed quite adequately by either *war* or *fighting* alone, or by *combat* for that matter. What other kind of fighting do we do? I detect, perhaps, an unattractive geopolitical defensiveness in the vogue for the word, as if to protest that our posture and policy are not all bluster. ("When we say fight, we mean war, by golly.")

In addition, as a gerund, it suffers from the defect of not being capable of back-derivation to a verb. *Viz*: "The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly and warfight—and don't you forget it!" And, of course, it is applied capriciously and indiscriminately. Why not, to be consistent, rename our senior service school the Air War-fighting College?

*Major Michael B. Jennison, USAFR
Washington, D.C.*




books,
images, and
ideas

OUR CHANGING VIETNAM RETROSPECT

DR. JOE P. DUNN

OUR retrospect on Vietnam has changed dramatically in the last decade. Ten years of boat people and the reality of an imperialist, totalitarian Hanoi-dominated regime make it virtually impossible for anyone but the most ideologically committed to perceive Vietnam benignly. Many of the accepted clichés of the sixties and seventies are under challenge as the recent battle of documentaries between the heralded Public Broadcasting System (PBS) "The Vietnam Experience" and the upstart Accuracy in Media (AIM) "response" demonstrated. In



popular culture, *Apocalypse Now*, *Coming Home*, and *The Deer Hunter* have given way to *Uncommon Valor*, *Missing in Action*, and *Rambo*. Although the latter movies are as far from reality as the former, they do reflect the new climate and new perspectives on the war. Who would have guessed it in the early seventies, but the divisive and controversial Vietnam War, like previous unpopular conflicts, is being legitimized, even romanticized, with the passage of time.

Patriotism is back in vogue, military service has regained honorable status, and the Vietnam veteran is finally receiving long-deserved recognition and understanding. Television interviews, a host of memoirs, the national monument, and even a parade—Vietnam veterans are, at the moment, definitely “in.” It is less chic today to brag about how one avoided the draft and the war. Some avoiders are evincing remorse; others, at least a sense that they missed out on the experience of their generation. Just as World War II was the heroic involvement for the previous generation and as politicians and community leaders have invoked their service in that event now for four decades, so Vietnam may be for the next decades. As Vietnam veterans have begun to emerge prominently in political life, business, education, and the community, a few politicians have even tried to invent records of Vietnam service to enhance their public image.

Most important, the literature on the war is changing. Many of the new books that are pouring off the presses take a revisionist perspective from the norm of the late sixties and seventies. These books are more understanding and sympathetic about our involvement. Even when harshly critical of our policy, they are less cataclysmic and polemic. This change in tone allows for new parameters in Vietnam scholarship. In the small sample being reviewed here,

we can see some of the new directions of Vietnam historiography.

IF for no other reason than its author, Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* will attract popular attention.† Like all five books that the former chief executive has written since he left the White House, this volume is classic Nixon—emphatic, provocative, pugilistic, polemic, and self-serving. Nixon begins with the premise that no event in American history has been so misunderstood, misreported, misremembered, and misjudged as has Vietnam. He outlines a list of myths, distortions, and falsehoods that he contends abound about the war, and he sets about to refute these errors. Particularly he addresses four so-called articles of faith of the antiwar movement: that the war was immoral, that it was unwinnable, that diplomacy without force is the best response to Communist wars of liberation, and that the United States was on the wrong side of history in Vietnam. Concomitantly, Nixon attempts to debunk a long list of other canards—that the conflict was really a civil war, that Ho Chi Minh was primarily a selfless nationalist, that the Vietcong had popular support, that the U.S. combat effort resulted in indiscriminate and wanton destruction, that American actions aided and precipitated the triumph and extreme savagery of the Khmer Rouge, and many other myths.

The volume is the clearest compilation of the wide scope of the revisionist arguments about the nature of the war. It enunciates the issues emphatically for the lay audience, and it offers some healthy correctives to much of what presently exists in print. But these positive features do not make *No More Vietnams* a good book. To my mind, Nixon's account is too arrogant and belligerent, and its overstatement and ac-

†Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (New York: Arbor House, 1985, \$14.95), 240 pages.

cusatory-conspiratorial tenor detract from the message. Certainly the press deserves considerable criticism for its treatment of the war, but the author's attack engages in excessive cheap shots. He attempts to cover up some of his own mismanagement of the war by placing the blame on the press.

Moreover, these contributions are hardly novel. The basic arguments can be found in much earlier works, some published in the mid-1960s, by such individuals as Frank Trager, Anthony Bouscaren, Marguerite Higgins, William Corson, and others. And his characterization of Ho Chi Minh as international Communist rather than sincere nationalist is much better developed by Robert Turner, P. J. Honey, Douglas Pike, and Bernard Fall. More recently, Norman Podhoretz's *Why We Were in Vietnam* (1982) and Harry Summers's *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (1981) have become popular revisionist classics. In a more scholarly vein, Bruce Palmer's *The 25-Year War* (1984) and Timothy Lomperis's *Vietnam: The War Everyone Lost—And Won* (1984) also anticipate Nixon's themes.

But the primary problem with the former President's book is that it is so obviously self-serving. It reemphasizes a theme consistent in his earlier memoirs that, if we are to believe the author's thrust, he constantly made the right decisions. His commitment to the hard-but-necessary moral choices and his steadfastness against those of weaker fiber resulted in winning the war. Then, after the long national sacrifice, Congress—in a spasm of irresponsibility—snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. While it would be difficult to justify many of Congress's actions after 1973, the story is not as simplistic as Mr. Nixon purports. He bears far more guilt than he would begin to admit or understand.

This volume speaks eloquently to those al-

ready disposed to the author's perspective, but the strength of his analysis and argument is not adequate to change the minds of many skeptics.

WHILE Richard Nixon taunts those with whom he differs, John Wheeler's equally revisionist work seeks reconciliation.† Wheeler begins with the proposition that Vietnam separated us, one from another and from ourselves. One of the great cleavages was between those who fought and those who opposed the war. The scars, antagonism, and separation run deep. In an effort at mutual understanding and reconciliation, Wheeler was instrumental in bringing together a 1980 symposium of those from both ends of the spectrum, from which came A. D. Horne's *The Wounded Generation* (1981). *Touched with Fire* is an expansion of the issues and ideas treated in the symposium and earlier volume.

As son of a general, West Point graduate, Harvard M.B.A., seminary student, graduate of Yale Law School, and Special Counsel to the Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission and to the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, John Wheeler may not be the typical Vietnam veteran, but he is representative. One of the author's major emphases is that the stereotype of Vietnam veterans perpetrated in so much of the popular literature of angry, violent, drug-ridden, maladjusted, and unassimilated time bombs planted in larger society, is neither fair nor accurate. True, many veterans were scarred physically and psychologically by the war. But Wheeler reminds us that the majority returned normal—in fact, tested, tempered, and often strengthened to be leaders for the rest of this decade and beyond. The author himself is dedicated to projects that will enhance the image and contributions of the Vietnam vet. He presently serves as chairman

† John Wheeler, *Touched with Fire: The Future of the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984, \$16.95), 259 pages.

of the board of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, director of the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program, and president of the Project on the Vietnam Generation.

As some of the stereotypes are moderating today, a more balanced image of Vietnam veterans is emerging in the media; and as the emotion of the war subsides, veterans can more easily come to grips with their experience. The camaraderie, bonds, and pride manifested by veterans of earlier wars are becoming more common among Vietnam vets. Wheeler dismisses the protesters' claim that their decision not to go to Vietnam but to fight against the war was the truly difficult, daring act of moral courage. He responds that those who answered the call to national service, like their fathers and forefathers before them, accepted a "masculine obligation." The sense of personal and national sacrifice of World War II fortified the participants of that generation; and in the writings of former avoiders and protesters, such as James Fallows, Christopher Buckley, Michael Blumenthal, and Sam Brown, Wheeler notes a sense that the authors are poorer for not experiencing the shaping event, the personal sacrifice, of their generation. Wheeler is greatly concerned about the supposed decline of masculinity and masculine obligations.

The book is a stream-of-consciousness intermingling of Wheeler's personal experiences, questions, and concerns, together with a sweeping commentary on a wide range of cultural and societal issues. What it lacks in order and coherence, it makes up for in provocativeness. Although very different in perspective, it has similarities with Gloria Emerson's *Winners and Losers* (1976) and Myra MacPherson's *Long Time Passing* (1984). While the topics are too vast to summarize, two themes seem omnipresent. Wheeler seems transfixed with

the uniqueness of what he calls the Vietnam generation. He implies a level of commitment, creativity, and zeal that can produce tremendous results. Also, he appears to have just discovered the women's movement. He intones throughout on the status of women, their role in the healing and readjustment process, their creative future, and the feminization of society (which he believes has both positive and negative attributes). Feminists will find the volume curious.

Throughout this stimulating book, there is much to disagree with and to challenge. However, the author's purpose is not to be divisive but to stimulate dialogue, mutual understanding, and reconciliation. On the whole, he is successful. *Touched with Fire* is a new kind of Vietnam book—it is actually a strange book—but it is a very challenging and good work. We are likely to see more of this type of effort in the future.

NOTED international journalist and West German television personality Peter Scholl-Latour offers another type of book, a different and useful perspective.† Much of the literature on the war has been written by journalists. While some of it is exceptional—journalists can often draw sharper focus than even the most knowledgeable scholar—a large percentage has been transient, dogmatic, or just plain wrong. (Frances Fitzgerald is one of the better examples of a heralded "instant expert" whose work suffered all three maladies.)

Few American journalists had long-term careers in Indochina. Peter Scholl-Latour did. He first traveled to Indochina on board a French troopship in 1945. Over the years, he visited the area many times as a correspondent covering the French, American, and post-American

†Peter Scholl-Latour, *Death in the Rice Fields: An Eyewitness Account of Vietnam's Three Wars, 1945-1979* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, \$14.95), 383 pages.

phases of the long conflict. *Death in the Rice Fields* is a compendium of fifty vignettes written from memory and covering this long span of time. It is a marvelous collection that captures the sights, sounds, feelings, and human dimension of the war. The author reveals no strong political posture that will inflame the biases of his readers. His talent is in depicting the complexity of individuals and events and in projecting empathy and compassion for the myriad elements of war-torn Indochina. And he introduces a host of actors: the multinationals who composed the French Foreign Legion in immediate post-World War II Vietnam; French military and political leaders; Indochinese of every political, religious, and social affiliation; dignitaries and common folk; American scholars; Chinese personalities; journalists; guerrillas; and many more.

The scope of the vignettes is broad, and the characterizations, the humanity, and the pulse of life in Indochina at various points through the years are fascinating. One is reminded of Bernard Fall's understanding of the complexity of Vietnamese society and the ability to articulate that complexity which Fall manifested in his works. Simply put, *Death in the Rice Fields* is one of the most rewarding books that I have read on Indochina.

THE next three books are collections; the first two, anthologies. None of them are vital works. Bernard Edelman's *Dear America: Letters from Vietnam* has the best reason for existence.† It is a unique type of collection, and it fills a niche in Vietnam literature. No one knows how many millions of pieces of personal correspondence flowed to and from

Vietnam during the years of American involvement. One thing is certain: mail was the most important element in each serviceman's life. The letters replicated in Edelman's volume, examples of that vast correspondence, reveal, as well as any other source in print, the thoughts, fears, and hopes of the ordinary participant.

In response to a public appeal by the New York Vietnam Memorial Commission for materials by veterans, more than 600 individuals submitted Vietnam correspondence—a total of some 3000 pieces. For this volume, 208 pieces written by 125 different authors were chosen. The letters were edited to eliminate repetitious, private, and tangential information; to correct and regularize spelling; and to indent paragraphs. But the authenticity remains in these letters from young men and women, who, far from home, strived to convey to friends and loved ones some sense of their reality as they saw it.

Grouped under such chapter headings as "First Impressions," "What Am I Doing Here?" and "Last Letters," the letters reflect the myriad natures of the Vietnam experience for grunts, clerks, officers, enlisted, minorities, women, etc., at the different times, places, and conditions of the war. After each piece, the editor lists the writer's name, unit, dates of tour, and present position. Many of the letters are particularly poignant because the author did not return alive. *Dear America* may not be the most profound book in print on Vietnam, but it is one of the most interesting first-person sources.

I am less impressed by *Touring Nam*.†† One of my mentors used to categorize volumes as real books, semibooks, and pseudobooks. By his standards, Martin Greenberg and Augustus

† Bernard Edelman, *Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam* (New York: Norton, 1985, \$13.95), 316 pages.

†† Martin H. Greenberg and Augustus Richard Norton, editors, *Touring Nam: The Vietnam War Reader* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985, \$16.95), 416 pages.

Norton's offering fits into the last category. True, the volume is interesting. Academia is flooded with such anthologies or reading books, and a paperback version could probably find its place in several college classrooms. But what significant contribution have the editors really made? They have simply collected pieces already in print and drawn them into a single volume. The scant introduction makes a rather feeble point that the book is organized along the lines of a year's tour in Vietnam. Most academic anthologies at least provide substantive narrative context for the included excerpts. The editors here devote only a couple of sentences to introduce each inclusion. They contribute no material themselves, offer nothing not already in print (albeit a few of the pieces are from rather obscure sources), and provide little rationale about why their selections merit consideration.

Touring Nam is a rather quick and unnecessary publication, not unlike scores of other such collections. Readers would gain far more by pursuing the original works in full—especially Tim O'Brien's *If I Die in a Combat Zone* (1973), from which six of the volume's twenty-six selections are drawn; Charles R. Anderson's *Vietnam: The Other War* (1982), one of the best first-person narratives (two excerpts); Stanley Goff and Robert Sanders, *Brothers: Black Soldiers in the Nam* (1982), another exceptional source (two excerpts); Josiah Bunting's *The Lionheads* (1972), one of the finest novels written about the war; and Ronald Glasser's quite informative *365 Days* (1971).

Any one of the following collections also would be far superior to *Touring Nam*: Al Santoli's marvelous *Everything We Had* (1981) and *To Bear Any Burden* (1985); Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller's *Charlie Company*

(1983); Wallace Terry's *Bloods* (1984); and, to a lesser extent, Mark Baker's *Nam* (1981). In sum, nothing is wrong with *Touring Nam* except that it is unnecessary. If I were choosing a book to reflect the Vietnam experience, I would select any of these or classics such as Philip Caputo's *A Rumor of War* (1977), Michael Herr's *Dispatches* (1977), or John Del Vecchio's *The 13th Valley* (1982) before this anthology.

IF *Touring Nam's* only reason for being is the possibility of gaining some foothold in the college text market, the same can be said for *America in Vietnam: A Documentary History*.† The resurgence of interest in the war and the proliferation of new college courses on the subject have engendered a demand for document collections. The *Pentagon Papers* are out of print again and other collections—such as Marvin E. Gettleman's *Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis* (1970), Gareth Porter's *Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions* (1979), and Steven Cohen's *Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History* (1983)—are all less than adequate for one reason or another. Thus, the market was ripe for a mass-circulation paperback edition such as this.

Four of the nation's best known diplomatic historians, all doyens of the so-called New Left, collaborated in this effort. The eighty-four documents, which include presidential and State Department papers, congressional debates, military reports, newspaper accounts, and treaties ranging over the period from the 1840s to 1975, are divided into four chronological sections. A lengthy introductory essay heads each section, and short commentaries illuminate the individual documents.

†William Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner and William LeFeber, editors, *America in Vietnam: A Documentary History* (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1985, \$9.95 paperback), 341 pages.

I definitely am in favor of document collections being made easily accessible. However, anything that proposes to capture the immense dimension, complexity, and controversy of an event such as U.S. involvement in Vietnam by providing a relatively small selection of documents must, by definition, distort grievously. From the vast repository of available documents, what one selects and purports as representative can be used to propagate any interpretation. This particular collection exhibits a strong bias. Since *America in Vietnam* probably will be adopted in many college classes, this viewpoint may unduly shape the next generation's perspectives on Vietnam.

AUTHORS Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan also are committed to propagating a particular viewpoint, one quite at variance with Richard Nixon's outlook.† Nixon and the two authors of *Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* have very different ideas about who constituted the antiwar movement, their motivations, their achievements, and their rightful role in contemporary assessment.

Despite the extensive literature on all aspects of the war and on protest of every sort in the 1960s, *Who Spoke Up?* is the first comprehensive account of the anti-Vietnam War movement. To derive coherence from the overwhelming mass of names, organizations, acronyms, ideological battles, internecine struggles, and myriad happenings of the period is no small undertaking. However, this free-lance, husband-wife team has drawn on the available printed sources—secondary literature, memoirs, newspapers, and the array of protest writings—to compile a sound, readable year-by-year chronicle of at least the national-level phenomenon.

Correctly, the authors emphasize that the peace movement was no monolith; rather, it was "a loose, shifting, often uneasy coalition of groups and individuals who often disagree on every issue except their hatred of the war." They assert that the participants were not cowards, violent revolutionaries, nihilists, or "licentious countercultures living a sexually promiscuous lifestyle." They summarily dismiss the impact of any foreign influences and even attempt to downplay the role of leftist ideologues. Instead, they contend that the movement was begun and sustained throughout by lifelong pacifists and was manned by ordinary citizens "who believed profoundly in their American heritage and who relied upon their Constitution, their Bill of Rights, and the tradition of their American Revolution as fundamental to their opposition to war."

The scope of the book is far broader than that of previous accounts on antiwar activities, such as William O'Neill's *Coming Apart* (1971), Kirkpatrick Sale's *SDS* (1973), G. Louis Heath's edited *Mutiny Does Not Happen Lightly* (1976), Fred Halstead's *Out Now* (1978), or Irwin Unger's *The Movement* (1974). (Interestingly, Unger's book, the previous best account of antiwar activities, is not included in Zaroulis and Sullivan's very extensive bibliography, possibly because Unger projects an incisively critical assessment of leftist protest.) However, although *Who Spoke Up?* resembles Lawrence Wittner's classic study of the American peace movement *Rebels against War* (expanded edition, 1985) or Myra MacPherson's account of the effects of Vietnam on a generation (noted earlier), it lacks the substance and depth of either volume. Much greater analysis is needed to understand the confusion, contradictions, and conflicting aims and expectations of the diverse coalition. The authors proclaim rather

†Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (New York: Doubleday, 1984, \$18.95), 460 pages.

than prove their assumptions. No matter what they may insist, the antiwar coalition included a generous element of crazies, nihilists, druggies, strident ideologues of every stripe, and simple naifs carried along by the *au courant* spirit of the day. These do not disappear simply because they do not fit into the author's idealized vision of what the movement should have been.

Who Spoke Up? has some value as a historical remembrance of a powerful social-political force; however, when one considers the suffering and horror of the Vietnamese today, hagiography seems less relevant than an analysis of how the antiwar movement did or did not contribute to the present Indochina gulag. The protesters dedicated themselves to forcing the United States out of the war, and they eventually succeeded. Since their romantic and often arrogant vision of the glories of the postwar situation in Vietnam was so tragically wrong, what responsibility do they bear? Some former protesters, such as Joan Baez and Peter Berger, are searching their souls and rethinking their arrogance and moral certitude. Are others who were in the movement having similar pangs of conscience? Or are they, like some of the heroes of this book, pathetically attempting to argue that life under the Communists is better than it was during the war? What are those "who spoke up" saying today?

THE final book, *Sherman's March and Vietnam*, is different from anything else in the literature on Vietnam and, in fact, has little to do with Vietnam.† James Reston, Jr., son of the famed *New York Times* correspondent, has written two novels, two plays, and four nonfiction works on such subjects as amnesty for Vietnam avoiders, the Joan Little affair, and James Jones of Guyana Massacre fame. One of

his previous plays was on General William T. Sherman, the primary subject of this strange book. The bulk of the effort is a *National Geographic*-style combination of popularized history and present-day travelogue following Sherman's famous march.

Reston's geographical trek from northwest Georgia to Milledgeville, to Hartsville, to Darlington, to Bennett Place featuring along-the-way conversations with such colorful personages as Dent Myers, Sheriff Zollie Compton, Roger Durham, and Elizabeth Boatwright Coker is entertaining. However, not only is Reston's trivialization of Civil War history bad, but his ill-informed and pathetic asides and allusions to Vietnam are appalling. Besides making numerous factual errors that make you wonder why the author believes that he knows anything about Vietnam, Reston manages to evoke virtually every liberal cliché and stereotype ever proffered about the war. His attempts to draw parallels between Sherman's March and the latter experience in Vietnam range from silly to absurd. One of his consistent purposes throughout is to champion the idea of amnesty for those who fled the country to avoid Vietnam. Taken as a light, amusing attempt to look at long-held prejudices and unquestioned shibboleths in new ways and context, the book has some value. But as a source for learning anything about the Vietnam experience, it has little merit.

THUS we end where we began. The myths, distortions, and falsehoods that Nixon so passionately attempts to dispel are still being propagated by those such as Reston, the authors of *Who Spoke Up?* and the editors of the *America in Vietnam* documentary collection. The literature provides more than an interesting lesson in historiography, for what we ulti-

† James Reston, Jr., *Sherman's March and Vietnam* (New York: Macmillan, 1984, \$14.95), 323 pages.

mately conclude about Vietnam has tremendous import for the present and the future. The books surveyed here give us some taste of the

directions we are going in the continuing retrospect.

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Short Bursts

Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat by Bruce G. Blair. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985, \$32.95, 341 pages.

Bruce Blair is now a nationally recognized DOD communication expert, largely due to the impact of this book. He was the project director of the recently completed Congressional Office of Technology Assessment study of strategic command and control. His book is must reading for anyone who wishes to understand the dominating effects that command and control limitations have on deterrence strategies and the strategic balance.

Blair's thesis is that command and control limitations combine with offensive force vulnerabilities to make strategies for flexible response and protracted nuclear war unsupportable and irrelevant. Because of these limitations and vulnerabilities, the traditional concerns over the relative size and capabilities of superpower arsenals are almost totally misplaced and inappropriate. He reasons that command and control are the weak link in strategic systems, that both sides have long recognized them as such, and that the problems which this weak link creates are not getting the necessary attention to resolve them. Knowing that the command structure cannot be expected to hold up under attack and that the strategic forces themselves are vulnerable to counterforce attack, the decision makers cannot ride out an enemy attack before they have to make their launch decision. If they delay their launch decision until the first warheads detonate or even until early-warning radars confirm the attack and computers attempt to characterize its intent, the command network may be knocked out and it then will be too late to respond at all. Blair maintains that because of the overwhelming vulnerability of command and control systems, nuclear decision makers, long before Minuteman

vulnerability became an issue, have been geared to launch on warning and have never seriously considered less than massive response as appropriate. He argues that although a long list of single integrated operational plan (SIOP) options has been developed, decision makers would be unable to use any of those that could be characterized as limited. He also contends that although great progress has been made recently, command and control systems historically have not kept pace with the evolution of nuclear doctrine. That doctrine now demands flexible response capabilities and limited, protracted war strategies. These strategies are simply not supportable, given the limitations and vulnerabilities of present systems.

In addition to laying out the history of command and control, Blair provides a complete discussion of the present deficiencies of strategic command and control systems. He does not claim that these deficiencies have resulted from the neglect of those officials who are responsible for command and control; rather, they exist because of the lack of a broad-based understanding of how important command and control limitations are. Without such understanding, programs to improve command and control capabilities do not enjoy the political and military support necessary to compete successfully for funding in the budgetary process. Overcoming this problem is the purpose of Blair's book.

Blair does not cop out when it comes time to propose solutions to the problems he uncovers. His advocacy has both short-term and long-term objectives. For the short term, he describes a program of command and control acquisitions that are necessary to ensure our ability to carry out the traditional SIOP mission of retaliation. For the long term, he lays out a strategy of "no immediate second use" that prescribes survivable strategic forces and a redun-

dant and reconstitutable command and control system. This strategy calls for warning systems whose only mission is to put strategic forces into their most survivable modes. No longer having to support a launch-on-warning strategy, the requirements for tactical warning systems would be much less demanding. Even more important would be the resulting relaxation of the current time constraints on the launch decision-making process. These constraints now give rise to fears that a nuclear war could result from hurried decisions, mistakes, and misperceptions, and, according to Blair, totally preclude any possibility of controlling escalation, maintaining intrawar deterrence, or successfully terminating the conflict under favorable conditions before major exchanges take place.

However, a strategy of "no immediate second use" would require major changes in two legs of the Triad and the way we think about conducting a nuclear war: land-based missiles would be mobile rather than fixed, while there would be less dependence on aircraft delivery systems. Those aircraft that remained in the SIOP would have much longer endurance and the ability to operate from austere airfields. A strategy of "no immediate second use," as the name implies, is a rideout strategy. After the attack was over, command and control systems would reestablish contact with surviving offensive forces to carry out carefully considered retaliatory attacks. Prompt hard-target kill and counterforce requirements would be replaced by assured retaliation and strategies for limited, protracted war that would be truly flexible, practical, and supportable from both political and military perspectives.

Remarkable, to me, however, is how much Blair's strategy of "no immediate second use" resembles the strategy developed in the CADRE study on the policy implications of nuclear winter. That study concluded that any belief in the theory of nuclear winter demands either a capability to control, limit, and terminate nuclear war or a willingness to maintain our security by threatening hemispheric, perhaps global, destruction of the ecosystem. The authors of the CADRE study opted for the former and devised a strategy accordingly. True to Blair's perception that the importance of command and control limitations is widely unappreciated, the CADRE study of nuclear winter ignored their implications. I found his book to be most helpful in that regard.

Blair's assessment and proposals have been the source of considerable controversy. The nature of his assertions, whether they are true or not, are such that the national authorities who are responsible for nuclear retaliatory decisions are simply not in a position to comment on them one way or the other. To

most readers, his straightforward assertions as to launch postures and operational employment strategies will be disconcerting, especially to anyone who has thought through the demands that the increasing acceptance of the nuclear-winter theory have on nuclear force structure and employment strategies. Various experts who have full access to SIOP details and the inner workings of C³I systems may take exception to some of what he says. In particular, Blair may have understated the degree to which many of the problems he identifies have already been resolved or soon will be.

In spite of this controversy, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* is an important book for two reasons. First, the relationships between command and control capabilities and employment strategies that Blair describes need much broader dissemination and understanding. Blair's book helps us all appreciate the tremendous gap between the employment strategies we would like to have and the realities of the forces and command and control systems we have at our disposal. Second, his ideas for a strategy of "no immediate second use" are interesting, logical, and worthy of consideration. I think that Bruce Blair's ideas should receive the careful consideration of anyone who contributes to the nuclear policy-making process, and I highly recommend his book for widespread reading and discussion.

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Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control by Jeffrey Simon. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985, \$19.50, 246 pages.

Despite some analytical shortcomings, *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control* presents a wealth of information on the development of the Warsaw Pact. Divided into time periods, its ten chapters cover such key events as the origin of the pact, Khrushchev's policies toward it, the Czechoslovak crisis, the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process, and the Afghanistan and Polish events.

Jeffrey Simon's book is particularly useful as a guide to events within the pact's political and military organs. For example, meetings of the Political Consultative Committee (the pact's highest organ) are dealt with in some detail, as are gatherings of foreign ministers and the various defense structures. In addition, *Warsaw Pact Forces* contains some very useful appendixes covering major Soviet and com-

bined Warsaw Pact exercises, as well as selected data on pact military capabilities. Anyone who has spent hours trying to track down a list of pact exercises from a wide variety of Soviet and East European sources will be grateful to Simon for his work in this area.

Unfortunately, the book's title is not very accurate: Simon does not really deal with questions of command and control. Instead, he focuses on broader issues, such as pact mechanisms for coordinating foreign and defense policies. The question of whether and/or how the Soviets would go about mobilizing pact forces in a crisis is not really addressed. It is one thing to suggest that the Soviets would ignore pact command structure in a crisis and deal directly with East European forces. It is quite another to show how this takeover would work. What if the East Europeans resisted? I would suggest that the script for this scenario is what command and control is all about.

Warsaw Pact Forces also passes over some of the more critical issues facing the pact today. For example, Simon uses the term *reliability* on a number of occasions—indeed, it appears to be one of his major concerns. Unfortunately, he never defines this highly complex concept. In addition, he seems to equate "positive reliability" (to coin a phrase) from the Soviet standpoint with an increased frequency or at least a high level of pact exercises. There are, however, other explanations for continuing to assign priority to joint exercises—a concern over reliability or a need to better integrate diverse weapon systems come to mind as possibilities. Simon also fails to analyze the importance of (and in some cases even neglects to mention) the many examples of unreliability on the part of East European militaries since the midfifties and their relevance for the pact. Surely such events as the purge of the Czechoslovak military in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion had an important impact on the utility of Prague's contribution to the pact's combat capabilities. Similar questions could be raised concerning recent events in Poland.

Finally, like many Western writers on the Warsaw Pact, Simon does not really focus on what is becoming, in my opinion, a major problem for pact planners—the increasing disparity between Soviet and East European weapon systems. Given the increasing obsolescence of East European equipment, one writer has suggested, the Soviets could encounter serious problems in carrying out a combined arms operation.

Simon concludes that in spite of problems between Moscow and its East European allies, the Soviets have been somewhat successful in improving

command and control over pact forces. For the reasons outlined here, I would suggest that Simon's conclusion is perhaps too optimistic. Moscow has serious problems with its pact allies, and these problems appear to be getting worse.

Dr. Dale R. Herspring
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Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers by Alexander Dallin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, \$14.95, 130 pages.

Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers is undoubtedly the best piece of work on the subject yet to appear in the public domain. It is written dispassionately and impartially, is carefully and systematically presented, and explores doggedly the evidence for a wide variety of plausible and even implausible hypotheses that have appeared in the American, European, and Soviet press. Alexander Dallin's sources consist of journalists' accounts, official statements, and conversations with knowledgeable people in both Washington and Moscow. It is evident that Dallin has had some kind of access to information from classified sources, as he refers occasionally to sources that he refuses to name, and he presents a modest amount of information and some speculation that have not hitherto appeared in the public media.

While Dallin admits that there is still much that we do not and cannot know about the incident, he is able to clarify some of the early mystification surrounding it. It is clear, for example, that KAL-007 was not flying without lights, at least during the last few minutes of its flight, and that Soviet fighter planes, contrary to Soviet assertions, reported sighting the plane's lights to ground control. In addition, U.S. authorities now concede that the Soviet fighters did fire tracers along the flight path of the errant airliner as a warning of its plight. Moreover, unidentified U.S. officials now admit privately that the Soviet military probably did not know that 007 was a civilian aircraft. As one of them put it, they should have known, but they probably did not.

One of the more vexing questions apparently requiring us to accept either the incompetence or the sinister complicity of U.S. intelligence agencies in the disaster is handled credibly by Dallin: how was it possible, given the formidable capacities of U.S. electronic surveillance revealed in the aftermath of the incident, that an airliner might have innocently strayed so dangerously far off course and yet U.S. intelligence did not detect it and give warning in time? One plausible answer is that all U.S. electronic

gadgetry was targeting the SS-X-25 test, which 007 overflew. (Another intriguing suggestion is that 007's real mission was to force cancellation of that test—which it did—until even more electronic surveillance could be brought to bear on it.)

Considered exclusively from the viewpoint of cold-war politics, the results of the incident weighed heavily in favor of the United States. The Soviets showed themselves, in the opinion of many, at their inhumane worst; and their air defenses were demonstrated to be ridiculously weak. As one Soviet insider privately remarked, it took them too long to sober up their fighter pilots. The PVO (air defense command) has subsequently simulated the intrusion of 007 several times. Overall, it was a great propaganda and intelligence bonanza for the United States.

In analyzing Soviet motives, thoughts, and intentions, Dallin presents a fascinating series of analogous cases (pp. 79 ff.), some of them heretofore little known. He argues that the principal objective of Soviet propaganda in the aftermath of the disaster was to present a plausible face of infallible competence to the native Soviet public.

His analysis of American conduct is just as incisive and critical. He details what he considers the scandalous—and alarming—American ignorance of Soviet politics. There were three reactions in Washington and elsewhere that he considers hopelessly wide of the mark of Soviet reality: the idea that the destruction of 007 represented some kind of foreign policy decision as opposed to a military decision; the speculation that the Soviet military was thereby challenging the primacy of the party, perhaps with a view to preparing a military coup d'état; and the thesis that the military destroyed 007 either to spoil the arms control talks in particular or, more generally, to preempt the development of a thaw in Soviet-American relations, the first signs of which were just beginning to appear at that time.

Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers is as fascinating as it is useful, and it deserves wide reading and careful consideration, especially in policy-making circles.

Dr. Hugh Ragsdale
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Electronic Warfare: From the Battle of Tsumi to the Falklands and Lebanon Conflicts by Mario de Arcanglis. Poole/Dorset, England: Blandford Press (distributed by Sterling Publishing Company), 1985, \$19.95, 320 pages.

Electronic warfare has added a new twist to the ancient ritual of combat. Mario de Arcanglis carefully documents that those who fail to use this new

electronic sword shall surely perish before it. In what may be one of the better histories of electronic warfare, the author reviews the development of this rapidly changing technology from the Russo-Japanese War to electronic warfare in space. He drives home several significant points.

Nations that fail to continually exploit evolving electronic technology pay the price in lost battles and wars. It is not enough to concoct some wizardry and then assume that it will continue to be successful. The European theater during World War II, for example, was a continual seesaw of new measures and countermeasures. Neither the Germans nor the allies could maintain a comfortable edge for long. Clever German guidance systems designed to lead streams of bombers over British targets were neutralized by equally clever countersystems. The level of sophistication spiraled ever upward as first one side and then the other sought to electronically outflank the opponent.

Electronic warfare did not provide the decisive difference in World War II, but it was a contributing factor in the Allied victory. At Normandy, electronic countermeasures caused Hitler to make serious errors in judgment about the use of reserve forces. They also added to the general confusion that allowed the Allies to make a safe lodgment. One of the greatest contributions was the intelligence collected from enemy communications signals. From the North African campaign to the Battle for Berlin, Allied commanders were fighting with the advantage of having read their adversary's mail.

Gathering electronic data continued to be a major activity of virtually every nation following the war. Collection activities were conducted initially by using conventional methods, but they soon progressed to increasingly sophisticated satellite systems. The nonstop Middle Eastern wars and other conflicts around the globe now feature high-tech warfare. The race to gain an electronic advantage continues in peace and war—in the laboratory and on the battlefield.

Electronic Warfare was written to remove the mystery that all too often shrouds this ever-changing field. While the methods that nations employ to conduct this warfare may remain a closely guarded secret, the results are abundantly clear. Electronic combat may be the decisive factor in most future wars.

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Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest by John M.

Oseth. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985, 236 pages, \$24.00.

In recent years there has been a growing interest in intelligence, and John M. Oseth's *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations* is a welcome addition to the historiography. Oseth looks at the business of intelligence and how it squares with the ideals of a free and open society that stresses the rights and freedoms of individual citizens. The study covers the immediate post-World War II period, when the National Security Act was passed (in 1947), to the present. It examines governmental decision-making concerning intelligence, as well as the public's reaction (expressed through the Congress) to the activities of the intelligence community. The book focuses almost solely on the Central Intelligence Agency, the first among not-so-equals in the community.

The loosely monitored activities of the intelligence community provided such domestic operations as CHAGS and COINTELPRO and resulted in the backlash of what, for the intelligence community, became the Dark Ages of the 1970s. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the Rockefeller Commission, the House and Senate investigative committees (particularly the Senate's Church Committee) evolved from a general dissatisfaction over what the intelligence agencies were doing and what philosophical barometers they were using as references. Congress raked the community over the coals, slashed intelligence manning and programs, and held the community more accountable to public oversight and control. The Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts evolved, in part, because of government's increasing encroachment on individual civil liberties. As Oseth points out, these safeguards have not been repealed, although they have been considered onerous by many intelligence professionals, who in recent years have evoked sympathy from the Congress and other former critics, and although the community has been rebuilt in recent years.

While Roger Hilsman, in his foreword, emphasizes the great successes of the CIA, there have also been spectacular failures in judgment and operations—the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the overthrow of Diem in Vietnam, bungling in Iran, the mining of Nicaraguan ports, publication of a handbook on terrorism and assassination, and more. One wonders if better oversight would have prevented some of the earlier flubs, while the last two foul-ups make one wonder if oversight is really working now. In fairness, though, Oseth mentions that Congress has not had an enviable record in keeping secrets in past years.

There is a useful bibliography here, but Oseth

seems to have conducted no interviews with key figures involved in policy, operations, or regulatory decision making. Although the prose is scholarly, one winces occasionally when Oseth slips into the bureaucratic style of writing that has so coarsened the English language. For instance, within a single paragraph, one finds not only "institutionalization of regularized scrutiny" but also "oversight . . . was routinized."

However, with growing general interest in all aspects of intelligence, *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations* is a thoughtful, academic work, which, while narrowly focused, is a valuable addition to the literature on intelligence.

Dr. Peter M. Dunn
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British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Volume III, Part 1, by F. H. Hinsley, with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 693 pages, \$39.50.

There is no shortage of commentary concerning intelligence activity during World War II. The professional intelligence analyst can peruse not only personal and interesting accounts of particular activities but substantial amounts of additional published information relating to a wider scope of intelligence activity. Yet, a scholarly, in-depth, and detailed coverage of major time frames relating to intelligence activity is not easy to find today. Fortunately, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* is an obvious exception.

F. H. Hinsley and his associates have produced a detailed account of British intelligence and strategy during the Second World War. In spite of recognizable problems noted in the preface (e.g., how to avoid retelling the history of the war in all its detail and how to define intelligence), this work constitutes a splendid professional contribution for those of us interested in war-time intelligence activity.

Apparently, Hinsley and his associates were able to make use of an abundance of primary sources without restrictions.

No restriction has been placed on us while carrying out our research. On the contrary, in obtaining access to archives and in consulting members of the war-time community we have received full co-operation and prompt assistance from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the appropriate government departments. (p. ix)

This volume is an example of first-class scholarship.

Hinsley and his associates made ample use of the abundance of government intelligence reports that relate to the period described. Hence, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* will appeal to the serious scholar rather than to one who would be more comfortable with a simple narrative of events without a plenitude of official documentation.

This particular work of a multivolume set is divided into a number of parts, each part having various chapters. The volume begins with Part VIII and deals with strategic assessments and intelligence on the German economy. Part IX explains the role of intelligence in the capture of Sicily, the allied struggle for Rome, and the Italian surrender. Part X concentrates on U-boat warfare and seafare operations. Part XI focuses on the allied air offense, as well as German air operations; this part should be of particular interest to air force intelligence specialists. Part XII concludes this volume and deals with the V weapons and their importance to both the Allies and the Germans.

When reading this book, the reader will recognize the emergence of a number of important conclusions relating to the intelligence community. First, it is obvious that the intelligence community is quite diverse. Within the community, there are various specialized units, which have responsibilities for their own specific tasks. Second, there are several different types of possible sources of information available to intelligence analysts. For example, the writers of this volume make reference to the substantial information secured through the use of POW interrogations, aerial reconnaissance, and the interception and decryption of enemy communications. They also allude to the use and need of using one source of information to substantiate and verify another source.

British Intelligence in the Second World War will appeal to military intelligence professionals from diverse branches because it does not focus on any one military branch. Rather, it concerns a wide spectrum of military intelligence activity. Thus, an air force intelligence specialist will find interesting and rewarding that part of the volume which pertains to air force activity. A comparable benefit will accrue to navy and army intelligence analysts, who will find information of value relating to their particular interests and specialties. However, the style of writing is not captivating or attention-getting but, instead, is precise and impersonal. The reader motivated by a sincere professional interest in intelligence activity will gain valuable insights; others may lose interest.

Dr. William E. Kelly
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Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars edited by Ernest R. May. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984, \$29.50, 561 pages.

As a reflection on the processes of international discourse, perception, and judgment, *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* provides another example of man's seemingly universal failure to observe one of the most basic of human experiential axioms: "One should learn from the mistakes of one's predecessors." Moreover, the work implies correctly that today's practitioners of intelligence and policymaking are equally susceptible to errors induced by inadequate attention to history.

The fault, of course, lies not with a paucity of information. As Dr. Ernest May notes in his introduction, there was an enormous amount of available literature on strategies, diplomacy, and military planning at the advent of both of the two world wars. Thus, those responsible for policies and decisions had little excuse for acting from a position of historical ignorance.

By comparison, Dr. May explains that, until recently, substantive exploration of the role of intelligence in the decision-making process has been deprived, by dint of classification, of adequate and appropriate data on which to base comprehensive studies. Perhaps, then, intelligence professionals should be forgiven their occasional failure to note historical context; then again, it is they who are and have been the keepers of the classified archives.

In any event, now that great amounts of previously protected information have been made available, May and his fifteen colleagues have documented meticulously many of the past mistakes of intelligence assessment. Part I of *Knowing One's Enemies* addresses the intelligence and policy interactions of many of the major national actors of World War I (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Imperial Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy); Parts II and III follow the same format for World War II (Britain, France, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States).

The final chapter analyzes pre-World Wars I and II assessment processes and offers five recommendations that are worth synopsis here: if the desire is better coordination and fewer errors, reorganization of intelligence agencies is not the proper vehicle (changes in procedures and routines are more likely to be effective); rely on intelligence agencies more for short-term estimates and warning than for long-term projections; be aware that any estimate of how "the other guy" sees things is likely to overstate his

capabilities, knowledge, etc.; and determine who the real enemy is, and take a realistic view of your own weaknesses and strengths.

While it takes 540 pages to get to these recommendations, it is well worth the effort, provided, of course, that the reader can absorb the mental assault of 539 pages of intelligence and policy blunders. The serious student of intelligence or international affairs should be willing to pay the price; the intelligence professional and the practicing decision-maker should, as well, make the recommendations a hip-pocket reference. For all of these, *Knowing One's Enemies* is both a long overdue source of information and a keeper.

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For the Duration: The United States Goes to War, Pearl Harbor—1942 by Lee Kennett. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, \$15.95, 243 pages.

This excellent little volume covers the span from 7 December 1941 to June 1942, which is to say, from Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Midway. It makes no claim to being a comprehensive history of the home front in this period but offers a series of vignettes that capture not only the mood of those traumatic months but the manner in which the people of the United States adjusted to the reality of war. Lee Kennett is a skillful craftsman; using the technique so well developed by Frederick Lewis Allen in *Only Yesterday*, he has searched out episodes or anecdotes that communicate an underlying meaning reaching far beyond the significance superficially evident. One such: the lone Washington policeman guarding the Japanese Embassy, where a large but well-behaved crowd gathered soon after learning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. A glimpse of this sort can tell us much about the law-abiding tradition of self-restraint in the United States, just as the report of Londoners queuing up to enter shelters when the bombing began probably reveals more about British phlegm than thousands of scholarly words analyzing the national character.

Kennett reminds us of how irenic the nation was in the prewar years. The U.S. Army ranked nineteenth among the powers of the world, just below the Dutch army; all of the soldiers in the continental United States could, in those days, be seated comfortably in Yankee Stadium. We were seriously unprepared for war and woefully inexperienced. Item: in an early practice air alert in Boston, the civic authorities ill-advisedly pulled the master power switches,

promptly shutting down all traffic lights, thereby creating horrendous traffic snarls and keeping the electrically operated fire station doors from opening. From such experiences, the nation learned, slowly, to cope with the extraordinary demands of war. Kennett traces the process: the organizing of civil defense, mounting coastal defenses against threats of Japanese attacks in the West and German subs in the East, mobilizing the armed forces, mobilizing industry under the War Production Board to become the arsenal of democracy, and mobilizing the arts to unify the national will.

For the Duration: The United States Goes to War, Pearl Harbor—1942 will be especially useful for introducing undergraduates to the problem of mobilizing a nation for war because it is so eminently readable and mercifully brief. Unfortunately, the title conceals rather than reveals, so many would-be readers may miss this worthwhile study.

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The Challenge of American Foreign Policy: Purpose and Adaptation by John P. Lovell. New York: Macmillan, 1985, no price given, 331 pages.

John Lovell is a professor at the University of Indiana and got the inspiration to write this book while serving as a visiting civilian professor at Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He believes that U.S. policymakers "have compounded rather than alleviated policy problems by their inability or failure to address root causes and by their failure to make adjustments in policy appropriate to changing circumstances." (p. vii) He feels that during the Vietnam War "a sensitivity to the underlying dynamics of social and political change in Southeast Asia was almost totally missing from the calculations of American policymakers." (p. viii) Unfortunately, he fails to make a good case for this charge.

The focus of *The Challenge of American Foreign Policy* is on how U.S. foreign policy is made rather than on the policies themselves. The author's observations about policy are largely limited to the period since 1945, and these observations, for the most part, are sound in my view. Lovell skillfully and persuasively describes the way in which Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe forced the United States (which had demobilized) into rebuilding its defenses and those of its allies.

Referring to the growing confidence in computers, Lovell describes the "fanciful creation of the

Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy (IMMP)." Such a machine "must have a capability for learning from experience and for making available in the future the lessons of the past." (p. 30) But, he says, such a machine is impossible "because the policy process is political, and politics cannot be reduced to the functions of even a marvelously ingenious machine." Thus this book is in fact "a detailed examination of how the American political system functions in the performance of the essential tasks of making and executing foreign policy." (p. 31)

Among the major problems analyzed is the relationship between Congress and the executive branch, most notably as reflected in the War Powers Act. Lovell is perhaps too restrained in judging the deleterious results of this particular attempt to hobble a president in the constitutional execution of his powers as chief executive officer and commander in chief.

The notes and suggested readings at the end of each chapter are most useful.

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European Armies and the Conduct of War by Hew Strachan. Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1983, \$12.50, 226 pages.

Hew Strachan has written an important book in which he delivers just what he promises. In his introduction, Strachan, a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and formerly a war studies lecturer at Sandhurst, explains that he is writing about "the theory and practice of war" as planned and conducted by European armies as well as writing about "social and technological change" from the eighteenth century to the present. He quite rightly includes air power and the activities of the U.S. military when they have an impact on the conduct of war in Europe. *European Armies and the Conduct of War* "is not primarily an account of the campaigns fought in the last two or three hundred years." He includes an insightful chapter on colonial warfare in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries but does not deal directly with revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency since World War I. The strength of this book lies not in new historical interpretations but in Strachan's synthesis of the subject.

In his first chapter, where Strachan makes the telling point that the military history taught and used in professional military schools and "academic" military history must be the same in terms of

their respect for truth and accuracy, Strachan identifies four themes that he successfully develops throughout the book. Building on his recognition that when war has been limited the limitations have been the product of social, economic, or political forces rather than the product of theories of war, Strachan's first theme is "to examine the works of better-known theorists of war and to explain their popularity in the context of the external constraints that have operated on war." He moves easily through the eighteenth-century theories of Guibert to the nuclear theology of today. His chapters on "Jomini and the Napoleonic Tradition," "Clausewitz and the Rise of Prussian Military Hegemony," and "Blitzkrieg" alone are more than worth the price of the book. His second theme is that "the industrial revolution and the advance of technology have transformed the mechanics of warfare." This theme interacts with the third, which is that "the bearing of arms in civilian life has all but disappeared, and thus the skills of the soldier have become more distinct." In other words, our society has effected the growth of military professionalism, which, in turn, has a direct impact on "the relationship between politics and the waging of war," Strachan's last theme.

Masterfully weaving these themes together, Strachan has written a book truly "about the theory and practice of war," a study in which military ideas, including doctrine, are as important as military events. As he analyzes "the theory and practice of war" over time, Strachan demonstrates repeatedly for soldiers and scholars alike to realize that "if uncomfortable facts do not accord with theories, then it is not the facts that must be suppressed but the theory that should be revised."

Strachan's documentation is useful but not without limitations. Although he concludes each chapter with a brief and valuable "Guide to Further Reading," the nine-page "Select Bibliography" at the back of the book unfortunately is not categorized in any manner but is simply listed alphabetically by author. Whatever Strachan's criteria for inclusion of works, it is worth noting that he omits such key works on air power as Frank Futrell's *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964*, I. B. Holley's *Ideas and Weapons*, and David MacIsaac's *Strategic Bombing in World War Two*. Moreover, his work includes no footnotes. Perhaps because it "is a work of synthesis" drawing "heavily on the work of others," the editors balked at the expense of full scholarly documentation, but footnotes on at least the direct quotations would be helpful.

European Armies and the Conduct of War is not,

and does not attempt to be, a general survey of military history; thus, it is not suitable as the text for a survey course. Strachan makes only passing references to naval affairs, thereby seriously limiting his discussions of strategy in the wars of the French Revolution as well as in World Wars I and II. There is no doubt that Strachan is aware of the importance of the naval element in military history. While discussing "The Revolution in Strategy" after World War II, he asserts, "It finally became impossible to consider the operations of armies independently of those of air forces or even of navies." To deal with naval affairs at the same high level as he has dealt with *European Armies and Their Conduct of War*, Strachan would have had to write a much longer book.

The omission of substantive coverage of naval affairs notwithstanding, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* is a book that should be read by anyone interested in questions such as why those who should have known better expected a short war in 1914 and what that question has to do with us today. This volume belongs in the library of all professional soldiers and other serious students of war.

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Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914-1917 by Keith Neilson. Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1984, 338 pages, \$29.95.

Too often, in military affairs, operations forgets about logistics: it is just assumed that "the loggies" can do what the "ops type" want. And, almost as often, campaigns are lost "for lack of a nail." A classic case in point is the Germans' loss to the Russian generals—during bitter cold January and February days—because they had overextended their supply lines and neglected to bring winter gear. For this reason, Keith Neilson has done a great service through the publication of his doctoral thesis, which relates the issues of strategy and supply as they concerned the Anglo-Russian alliance during the first three years of World War I.

Neilson's work is a well-documented analysis of the interworkings of strategy and supply. The author has chosen the Anglo-Russian alliance as his case study, and he does an excellent job of tracing the alliance from its origins through the two revolutions in Russia from the British viewpoint. Neilson outlines clearly the changes of attitudes toward lo-

gistics support on the part of the British government, which reflected the changing attitudes toward an ally first viewed as the potential "steamroller" that would, in the absence of British land forces, halt the Hun; only as events unfolded did it become obvious to the British that the steamroller was an ineffectual ally exploding under pressure. Further, Neilson has done a great service by presenting and differentiating between political and military strategy.

Despite the fact that *Strategy and Supply* is heavily documented with British and Russian primary sources, its greatest shortcoming is in the fact that it takes a British slant in most of its arguments. While Neilson is willing to give some credence to Russian claims that the "British were willing to fight to the last drop of Russian blood," he consistently claims national interest or military necessity for the British while ignoring Russian troops who died for lack of shells or artillery, thus begging the question as to whether these decisions were proper in an objective sense. This matter is left for other historians to determine.

While the Soviet specialist may be disappointed, *Strategy and Supply* is a worthwhile book not only for logisticians, operators, and strategists but also for politicians. The question it begs merit consideration and may be more important than the answers it offers.

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War in the Middle Ages by Philippe Contamine and translated by Michael Jones. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 387 pages, \$29.95.

Blessed, too, are the writers of surveys, for they can expect no reward from their specialist colleagues. Philippe Contamine, however, deserves an earthly benefit for this fine survey of medieval land warfare.

War in the Middle Ages comes in three parts. The last, an analytical bibliography of some 110 titles, is a treasury of delights, many of them already advertised in the footnotes to the text. The first part, "The State of Knowledge," chronologically treats the sources of military history and major military-related developments: weaponry, personnel, provisionment, tactics and strategy, and the wider world of authority, power, and values in the societies of the time. Here, Contamine, primarily a student of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, helpfully reads his late medieval perspectives into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The classic identifying marks of feudalism—war, nobility, horse, and land—were

no sooner established than they were eroded by money, paid service, and infantry. Contamine notes the existence as early as 1140 of a circular flow chart of the "connections between the king, the army, and money." (p. 90)

The second section, "Themes and Perspectives," is a series of freestanding essays, ranging from competent ("Arms and Armour" and "Artillery") to enlightening ("The Art of War") to exciting ("Towards a History of Courage" and "Juridical, Ethical, and Religious Aspects of War"). In these last essays, Contamine delicately traces the zones of compatibility and incompatibility of medieval Christianity and the warriors' world.

The book's single failing is organizational: one never knows what to expect. The chronological chapters of Part I are not uniform in internal structure or topic; Parts I and II unpredictably and madly overlap; the bibliography's topical subdivisions are unique to that section. Such needless jigsawing, unremedied by a humdrum index, limits the utility of *War in the Middle Ages* as a work of reference. It does less damage to the book's value as an introduction to be read in its entirety. Here, more is clearly better and Contamine registers a triumph.

Dr. Michael Mendle
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The Fighting Israeli Air Force by Brigadier General Stanley M. Ulanoff, USAF (Ret), and Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Ret). New York: Arco, 1985. \$19.95, 208 pages.

This is not the place to discuss or to contest the authors' premise, early expressed in *The Fighting Israeli Air Force* (p. 5) that once "scattered" to the "four corners of the earth" by the Romans in 586 B.C., the Jewish people have since lived with "the threat of annihilation hanging over their heads" and, as minorities among the citizenry of many countries, "have been the scapegoats whenever these countries suffered economic, religious, political, military, or other reverses." It is fair to say, however, that this work is essentially a tale of "them against us" in tracing the development after World War II of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and in recounting Israeli exploits in the 1948 war of independence, the 1956 Sinai campaign, the 1967 Six-day War, the ongoing "war of attrition" before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the more recent preemptive strikes against terrorists at Entebbe, the nuclear reactor in Baghdad, and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Throughout, it is a tale of "brilliant" and "unequaled" IAF performance, an "astounding rate of readiness," and "su-

perior quality" of IAF personnel. Only a portion of one paragraph is allocated to the "lack of agreement on the organization and shape of the air force" and the "disputes over budget priorities [which] severely complicated the development of the air force during the early 1950s." The story picks up quickly thereafter with the naming, in 1954, of a Palestinian Jew, Dan Tolkovsky, to head the IAF. "Under his leadership, the air force lost the temporary and makeshift atmosphere that had characterized it from the beginning and became," in the authors' words, "a highly disciplined and professional fighting force." Veteran volunteers returned to their countries of origin, and "young, enthusiastic Israelis joined the IAF."

The years 1954-55 marked the lull before an oncoming (and still ongoing) storm. How tragic for mankind that, in August 1955, an American emissary was thwarted in his efforts to bring about a political settlement between Israel and Egypt, which were then engaged in what the authors of this book characterize as "low-level" guerrilla warfare in the Gaza Strip and Kahn Yunis. Although not mentioned by the authors, the diplomatic mission was a secret one divulged in 1982, which had the backing of the Eisenhower administration, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Israeli defense minister David Ben-Gurion (Israel's principal political figure at the time). Under heavy pressure from his generals to derive new sources for arms, Nasser was reluctant to turn to the Soviet Union (which he subsequently did). Meanwhile, Ben-Gurion, according to the published report of the secret American mission, considered Nasser "a decent fellow who has the interest of his people genuinely at heart." It is said that the Israelis called off an attack in deference to the American mission but then proceeded with an attack that caused Nasser to defer meeting with Ben-Gurion until after a long "period of calm" could ensue. Nasser thereupon concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, provoking a storm throughout the Middle East and Europe. As the authors of this book see it, "President Nasser resolved to build an armed force capable of overcoming the Israelis in any future conflict." First came the Sinai campaign of 1956 in which the IAF, the authors say, "achieved all objectives in a lightning war of only 100 hours." After that, both sides moved from the piston-engine to the jet fighter era, with Israel arranging to procure its jets from France. During the interlude before Israel's Six-day War with Syria and Egypt in June 1967, Israel became alarmed over a perceived Arab arms buildup and what the authors cite as Nasser's "shouting [of] provocative threats" and the "rattling [of] his sabre." Even before the Six-day War,

France's Charles de Gaulle abandoned his quasi-alliance with Israel and, by the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the United States had become Israel's principal arms supplier.

The litany of ongoing battles and preemptive air strikes against nations and terrorists is fully recounted, perhaps for the first time, in these pages. An extensive appendix of nearly fifty pages lists IAF missions, IAF commanding officers and air bases, depicts three-view drawings of IAF aircraft, and even provides a chronology of events in Israel from biblical times to the present. However, when all is said and done, it is well to keep in mind what *New York Times* foreign correspondent C. L. Sulzberger observed in a 1975 column:

The Israelis have made crucial mistakes in diplomacy. They have won their wars—even the 1973 meatgrinder—but they have not consciously acknowledged that wars are often fought for more than mere survival, to achieve policy goals. The 1967 triumph could have been made monumental had it been immediately followed up by a generous offer on which peace could be based—an offer including virtually all territory won in six days' fighting. Israel likewise kept dawdling in secret negotiations with Jordan's King Hussein, then spokesman for Palestinian Arabs. So it ends up with Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization . . . Jerusalem failed to give while the giving was good.

William Welling
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Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf by Thomas L. McNaughter. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985, \$26.95, 226 pages.

The oil-rich Persian Gulf is a region crucial to the world's security and economic health. For the United States today, it presents a variety of major challenges both militarily and diplomatically. Thomas McNaughter, a research associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, offers the reader a military strategy for the region that seeks to balance overinvolvement against neglect. Briefly stated, the author believes that the United States must cultivate the traditional security mechanisms of the Arabian Peninsula, cooperate with traditional allies such as Britain and France, and focus on protecting the Persian Gulf states from external attack. The author would leave internal security up to the states themselves.

Arms and Oil is divided into an opening chapter setting up the current situation in the Persian Gulf

region, two parts examining Soviet power and U.S. interests in the gulf and peninsula, and an appendix describing the Gulf Cooperation Council's forces as of 1984. By posing a variety of interesting questions in the opening chapter concerning political, military, and budgetary problems, McNaughter cleverly leads the reader into a full discussion of the region.

In Part One, the author provides a detailed examination of Soviet military threats to the region, questions how the United States can apply or maintain its force most effectively to achieve its political objectives, and offers the demanding suggestion that deterring Soviet entry into any part of Iran is critical. The reader may well wonder how the President and the Pentagon plan to handle this provocative suggestion.

Part Two of this well-written and easy-to-read book is focused on Saudi Arabia. McNaughter points out that while the demands on U.S. forces will be less pressing, the demands on U.S. political sensitivities will be far greater. For those perhaps forgetting that France and Britain preceded the United States into these troubled waters, he argues cooperation as a logical means of bypassing some of the U.S. restrictions on the region. McNaughter urges political sensitivity and in a prophetic statement concludes by stating, "Whether or not the United States comes to terms with this region remains to be seen. If the United States does not, and if the Gulf's importance indeed grows, the security of important U.S. interests there will depend on sheer good luck."

Dr. Robert H. Terry
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Chinese Defence Policy edited by Gerald Segal and William T. Tow. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984, 286 pages, \$29.95.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) fields the world's largest armed forces. Numerical size notwithstanding, there are problems in assessing the combat capabilities of these forces and the foreign policy aims they are intended to support. *Chinese Defence Policy* grew out of a conference sponsored by the Ford Foundation and held in Garmisch, Germany, in May 1983 to examine these aspects of China and related issues.

The conference organizers assembled a group of eighteen scholars representing five different countries and asked them to structure their comments around five major themes. First, is China weak, or has its military modernization made more progress than generally believed? Second, is Mao's doctrine of

People's War entirely out of date, or has China adapted it to new realities? Third, is the Chinese military unified, or do important interservice and military industry rivalries exist? Fourth, is China seriously threatened by the Soviet Union and others, or is it relatively secure from external threats? Fifth, is there much that Western states can offer Chinese defense planners, or have these nations overrated their potential contributions?

Many of the responses are highly predictable; readers will not be surprised to learn that "China is not as weak as some had thought," that the doctrines of People's War are adaptable to different circumstances, and that China "has more foreign-policy options than merely seeking Western aid." The real value of the book lies elsewhere, as the authors, who include several internationally known specialists in their fields, address themselves to such topics as strategy, nuclear forces, military industry, and technology transfer.

As is frequently the case with edited works, particularly with so many authors, there are problems of integration. Surprisingly, however, the authors have chosen not to formulate a concluding chapter, perhaps because, as they explain in the introduction, "those seeking neat coherent models or pithy descriptions of defence policy will be disappointed." However, this decision gives a somewhat disjointed quality to the work. In particular, it makes the book's final section, which focuses on foreign pol-

icy, seem tacked on: while it is clear that defense policy and foreign policy should be interrelated, the reader is not enlightened as to how the two are coordinated in the Chinese case.

There are also problems of unevenness of quality. I found Paul Godwin's chapter on strategy and Karen Berney's on defense industries of special interest; there are many other fine chapters. However, there are some jarring notes as well. One author (p. 6) contends that "People's War differs fundamentally from ancient Chinese warfare in relying on *organised armed forces* under a 'centralised strategic command'." It will surely come as a surprise to specialists to learn that premodern Chinese armies had neither organization nor centralized strategic command. Another peculiarity is the reference (p. 81) to the PRC's success in establishing production of the Rolls-Royce Spey engine; the experiment is widely considered an embarrassing failure, even by Chinese associated with the project; its problems are, in fact, referred to elsewhere (p. 134) in the book.

Nonetheless, *Chinese Defence Policy* remains a useful and valuable volume. It is written in a clear and interesting fashion, and the editors deserve much credit for putting the many facets of the PRC's military capabilities between two covers. It should remain a standard work for some time to come.

Dr. June Teufel Dreyer
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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "War, Doctrine, and the Air War College: Some Relationships and Implications for the U.S. Air Force" by Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF (Ret), as the outstanding article in the January-February 1986 issue of the *Review*.

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the contributors



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


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